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ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS:
1.

Transcript of Hearing on November 23,2009, Laurel Kulm v. Mercy Medical Center and
Indemnity Insurance Company ofNA; I.e. No. 2006-012770.

2.

Transcript of hearing on May 11,2010, Tim Stienmetz v. G2B Co., Inc. and State Insurance
Fund, I.C. No. 2008-002191.

3.

Transcript of Hearing on April 12,2010, Maria Gomez v. Nampa Lodging Investors, Inc.,
and Liberty Northwest Insurance Corporation; I.C. No. 2005-510285
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387)
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588)
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES,

P.A.

942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 345-1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700
Attomeys for Claimant

RECEIVED
llWUS rRlAL COl'\~1ISSI0N

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Laurel Kulm,
Claimant,
I.C. No. 06-012770
VS.

AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW C. MARSH
IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO RECONSIDER
DENIAL OF
ATTORNEY FEES

Mercy Medical Center,
Employer,
and
Industrial Claims Management,
Surety,
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
)ss
)

Andrew C. Marsh, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows:
1. I am an associate attorney of the firm Seiniger Law Offices, P.A., and attorney of record

for the Claimant in the above-entitled matter. I make this Affidavit based on personal
knowledge.
2. An attorney fee hearing was held in the above-entitled matter on Nov. 23, 2009.

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000

AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW C. MARSH
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO RECONSIDER
DENIAL OF ATTORNEY FEES
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3. On May 20,2010, the Commission issued its FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RELATING TO COUNSEL'S REQUEST FOR APPROVAL
OF ATTORNEY'S FEES (hereinafter "KULM DECISION").
4. The KULM DECISION contains Footnote 1 on page 34 that reads as follows:
Interestingly, in a companion case, treating a similar demand for approval
of a requested fee, Counsel offered a Form 1022 that contained language
identical to that quoted above. At hearing on the motion to approve the
requested fee in that case, Counsel acknowledged that the quoted
paragraph is "boilerplate" and goes into all of his Form 1022 recitations
even where, in a particular case, surety had not denied or disputed
Claimant's entitled [sic] to a PPI rating prior to Counsel's retention. This
may explain why staff was unable to obtain a satisfactory explanation for
the averments made in the quoted paragraph. (emphasis in original)
5. The Footnote does not cite or identify the alleged "companion case." However, upon
information and belief, I assume that the Commission is referring to the case of Drotzman

v. Molson Coors Brewing Company and Zurich American Insurance Company,

I.e. No.

06-006711. A hearing on Counsel's request for attorney fees was held in Drotzman on
Feb. 3,2010. True copies of pages 42, 49, and 50 of the Drotzman Transcript are attached
hereto as Exhibit A.
6. On February 10,2010, Counsel hand-delivered a Letter to the Commissioners in followup to the Drotzman hearing that read as follows:
I wanted to provide some additional information on an issue raised by the
Commission at the hearing on February 3,2010, in regard to Par. 10 of the
Form 1022 that I filed on May 8, 2009. In preparing for the hearing, I did
not anticipate that my statements in Par. 10 would be one of the topics,
and I regret that my responses to the Commissioners' questions indicated
an incomplete present recollection of past events.
Accordingly, I have gone back and re-reviewed my file. The language in
the paragraph comes from a form that we use whenever we need to
generate a Form 1022. Our intention each time is to edit the form to match
the specific circumstances of the particular case. Having reviewed the file,
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000

AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW C. MARSH
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO RECONSIDER
DENIAL OF AHORNEY FEES
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I believe I can shed some light on why, in filling out Form 1022 nearly a
year ago, I believed that at the commencement of Cody's case there were
issues in controversy or benefits that were "denied, discontinued, or
disputed."
1.
The first time I was contacted regarding this case was by Cody's
mother on September 29,2006. My notes in our database read as follows:
"mother Diane called for her 25 yr old son Cody (father is Jim). Driver for
Coors for 7 yrs, injured while using a handtruck, weeks later when pain
became excruciating he went to Dr, had surgery for herniation ofL4-5 on
9/26106. Claim has been accepted. His mother is concerned about perm
impairment and need for retraining. Son is concerned because he doesn't
want to sue Coors, mom thinks he doesn't understand how work comp
works."
"Referred by Greg F. at the Hospital. He is a driver for Coors
Distribution. May 6th backed over a two wheeler so he had a smaller one,
on the stairs, fell and herniated L4-5. Reported weeks later..injections,
MRI .. Had Surgery(Montalbano), sent home from hospital. Will be
terminated 12/05/06 by Coors .. Still being paid by Coors. IC wants to
Evaluate him at home 10104/06."
I interpret these notes as meaning that there was some controversy
regarding permanent impairment, and regarding a threat from Coors to
terminate Cody. (At this point, Cody had not yet engaged our services.)
2.
There was a meeting at our office on October 16, 2006 with Cody
and his parents. My notes read as follows:
"met with Cody and parents, WBS and ACM.
he should get permanent restrictions from Montelbano at MMI, in writing,
then call WBS back to discuss next step, such as go to voc expert and get
disability rating.
IfICRD claims they have right to be there for Dr opinions, ask for a ltr
stating her authority."
I interpret these notes as meaning that, again, there was some ongoing
controversy regarding permanent impairment. (At this point, Cody had not
yet engaged our services.)
3.
Cody's mother called on November 16,2006, and spoke to Breck.
The notes read as follows:
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345·1000
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"Telephone conference with potential client--mom called and said
Montebano told him to return to work. has not got impairment rating.
breck told her to send him to Radnovich. would need to invest $1000 to
get Radnovich. b told her to call back asap to come in and see us if she
wants to retain us."
I interpret these notes as meaning that Cody's doctor released him to work
without giving him an impairment rating, and that Cody's mom
considered this to be a dispute. (At this point, Cody had not yet engaged
our services.)
4.
Cody and his parents came in to the office on November 21,2006,
and asked us to represent them (they returned the signed fee agreement the
next day). They showed me a letter from Coors dated November 16, 2006
(copy attached) that read in pertinent part: "Therefore, your disability is
denied beginning 11-7-06." They also showed me an earlier letter from
Coors dated September 26, 2006 (copy attached) that read in pertinent
part: "Therefore, your medical restrictions/disability are denied beginning
9-18-06."

In filling out the Form 1022, I no doubt would have interpreted these notes
as meaning that there was at least some aspect of Cody's case that was
"denied" prior to the time he signed the fee agreement.
In addition, my notes from that same meeting with Cody read as follows:
"meet w/ client and parents to sign fee agmt.
Coors policy is that you must be recovered in 180 days to keep your job.
last day of work 9/25/06, surgery 9/26/06, then rec'd WC pmts
file complaint, send init ltr to surety, lIC, client, send ltr to radnovich re
issues and our questionaire and med rec to follow, send ltr to surety re
what med rec do they have re MMI that justifies cutting off TTDs?
he will call us after see Dr Maldonado [sic] tomorrow, after which we will
notify [surety] of our representation."
I interpret these notes as meaning that at the time we were retained, there
was an active dispute over whether the surety had a basis for "cutting off'
Cody's TTDs.
So although at the hearing I did not have a present recollection, it appears
that at the time I filled out the Form 1022 last year, I had a good faith basis
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000

AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW C. MARSH
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO RECONSIDER
DENIAL OF ATTORNEY FEES
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for considering that there were issues in dispute prior to the time we were
retained.
The Letter was signed by your affiant. A copy is attached hereto as Exhibit B and is
incorporated herein by reference.
7.

The Letter of February 10,2010, makes it clear that although, at the time of the
Drotzman hearing, :Mr. Marsh did not have a present recollection of the facts underlying

the representations made in his Form 1022, said representations were indeed supported
by the facts, as set forth in the follow-up Letter.
8.

The Drotzman Transcript and Letter make it clear that the following allegation made in
Kulm Footnote 1 is inaccurate and misleading:

At hearing on the motion to approve the requested fee in that case,
Counsel acknowledged that the quoted paragraph is "boilerplate" and goes
into all of his Form 1022 recitations even where, in a particular case,
surety had not denied or disputed Claimant's entitled to a PPI rating prior
to Counsel's retention.
9. At no time during the Drotzman hearing did Counsel state or imply that he uses the
"quoted paragraph" even where it is inapplicable. Any implication in Footnote 1 to the
contrary mischaracterizes Counsel's statements and the follow-up Letter.
10. As set forth above in the follow-up Letter, Counsel uses a legal form as a starting point
from which to generate a Form 1022: "The language in the paragraph comes from a form
that we use whenever we need to generate a Form 1022. Our intention each time is to edit
the form to match the specific circumstances of the particular case." As proof that
Counsel edits the form "to match the specific circumstances of the particular case,"
Counsel has attached (Exhibit C) a sample of excerpts from fifteen Form 1022's filed by
this firm in actual workers' compensation cases between 2003-2010 in which language
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000
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that is not "identical to the quoted paragraph" is used, based on the circumstances of the
particular case.
FURTHER SAYETH YOUR AFFIANT NAUGHT.
Dated June 8, 2010.

AndF~w

arsh

A~mey for Claimant
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942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000

AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW C. MARSH
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO RECONSIDER
DENIAL OF ATTORNEY FEES

PAGE60F6

271-

PAGE

1

2

MR. MARSH:

Okay.

42

With your permission Mr. Seiniger

will address that.

3

COMMISSIONER BASKIN:

4

MR. SEINIGER:

Certainly.

Thanks.

Mr. Seiniger.

If I may, just for purposes

5

of the record, Commissioner Baskin, first of all, with

6

respect to the other issues, which I -- I understand that

7

we raised in the Kulm matter and we'd like to confine our

8

discussion to the -- to the issue of the one rule on

9

primarily and substantially.

May we, for purposes of the

10

record, agree that those -- that those issues that have

11

been raised have been argued?

12

COMMISSIONER BASKIN:

13

MR. SEINIGER:

14

COMMISSIONER BASKIN:

15

MR. SEINIGER:

Certainly.

So, that I haven't waived any.
Yeah.

And, secondly, with respect to the

16

questions that you had about Mr. Marsh's affidavit or

17

declaration, I didn't prepare that, but I can tell you

18

that I'm responsible, essentially, for the boilerplate

19

language about things being disputed and it sounds to me

20

like either that was just completely incorrect or there

21

was a misunderstanding on Mr. Marsh's part.

22

to the TTD benefits that you asked about, there was, as I

23

understand it, a dispute and -- with respect to the IME

24

consultation --

25

COMMISSIONER BASKIN:

With respect

Let me stop you for a second.

EXHIBIT

I

A. 377
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1

unclear if one doesn't take a simplistic view.

It's sort

2

of like when Boise State wins a football game, towards the

3

end of the game there is a great pass.

4

and the great catch primarily and substantially account

5

for that victory?

6

say, yes, of course.

7

any credit for that, because the final points that won the

8

game were done by two people in the last 40 seconds.

9

can only say this:

Did the great pass

Well, without much analysis you would
Nobody else on the team could take

I

If by primarily and substantially you

10

mean did we, essentially, put a gun to the surety's head

11

and say we are pulling this trigger unless this guy gets

12

his impairment rating, then, in this case, certainly,

13

that's not what happened.

14

substantially you mean considering everything that was

15

done, it would not -

16

excuse me.

17

almost an impossible task, because they have to prove a

18

negative.

19

happened if they weren't there representing somebody all

20

of the way along.

21

I think that -- I take responsibility for this one thing

22

that you picked up on, Commissioner Baskin, this thing

23

about how benefits were denied or disputed.

24

Marsh about that and he said, well, they had admitted them

25

and that -- that's the way he understood.

Okay.

If by primarily and

it would not be -

Not the plaintiff.

the plaintiff

But counsel are faced with

They really have to prove what would have

And that's the problem that we have and

I asked Mr.

But if I'm

37%
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1

incorrect, it's boilerplate, there wasn't any attempt to

2

pull the wool over anybody's eyes and I think I owe you an

3

apology for that.

But I think, nevertheless, you see

4

you see my point.

The question is how deeply is one

5

willing to probe to try and figure out what the primarily

6

and substantially language means and our position is that

7

when -- I guess if a person says, hey, I never could have

8

gotten there by myself, that's probably the best evidence

9

that you can possibly have, absent the case where it's

10

very clear that a gun was held to the defendant's head and

11

why they paid.

12

always say, well, we would have paid anyway.

13

true we got this letter from him and it was a couple of

14

weeks late, but that was an administrative issue, so

15

that's my argument.

16

And even in that case the defendants can

COMMISSIONER BASKIN:

Yeah, it's

And that is the difficulty,

17

because, you know, it's occurred to us from time to time

18

that -- when we are kicking these around, well, let's call

19

up the surety and find out what they will say.

20

surety is going to admitted to taking the position, yeah,

21

we probably wouldn't have written this check absent the

22

claimant retaining the attorney?

23

admit that.

24

25

MR. SEINIGER:

Well, what

No surety is going to

That's a point we wanted to make, but

we -- and we actually tried to get some evidence on that,

SJEllN]GE1R
LAVV O FFI C E: S
Professional Association
WM. BRECK SEINIGER, J R.
Idaho, Oregon, Washingtnn, and tbe District of Columbia
J ULIE MARsH SEINIGER
Idaho, Indiana, and the District of Columbia

ANDREW C. MARsH
Idaho, Indiana, and MisSOliri

February 10,2010
VIA HAND DELIVERY
R.D. Maynard, Chairman
Idaho Industrial Commission
700 S Clearwater Lane
Boise, ID 83720-0041

RE:

Thomas Limbaugh, Commissioner
Idaho Industrial Commission
700 S Clearwater Lane
Boise,ID 83720-0041

Thomas Baskin, Commissioner
Idaho Industrial Commission
700 S Clearwater Lane
Boise, ID 83720-0041

Cody Drotzman v. Coors Brewing Co; llC Case No. : 06-006711
Follow-up Information

Dear Commissioners:
I wanted to provide some additional information on an issue raised by the Commission at
the hearing on February 3, 2010, in regard to Par. 10 of the Form 1022 that I filed on May
8, 2009. In preparing for the hearing, I did not anticipate that my statements in Par. 10
would be one of the topics, and I regret that my responses to the Commissioners'
questions indicated an incomplete present recollection of past events.
Accordingly, I have gone back and re-reviewed my file. The language in the paragraph
comes from a form that we use whenever we need to generate a Form 1022. Our intention
each time is to edit the form to match the specific circumstances of the particular case.
Having reviewed the file, I believe I can shed some light on why, in filling out Form
1022 nearly a year ago, I believed that at the commencement of Cody's case there were
issues in controversy or benefits that were "denied, discontinued, or disputed."
1. The first time I was contacted regarding this case was by Cody' s mother on
September 29,2006. My notes in our database read as follows:
"mother Diane called for her 25 yr old son Cody (father is Jim). Driver
for Coors for 7 yrs, injured while using a handtruck, weeks later when
pain became excruciating he went to Dr, had surgery for herniation of
L4-5 on 9126/06. Claim has been accepted. His mother is concerned
about perm impairment and need for retraining. Son is concerned
because he doesn't want to sue Coors, mom thinks he doesn't
understand how work comp works."

942 W. MYRTLE STREET
BOISE, IDAHO 83702

(208) 345-1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700

I

Andrew@SeinigerLaw.com
www.SeinigerLaw.com
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"Referred by Greg F. at the Hospital. He is a driver for Coors
Distribution. May 6th backed over a two wheeler so he had a smaller
one, on the stairs, fell and herniated L4-5. Reported weeks
later..injections, MRI .. Had Surgery(Montalbano), sent home from
hospital. Will be terminated 12/05106 by Coors .. Still being paid by
Coors. IC wants to Evaluate him at home 10/04/06."
I interpret these notes as meaning that there was some controversy regarding
permanent impairment, and regarding a threat from Coors to terminate Cody. (At this
point, Cody had not yet engaged our services.)
2. There was a meeting at our office on October 16, 2006 with Cody and his parents.
My notes read as follows:
"met with Cody and parents, WBS and ACM.
he should get permanent restrictions from Montelbano at MMI, in
writing, then call WBS back to discuss next step, such as go to voc
expert and get disability rating.
If ICRD claims they have right to be there for Dr opinions, ask for a ltr
stating her authority."
I interpret these notes as meaning that, again, there was some ongoing controversy
regarding permanent impairment. (At this point, Cody had not yet engaged our
services.)
3. Cody's mother called on November 16,2006, and spoke to Breck. The notes read
as follows:
"Telephone conference with potential client--mom called and said
Montebano told him to return to work. has not got impairment rating.
breck told her to send him to Radnovich. would need to invest $1000
to get Radnovich. b told her to call back asap to come in and see us if
she wants to retain us."
I interpret these notes as meaning that Cody's doctor released him to work without
giving him an impairment rating, and that Cody's mom considered this to be a
dispute. (At this point, Cody had not yet engaged our services.)
4. Cody and his parents came in to the office on November 21,2006, and asked us to
represent them (they returned the signed fee agreement the next day). They
showed me a letter from Coors dated November 16, 2006 (copy attached) that
read in pertinent part: "Therefore, your disability is denied beginning 11-7-06."
They also showed me an earlier letter from Coors dated September 26, 2006
942 W. MYRTLE STREET
(208) 345-1000
Andrew@SeinigerLaw.com
BOISE, IDAHO 83702
Fax: (208) 345-4700
www.SeinigerLaw.com
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(copy attached) that read in pertinent part: "Therefore, your medical
restrictions/disability are denied beginning 9-18-06."
In filling out the Form 1022, I no doubt would have interpreted these notes as
meaning that there was at least some aspect of Cody's case that was "denied" prior to
the time he signed the fee agreement.
In addition, my notes from that same meeting with Cody read as follows:
"meet w/ client and parents to sign fee agmt.
Coors policy is that you must be recovered in 180 days to keep your
job.
last day of work 9/25/06, surgery 9/26/06, then rec'd WC pmts
file complaint, send init ltr to surety, lIC, client, send ltr to radnovich
re issues and our questionaire and med rec to follow, send hr to surety
re what med rec do they have re MMI that justifies cutting offTTDs?
he will call us after see Dr Maldonado [sic] tomorrow, after which we
will notify [surety] of our representation."
I interpret these notes as meaning that at the time we were retained, there was an
active dispute over whether the surety had a basis for "cutting off' Cody's TTDs.
So although at the hearing I did not have a present recollection, it appears that at the time
I filled out the Form 1022 last year, I had a good faith basis for considering that there
were issues in dispute prior to the time we were retained.
Please let me know if! can provide any further information that would be of help to the
Commission. Thank you.
Sincerely,
~'I<-v;."r- / <t./I.:IA.Ac'-{'l.
Andrew Marsh
Attachments: As Stated
cc:
Cody Drotzman

942 W. MYRTLE STREET
BOISE, IDAHO 83702

(208) 345-1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700

Andrew@SeinigerLaw.com
www.SeinigerLaw.com
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Christopher Gamble,
Claim'Dt,

I.C. No. 09003177
VI.

FORM lOll, REPORT OF EXPENSES

aDd

. Dlinois Tool Works, Inc. (Wynns USA),

Employer,

STATEMENT OF
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL

aDd
Zurich Ameriean Insurance Comp8.DY,

Surety,
Defendants.

COMES NOW C1aimant'sCounsel and reports his expenses and submits the following in
support ofhis claim of attorney's fees and costs in the amount set forth below from the proceeds
of the settlement of the above cap1ioned case.
REPORT OF LITIGATION EXPENSES
In accordance with the requirements of § 72-528, Idaho Code.. this form shall be filled out

and returned to the Industrial Commission within 30 days following the time of entry of a final
award by the Industrial Commission in the above case, or, in the event of an appeal to a final
court, within 30 days following a final ruling by the Court. If there is an appeal, the totals

specified below shall include the expenses, costs, or fees incurred in the appeal.
SEINIGER LAW 6FFiCES, P.A.

942 W. MyrIIe SInIet
Bolle, IdIho 83702
(208) 34501000

FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES AND
STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL
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.
4.

Counsel advised Claimant as to the disclosures required by the Idaho Industrial

Commission.
S.

Counsel created a database file for Claimant in which pertinent information was

recorded for use in the handling of the claim.
6.

During, or shortly after, the initial meeting with Claimant, Counsel drafted the

following documents for the benefit of Claimant: a fee agreement and disclaimer statement
meeting the requirements of the Idaho Industrial Commission; medical releases; employment
release; a letter of representation and inquiry to the surety; a letter of representation to the Idaho
Industrial Commission requestiIig copies of Claimant's file; a letter to the treating medical
providers requesting complete copies of Claimant's medical and billing records; and a client
intake questionnaire for the initial gathering of relevant information concerning the client's
employment, educational, medical and health, military, vocational, and accident history.
7.

Co~l reviewed all medical records. employment records, and other requested

documents as they were received, and consulted with Cbtimant about the status ofthe case on a
periodic basis.

8.

Counsel advised Claimant concerning the need to keep medical appointments,

aspects of medical treatment which might potentially affect CJaimant's impairment rating. and

strategic issues relating to medical care which can impact the result of a worker's compensation

case.
9.

Counsel conducted legal research concerning aspects of Claimant's case and

injuries.
10.

During the case, Defendants discontinued or disputed Claimant's right to

additional medical benefits and treatment, time loss benefits, and attomey fees. E.g., "Notice of
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES. P.A.

942W._snet
BoIIt.1daho 83702
(208) 345-1000
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STATEMENT OF CLAIMANrS COUNSEL
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Claim Status" from surety dated 9/1/09, discontinuing all benefits (including medical and ITO)
effective 8/31/09 based on an alle~on that Claimant refUsed medical examination. As a result
of Counsel's efforts disputing the allegation, including phone calls,letters, and filing a
Complaint, Claimant received additional medical treatment and time loss benefits (e.g.
reinstatement letter from surety received by Counsel on 9/18/09 and TID benefit check received
on 10/7109) and (eventually) impairment compensation.
11.

During the case, Counsel investigated and determined that Defendants refused to

authorize medical treatment recommended by Claimant's primary treating physician, and
Defendants refused to pay time loss benefits in full or in a timely fashion
12.

Counsel made written demand upon Defendants for to authorize medical

treatment recommended by Claimant's primary treating physician, and to pay time loss bene~ts

in full and in a timely fashion
13.

In response to Counsel's actions, Defendant Surety retained legal counseL

14.

Counsel prepared and sent a written referral of Claimant to the Idaho Industrial

Commission Rehabilitation Division, and advised Claimant on working with the ICRD counselor
on education, training, job seeking, and other re-employment efforts.
15.

Counsel prepared a complaint and notice of service, filed originals with the Idaho

Industrial Commission, and served copies on Defendants. Defendants answered with a denial of
Claimant's entitlement to the benefits being sought Counsel reviewed and analyzed the defenses.
16.

An emergency telephone conference was requested by Claimant's Counsel, and

was held on 10120/09.

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. t.¥1te Snet
Bolle. Idaho 83702
(D) 346-1000
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Ir. (lSB:# 2387)
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB :# 6588)
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
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942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 345"1000
Fax: (208) 3454700
Attorneys for Claimant
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Charles Travis,
Claimant,
LC. No. 09-032710
VI.

FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES
and
STATEMENT OF
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL

Wal-Mart, Ine.,
Employer,

and
Sedgwick Claims Management Services,
Inc.,
Surety,
Defendants.

COMES NOW CJajmant's Counsel and reports his expenses and submits the following in

support of his claim of attorney's fees and costs in the amount set forth below from the proceeds
of the settlement of the above captioned case.
REPORT OF LITIGATION EXPENSES

In accordance with the requirements of § 72"528, Idaho Code. this form shall be :filled out

and retumed to the Industrial Commjssion within 30 days following the time of entry of a final
award by the Industrial Commission in the above case, or, in the event of an appeal to a final
court, within 30 days following a :final ruling by the Court. If there is an appeal, the totals
specified below shall include the expenses. costs, or fees incurred in the appeal.
SElNIGER lAWa:FiCeS. P.A.

942 W. My!te Shet
BdIe. Idaho 837Q2
(208) 346-1000
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for cooperation with treating physicians, the Idaho Industrial Commission Rehabilitation
Division, and Seinig~ Law Offices, P.A.
4.

Counsel advised Claimant as to the disclosures required by the Idaho Industrial

Commission.
S.

Counsel created a database file for Claimant in which pertinent information was

recorded for use in the bandling of the claim.
6.

During, or shortly after, the initial meeting with Claiman~ Counsel drafted the

following documents for the benefit of Claimant: a fee agreement and disclaimer statement
meeting the requirements of the Idaho Industrial Commission; medical releases; employment

release; a letter of representation and inquiry to the surety; a letter of representation to the Idaho
Industrial Commission requesting copies of Claimant's file; a letter to the treating medical
providers requesting complete copies of Claimant's medical and billing records; and a client
intake questionnaire for the initial gathering of relevant information concerning the client's

employment, educational, medical and health, military, vocational, and accident history.
7.

Counsel reviewed all medical records, employment records, and other requested

documents as they were received, and consulted with Cwmant about the status of the case on a
periodic basis.

8.

Counsel advised Claimant concerning the need to keep medical appointments,

aspects of medical treatment which might potentially affect CJairnant's impamnent rating, and
strategic issues relating to medical care which can impact the result of a worker's compensation

case.
9.

Before Counsel was retained on 118/10, Defendants cancelled Claimant's medical

treatment appointment for that very afternoon, which Claimant considered a denial,
SEINIGER LAW a=FICES. P.A.
942 W. _ SfAIet
BoIae,Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000
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discontinuance, or dispute of Claimant's right to additional medical benefits and treatment (see
Affidavit of Charles Travis, attached hereto) Subsequent to retaining Counsel, Claimant received
additional medical treatment, and also received time loss benefits.
10.

After being retained by Claimant, Counsel investigated and determined that

Defendants cancelled a medical appointment recommended by Claimant's primary treating
physician, and later Defendants refused to honor a referral from Claimant's primary treating
physician (Dr. Welch to Dr. Radnovich).
11.

Counsel made written demand upon Defendants to authorize medical treatment

recommended by Claimant's primary treating physician, to honor a referral from Claimant's
primary treating physician, and to pay time loss benefits in :full and in a timely fashion.
12.

Counsel made written demand upon Defendants for workers compensation

benefits that Counsel believed were due.
13.

In response to Counsel's action, Defendant Surety retained legal counsel.

Ultimately, Defendants agreed to pay ITDs.
14.

Counsel prepared and sent awritten referral of Claimant to the Idaho Indus1rial

Commission Rehabilitation Division, and advised Claimant on working with the ICRD counselor
on education, training,job seeking, and other re-employment efforts.
15.

Upon receiving a demand from Defendants for Claimant to submit to an

independent medical evaluation by a medical provider chosen by Defendants, Counsel advised
Claimant in advance of the procedure, which was cancelled when the case was settled.
16.

Counsel prepared a complaint and notice of service, filed originals with the Idaho

Industrial Commission, and served copies on Defendants. Defendants answered with a denial of

SEINIGERLAW OFFICES, P.A..
942W.Myrtesnet
BoIIIe.Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387)
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588)
SBINIGER. LAW OFFICES. P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise. Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 345-1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700
Attomeys for Claimant
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RECEIVED

INDUSTRIAL COMMjSS/OH

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Benjamin Gonzalez,
Claimant,

LC. No. 08-826319
VI.

FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES

Precision Craft, Inc.,

and

Employer,

STATEMENT OF
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL

and

Liberty Northwest,
Surety,
DefeDdaDtI.

COMES NOW Claimant's Counsel and reports his expenses and submits the following in
support of his claim of attorney's fees and costs in the amount set forth below from the proceeds
of the settlement of the above captioned case.
REPORT OF LmGATION EXPENSES

In accordance with the requirements of § 72-528. ldAAo Code. this form shall be filled out
and returned to the Industrial Commission within 30 days following the time of entry of a final
award by the Industrial Commission in the above case, or, in the event of an appeal to a final
court, within 30 days following a final ruling by the Court. Ifthere is an appeal. the totals
specified below shall include the expenses, costs, or fees incurred in the appeal.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA
942 W. t.t,'IIII S1reet

BoIIe,Ideho 83702

(208) 345-1000
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10.

Counsel prepared and sent a written referral of Claimant to the Idaho Indus1ria1

Commission Rehabilitation Division, and advised Claimant on working with the ICRD counselor
on education, training, job seeking, and other re-employment efforts.
11.

Counsel advised Claimant to undergo a new and separate vocational evaluation by

a vocational evaluation expert ofClaimanfs choosing; advised Claimant of the meaning and
import of the vocational report; and advised Claimant on the effect of the expert's report on the
need for retraining, the claim for benefits, and lump sum settlement.
12.

Counsel prepared a complaint and notice of service, filed originals with the Idaho

Industrial Commission, and served copies on Defendants. Defendants answered with a denial of
Claimanfs entitlement to the benefits being sought. Counsel reviewed and analyzed the defenses.
13.

Counsel prepared discovery and a notice of service, filed the notice with the Idaho

Industrial Commission, and served the discovery on Defendants.
14.

Counsel prepared a request for mediation and notice of service, filed originals

with the Idaho Industrial Commission, and served copies on Defendants.
15.

At the time Counsel became involved. all issues were disputed or disputable

because by law all defenses remain open to Defendants in a worker's compensation case as a
matter of law unless waived or determined to have no merit by the Commission. The amount of
all compensation paid or admitted as owed by Employer immediately prior to Counsel's

involvement was equal to the amount actually paid to that date, less any claims for overpayment
that Defendants might subsequently make. All issues that arose subsequent to the date Counsel
was hired were disputed or disputable, including rights to medical benefits and treatment, time

loss benefits, impairment compensation, disability beyond impairment, retraining, and attorney
fees. For the period prior to lump sum settlement, Counsel's itemization of litigation costs is set
SEINIGER LAW a:FICES. F>A.

942 W. Myrta SIreet
BoIM.IdIIho 837Q2
(208) 345-1000
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Wm. Breck Seiniger. Jr. (ISB # 2387)
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588)
SEINIGRIl LAw OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 345-1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700
Attorneys for Claimant
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
RyanLewiJ,
Claimant,

I.C. No.lOO8-021714
VI.

FORM 10l2, REPORT OF EXPENSES
and

Mel's Trim & Cabmets, LLC,

Employer,

STATEMENT OF
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL

and

Idaho State IDl1IftJlee Fund,
Sarety,

Defendants.
COMES NOW Claimant's Counsel and reports his expenses and submits the following in
support ofbis claim of attorney's fees and costs in the amount set forth below from the proceeds
of the settlement of the above captioned case.
REPORT OF LITIGATION EXPENSES

In accordance with the requirements of § 72-528, Idaho Code. this foan sbaU be filled out
and returned to the Industrial Commission within 30 dayS following the time of entry of a final
award. by the Industrial Commission in the above case, or, in the event of an appeal to a :final
court, within 30 days following a final ruling by the Court. If there is an appeal, the totals
specified below shall include the expenses, costs, or fees incurred in the appeal.
SElNIGER LAW 0i¥iCE8. PA
942 W. M)1III ShIt
Bolle, IdI/Io 83702
(208) 345-11XX1
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6.

During, or shortly after, the initial meeting with Claimant, Counsel drafted the

following documents for the benefit of Claimant: a fee agreement and disclaimer statement
meeting the requirements of the Idaho Industrial Commission; medical releases; employmem
release; a letter of representation and inquiry to the surety; a letter to the treating medical
providers requesting complete copies of Claimant's medical and billing records; and a client
intake questionnaire for the initial gathering of relevant information concerning the client's
employments educational, medical and health, military, vocational, and accident history.
7.

Counsel reviewed all medical records and other requested documents as they were

recdved, and consulted with Claimant about the status of the case on a periodic basis.
8.

Counsel advised Claimant concerning the need to keep medical appointments,

aspects of medical treatment which might potentially affect Claimant's impairment rating, and

strategic issues rela1ing to medical care which can impact the result of a wo!ker's compensation
case.
9.

Counsel advised Claimant to 1.Dldergo a new and separate independent medical

evaluation by a medical expert of Claimant's choosing; advised Claimant of the meaning and
import of the !ME report; and advised Claimant on the effect of the expert's report on the need
for present and future mediCal treatment, the claim for benefits, and lump sum settlement.
10.

Counsel advised'Clabnant to undergo a new and separate vocational evaluation by

a vocational evaluation expert of Claimant's choosing; advised Claimant of the J])eaning and
import of the vocational report; and advised Claimant on the effect of the expert's report on the

need for re1raining, the claim for benefits, and lump sum settlement.
11.

At the time Counsel became involved, all issues were disputed or disputable

because by law all defenses remain open to Dcfcndan1s in a worker's compensation case as a

FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES AND
STATEMENT OF CLAIMANTS COUNSEL
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matter of law unless waived or determined to have no merit by the Commission. The amount of
all compensation paid or admitted u owed by Employer immediately prior to Counsel's
involvement was equal to the amount actually paid to that date, less any claims for overpayment
that DefendanVJ might subsequently make. All issues that arose subsequent to the date Counsel
was hired were disputed or disputable, including impairment compensation, disability beyond

impairment, retraining, and attorney fees. For the period prior to lump sum settlement, C?>unsel
received no costs or attorney fees. For the lump sum settlement, Counsel's itemization of
compensation that constitutes available funds, itemim;;on of costs, and calculation of attorney
fees is set forth above.

12.

There are compensation benefits, u set forth above, available for distribution on

equitable principles. The services of CoUDSel operated primarily or substantially to secure the
fund out of which the attorney seeks to be paid, due to Counsel's efforts on behalf of Claimant
and due to Counsel's reputation as a plaintifrs lawyer in the practice of worker's compensation

law. It was agreed that counsel anticipated payment from compensation funds rather than from
the client, as set forth in the Attorney Fee Agreement attached hereto. The claim is limited to
costs, fees, or other disbursements incurred in the case through which the fund was raised. There
~ equitable considerations that necessitate the recognition and application of the charging lien,

including as follows: Claimant sought the services of Counsel as counselor and advocate;
Claimant contracted with Counsel to pay Counsel for said services; Counsel provided services as
counselor and advocate; Counsel has. a constitutionally-protected property right to be paid as
agreed; and Claimant has a constitutionally-protected right to have Claimant's contract with

Counsel honored. All terms used in this and the ~ing paragraph are used by Counsel in the

..,..snet

SEINIGER LAW a=FICES, P.A.

M2W.

BoIII,IdII1o 83702
(208) 346-1000.
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Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588)
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942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 345-1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700
Attorneys for Claimant
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE O~.u@
:z:

Tim StleJunetz,
Claimant,

LC. No. 2008-002191
VI.

FORM 1012, REPORT OF EXPENSES
.

G1B Co. lac.,
Employer,

ad
STATEMENT OF
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL

ad

Idaho State wunmce Fund,
Surety,

Detendots.

COMES NOW Claimant's Counsel and reports his expenses and submits the following in
support of his claim of attorney's fees and costs in the amount set forth below from the proceeds
of the settlement of the above captioned case.
REPORT OF UTIGATION EXPENSES
In accordance with the requirements of § 72-528, Jdaho Code. this form sball be filled out

and returned to th~ Industrial Commission within 30 days following the time of entry of a final
award by the Industrial Commission in the above case, or, in the event of an appeal to a final
court, within 30 days following a final ruling by the Court. If there is an appeal, the totals
specified below shall include the expenses, costs, or fees incurred in the appeal.
SEiNiGER LAWaTICES, P.A.
942 W. Myr\Ie $bet
Bolla, Idft 83702
(208) 345-1000

~
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scheduled ajob site evaluation. Counsel advised Claimant of tile meaniDg and import of the JSB

report.
11.

Counsel made written demand dated 6/3/08 upon Dr. Montalbano for a PPI rating

and permanent work restrictions.

12.

Upon receiving information that Claimant was to be seen for an independent

medical evaluation by a medical provider not chosen by Claimant, Counsel advised Claimant in
advance of the procedure, and subsequently advised Claimant of the meaning and import of the
!ME report, and the effect of the expert's report on the need for present and future ~edical

treatment, the claim for benefits, and lump sum settlement.
13.

Counsel advised Claimant to undergo a new and separate independent medical'

evaluation by a medical expert of Claimant's choosing; advised Claimant of the meaning and
import of the !ME report; and advised Claimant on the effect of the expert's report on the need
for present and future mediea11reatmeDt, the claim for benefits, and lump sum settlement.
14.

At the time Counsel became involved. all issues were disputed or disputable

because by law all defenses remain open to Defendants in a worker's compensation case as a
matter of law unless waived or determ.i.ned to have no merit by the Commission. The amount of
all compensation paid or admitted as owed by Employer immediately prior to Counsel's

involvement was equal to the amount actually paid to that date, less any clabns for overpayment
that Defendants ri:rlght subsequently make. All issues that arose subsequent to the date Counsei

was hired were disputed or disputable, including rights to medical benefits and treatment, time
loss benefits, impairment compensation, disability beyond impairment, retraining, and attorney
fees. For the period prior to lump sum settlement, Counsel's itemj7Jlti~ of compensation that
constituted available ftmds, itemization of costs, and calculation of attorney fees is set forth
SEINIGER LAW a:FiCEs. P.A.
942 W. MyIIt ShIt
Bolle, IdIho 13702
(201)341000
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387)
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588)
SEINIOER LAW OFFICES, P.A
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise. Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 345·1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700
Attomeys for Claimant
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF TBESTATE OF IDAHO
Jose Antonio Renteria,
Claimant,
I.C. No. 06-507603
VI.

Rick Carley Construetion LLC,

Employer,

FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES
and
STATEMENT OF
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL

and
Liberty Northwest,
Surety,

Defendants.

COMES NOW Claimant's Counsel and reports his expenses and submits the following in
support ofhis claim of attomey's fees and costs in the amount set forth below from the proceeds
of the settlement of the above"captioned case.
REPORT OF LITJGATION EXPENSES

In accordance with the .requirements of § 72-528, Idaho Code. this form. shall be filled out
and returned to the Industrial Commission within 30 days following the time of entry of a final
award by the Industrial Commission in the above case, or, in the event of an appeal to a final
court, within 30 days following a final ruling by the Court. Ifthere is an appeal, the totals

specified below shall include the expenses, costs, or fees incurred in the appeal.
SEINIGER LAW a=FICES. PA
942 W. MyI1Ie ShIt
Bolle, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000
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10.

At the time Counsel was retained by Claimant, the only benefits that defendants

legally conceded were the medical benefits already incurred and certain TIDs that had been paid
but previously discontinued. All benefits received thereafter, including medical treatment and
time loss benefits and impairment compensation and disability beyond impairment

compensation. were as the results of Counsel's reputation, efforts, demands. and negotiations.

11.

CoUDSel's paralegal spent many hours translating important documents or

correspondence from English into Spanish for the benefit of Claimant; whose native language is
Spanish.
12.

On or about 8127/07, Counsel wrote Surety confirming that there should be

authorization for the referral by primary treating physician, Dr. Leo Barf, to eye stttgeon
specialist Dr. Mark Boerner on the issue of possible removal of the injured eye. No objection

was received from Surety. After examining Claimant, on 9/13/07 Dr. Boehner scheduled
evisceration surgery for 10/18107. On 10/17/07. Claimant was informed by Dr. Boerner's office
that Surety had not authorized the next day's surgery and it would have to be cancelled. Counsel

immediately contacted Surety by phone and fax and insisted that the stttgery must be authorized
to proceed as scheduled. Counsel expressed that Claimant's physicians had determined there was

an urgent medical need for the surgery, and that it might take another month to get the surgery on
Dr. Boerner's schedule as it had the first time. It was also·Counsel's position that workers
compensation law required the Employer/Surety to pay for treatment of a workplace injmy as
prescribed by Claimant's treating physicians. In response, Surety ultimately agreed to authorize

the surgery and it was performed as scheduled the next day on 10/18107.

SEINIGER LAWa:F1C£S. P.A.

942W. MyrIe8lreet
Bolle, !dIN 83702
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Wm. Breck Seiniacr, Jr. (lSB # 2387)
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB 1# 6588)
SEINIOBR. LAw OFPICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 345-1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700
Attorneys for Claimant
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Debra A. Dalrymple,
Claimant,

I.C. No. 08-006605
VI.

FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES
and
STATEMENT OF
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL

Die Smoke LLC,
Employer,

and
State Iuuranee Fund,
Surety,

DefeadaDts.
COMES NOW Claimant's Counsel and. reports his expenses and submits the followiDg in

support ofbia claim of attorneYs fees and costs in the amount set forth below from the proceeds
of the sett1cm.cnt of the above captioned case.

REPORT OF UTIGATION EXPENSES
In aecordancc with the requirements of § 72-528, Idaho Code. this form shall be filled out

and returned to the Industrial Commission within 30 days following the time of entry of a final

award by the Industrial Commission in the above case, or, in the event of an appeal to a final
court, within 30 days following a final ruling by the Court. If there is an appeal, the totals

specified below shall include the expenses, costs. or fees incurred in the appeal.
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10.

Before Counsel was retained, Defendants denied. discontinued, or disputed

Claimant's right to additional medieal and other benefits. Subsequent to retaining Counsel.
Claimant received additional medical treatment and benefits aDd impairment compensation.
11.

Ai\:cr being retained by Claimant, Counsel investigated and determined that

Defendants refused to authorize medical treatment recommended by Claimant's primary treating
physician.

12.

Counsel made written demand upon Defendants for to authorize medical

treatment recommended by Claimant's primary treating physician.
13.

Counsel made written demand upon Defendants for workers compensation

benefits that Counsel beHeved were due, including underpaid ITDs in the sum of $3060.66
which were then paid by surety.

14.

Counsel advised Claimant on working with the IeRD counselor on education,

training, job seeking, and other re-employment efforts.

15.

Upon receiving a demand from Defendants for Claimant to submit to an

independent medical evaluation by a medical provider chosen by Defendants, Counsel advised

Claimant in advance of the procedure, and subsequently advised Claimant of the meaning and
import of the 1MB repoIt and the effect of the expert's report on the need for present and future

medical treatment, the claim for benefits. and lump sum settlement.
16.

Counsel reviewed the file in preparation for settlement. Counsel enpaed in

extensive negotiations with Defendants. Counsel had extensive communications with CJaimant
concerning the status of the case, and the strategic and tactical decisions that bad to be made with
respect to settlement discussions and preparation for bearing.
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB 1# 2387)
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588)
SElNlGBR LAw OFFICES, P .A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
J>hone:(208) 345-1000
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Fax: (208) 345-4700
Attorneys for Claimant
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Carla M. Alley,
Claimant,

I.C. No. 06-010629

va.
FORM 1m, REPORT OF EXPENSES

and

Sawtooth Lodge, Inc.,
Employer,

STATEMENT OF
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL

and
State Insurance Fud,
Surety,

Defendants.
COMES NOW Claimant's Counsel and reports his expenses and submits the following in
support of his claim of attorney's fees and costs in the amount set forth below from the pl.'OCeeCls
of the settlement of the above captioned case.

REPORT OF LITIGATION EXPENSES
In accordance with the requirements of § 72-528, Idaho Code. this form shall be filled out
and returned to the Industrial Commission within 30 days following the time of entry of a final

award by the Industrial Commission in the above case, or, in the event of an appeal to a final
court, within 30 days following a final ruling by the Court. If there is an appeal, the totals

specified below shall include the expenses, costs, or fees incurred in the appeal.
SEINIBER LAW a:FiCEs, P.A.
942W.M/IItsnet
BoIIe.IdIIho 83702
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4.

Counsel advised Claimant as to the disclosures required by the Idaho Industrial

Commission.
S.

Counsel created a database file for Claimant in which pertinent information was

recorded for use in the handling of the claim.
6.

During, or shortly after, the initial meeting with Claimant, Counsel drafted the

following documents for the benefit of Claimant: a fee agreement and disclaimer statement
meeting the .requirements of the Idaho Industrial Commission; medical releases; employment

release; a letter of representation and inquiry to the employer; a letter of representation to the

Idaho Industrial Commission requesting copies of Claimant's file; a letter to the treating medical
providers requesting complete copies of Claimant's medical and billing records; and a client

intake questionnaire for the initial gathering of relevant information concerning the client's
employment, educational, medical and health, military. vocational, and accident history.
7.

Counsel reviewed all medical records, employment records, and other requested

documents as they were received, and consulted with Claimant about the status of the case on a
periodic basis.

8.

Counsel advised Claimant concerning the need to keep medical appoin1ments,

aspects of medical treatment which might potentially affect Claimant's impairment rating, and
strategic issues relating to medical care which can impact the result of a worker'S compensation
case.

9.

Counsel conducted legal research concerning aspects of Claimant's case and

injuries.
10.

The entirety of this claim was established through the efforts of Counsel. Before

Counsel was retained, Defendant-Employer did not have workers' compensation insurance in
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA.
942 W. MyrIt 81rIIt
EIoIIt.IdIIIlo 13702
(208) 345-1(0)
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place for the d.ate of iIijury, and effectively denied or disputed Claimant's right to any and all
benefits in connection with the claimed accident, including medical benefits and treatment, time
loss benefits, impairment compensation, and attorney fees. After Counsel became involved,
Defendant-Surety agreed to "back-accept" the claim as to the hip injury, and in response to
Counsel's demands, Claimant received medical ~ent, time loss benefits and impairment
compensation.
11.

In response to Counsel's actions. Defendants through their legal counsel, Max

Sheils, agreed to pay attorney fees mcurred by Claimant as a result of Defendant-Employer not
having a policy of workers' compensation insurance in place for the date of injury. The attorney
fees were calculated as "25% of the amount of medical bills due as of December 1S. 2006, the

date upon which the claim was accepted." (Letter from Breck Seiniger to Sheils, 512107, attached
as Exhibit C.) See also, Letter from Sheils to Seiniger, SIIO/07, attached as ExhibitD.

12.

Counsel advised Claimant on working with the ICRD counselor on education,

training, job seeking. and other re-employment issues.

13.

Counsel advised Claimant to undergo a new and separate independent medical

evaluation by a medical expert of Claimant's choosing; advised Claimant of the meaning and
import of the !ME report; and advised Claimant on the effect of the expert's report on the need
for present and future medical treatment, the claim for benefits, and lump sum settlement.
14.

Counsel prepared discovety and a notice of service, filed the notice with the Idaho

Industrial Commission, and served the discovery on Defendants. Counsel reviewed and analyzed
the Defendant's responses when received.
15.

Upon receipt of Defendant's discovery requests, Counselor his legal assistant met

with Claimant and prepared responses. Counsel reviewed these responses, made revisions.
SEINIGCR LAW a:FICES. P.A.

M2W._snet
BollI, Idaho 83702
(208)345-1000
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COpy,

Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387)
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB #- 6588)
SEINIGBR LAW OmCBS, P.A.

942 W. Myrtle S1reet
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 345·1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700
Attorneys for Claimant
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMIsSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

KImberly Reek,
CJlima:at,

Le. No. 07-016185

VI.

FORM lOll, REPORT OF EXPENSES
and
STATEMENT OF
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL

Merry Maidst
_Employer,

and -

-Crawford Claims Management Services,
Surety,

Defendants.

I
COMES NOW Claimant's Counsel and reports his expenses and submits the following in
support ofhis claim of attorney's fees and costs in the amount set forth below from the proceeds

of the settlement of the above captioned case.
REPORT OF LITIGATION ExPENSES
In accordance with the requirements of § 72-528, Idaho Code. this form shall be filled out

and returned to the Industrial Commission within 30 days following the time of en1ry of a final
award by the Industrial Commission in the above case, or, in the event of an appeal to a final

- court, within 30 days following a final ruling by the Court. If there is an appeal, the totals
-

-

specified below shall include the expenses, costs, or fees incurred in the appeal.
-

-

FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES AND
STATEMENT OF CLAIMANrS COUNSEL
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5.

Counsel created a database file for Claimant in which pertinent information was

recorded for use in the handling of the claim.

6.

During, or .shortly after, the initial meeting with Claimant, Counsel drafted the
.

.

following documents for the benefit of Claimant: a fee agreement and disclaimer statement
meeting the requirements of the Idaho Indus1rial Com:cnission; medical releases; employment
release; a letter of representation and inquiIy to the surety; a letter of representation to the Idaho
Industrial Commission requesting copies of Claimant's file; a letter to the treating medical
providers requesting complete copies ofC~t's medical and billing records; a letter to the
primary treating physician requesting a detailed report of the etiology of Claimant's condition,

treatment to date, impairment rating, and temporary and permanent restrictions; and a client
intake questionnaire for the initial gathering of relevant information concerning. the client's
employment, educational, medical andhealtb, military, vocational, and accident history.
7.

Counsel reviewed aU medical records, employment records, am other req~

documents as they were received, and consulted ~ Claimant about the status ofthe case on a
periodic basis.
8.

Counsel advised Claimant concerniIlg the need to keep medical appointments,

aspects of medical treatment which might potentially affect Claimant's impairment rating, and
strategic issues relating to medical care whicli cali impact the result of a worker's compeilsation

case.
9.

Counsel conducted legal research concerning aspects of Claimant's case and

injuries.
10. . Before Counsel was retained; Defendants denied, discontinue<t or disputed
.

.

Claimant's right to anyand all benefits in connection, with the claimed accident, including

FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES AND
STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL
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niedica1 benefits and treatment. time loss benefits, ~t comPensation. disability beyond .
impairment, retraining, and attorney f~. These facts, and Counser$ demand for benefits, were
contained in a letter t() employer Merry'Maids dated 5/15/07 t which stated in pertinent part:
My client reports that she Was ·told by phone yesterday by your xepresentatives
that she was "tenniDlltNl" and that she would no longer be receiving work comp
benefits. for her existing workPlace irguries. If this is true, you are in violation of
Idaho law. and we demand that my client receive the full medical and wage-loss
benefits to which she is entitled. '
.

Subsequently. and as a result of Counsers actions, Claimant received additional medical
,

,

treatment (for which Counsel is entitled to but is not seeking attorney fees) and time loss benefits

.'

and impairment compensation (for which Counsel received the attorney fees listed above).

11.

After being retained by Claim~ Counsel inve.sti.gated and determined that

Defendants refused to pay time loss benefits in full and iD. a timely fashion. and that DefendantS
discharged Claimant from employment in apparent retaliation for the making of a 'worker's
compensation claim.
12.

Counsel made demand upon Defendantq for to authorize medical trea1ment, to pay

, time loss benefits in full and in a timely fashion. and to remedy the apparent 'WrOngful 'discharge
of Claimant from employment
13.

Co'lJ1l.le1. tuade vm.tten demaDd upon Defondmts r()t w~ke1:s oompensation

benefits that Co~l believed were due.

,14.

Counsel prepared and a referral of Claimant to the Idaho Industrial Cozrnnission

Rehabilitation Division. and advised Claimant on working with the ICRD counselor on
education. training,job seeking. and other re-employment efforts.
15.

Counsel advised CIalmant to undergo anew and separate independent medical

evaluation by amedical exp=rt of Claimant's choosing; advised Claimant of the meaning and
selNlGER v.w OFFICES, P.A.

942 W._ShIt
BoIIe.1dIho 83702
(208) 346-1000
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB #2387)
Andrew Marsh (ISB # 6588)
SBINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Voice: (208) 345-1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700
Attorney for the Claimant
IN THE .INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO

ANNA GALLIGAR,
Claimant,
Claim No. 07..(}Z3895
VI.

JOHN & WAYNE'S STEAK
HOUSE,

FORM 1022, REPORT OF
EXPENSES AND STATEMENT OF
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL

Employer,

8Dd
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY
COMPANY,
Surety,
Defendants.

Comes now Claimanfs counsel and reports his expenses and submits the

following in support of his claim of attorney's fees and costs in the amount

set forth

below from the proceeds of the settlement of the above captioned case:
REPORT OF LITIGATION EXPENSES

In accordance with the requirements of § 72-528. Idaho Code. this form shall be

filled out and returned to the Industrial Commission within 30 days following the time of
entry

of a final award by the Industrial Commission in the above case, or. in the event of

_____________________________________

~
OG

treating medical providers requesting complete copies of Claimant's medical and billing

records; a letter to the primary treating doctor requesting an detailed report regarding the
etiology of Clmmantts condition, treatment to date, impairment rating. and permanent
restrictions; a client intake questionnaire for the ini1ial gathering of relevant information
conceming the client's employment, educational. medical and

heal~

militaty,

vocational, and accident history; and various litigation documents including motions.

notices. requests. and discovery.
8.

Counsel reviewed all medical records. employment records, and other doclments,

which were requested as they were received, and consulted with Claimant about the

status of the ease on a periodic basis.
9.

Counsel advised Claimant concerning the need to keep medical appointments,

aspects of medical treatment which might potentially affect Claimant's impairment

rating, and strategic issues relating to medical care which can impact the result of a
Workers Compensation Case.
10.

Counsel conducted legal research concerning aspects of Claimant's case and

injuries, including He medical fee calculation procedures.
11.

Defendants denied Claimant's entitlement to the benefits that she sought as

appears of record.
12.

Counsel conducted extensive discovery, including the taking of depositions.

13.

Colll1Sel engaged in extensive negotiations 'With representatives of the defendants.

Counsel had extensive communications with Claimant concerning the status of the case,
and the strategic and tactical decisions that had to be made 'With respect to settlement
discussions and preparation for hearing.
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COpy

Wm. Breck Seiniger. Jr. (ISB #2387)
Andrew Marsh (ISB #6588)
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES. P. A.
942 Myrtle Street
Boise. Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 345-1000
Facsimile: (208) 345-4700
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
TERESA MANINI,
Claimant,

I.C. No. 04-521649

'. VS.

COMMUNICARE, INC.,
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES

Employer,

AND STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S
COUNSEL

and

STATE INSURANCE FUND~

Surety,
Defendants.

Comes now Claimant's counsel and reports his

ex~ses

and submits the following in

support of his claim of attomey's fees .and costs in the amount set forth below from the proceeAis
of the settlement of the above captioned case:

REPORT OF Ln'lGATION EXPENSES
In accordance with the requirements of § 72-528, Idaho Code, this fonn shall be filled out

and returned to the Industrial Commission within 30 days following the time of entry of a final
award by the Industrial Commission. in the above case, or, in the event of an appeal to a final
NOTE ADDED TO THIS EXHIBIT 6/2/10: there are no additional pages for this case because there is no
language whatsoever relating to the alleged boilerplate.
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB #2387)
Heather M. McCarthy (ISB #6404)
SEINIOER LAW OFFICES, P. A.
942 Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
TelePhone: (208) 345·1000
Facsimile: (208) 345-4700
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EMMA F. BALL,

Claimaut,
I.C. No. 0S-006871
VB.

FORM 1022, :REPORT OF EXPENSES
EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN GOOD
SAMARITAN,

AND STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S

COUNSEL

Employer,
and

SENTRY INSURANCE,
Surety,

DefendauCl.
Comes now Claimant's counsel and reports her expenses and submits the following in
support of her claim of attorney's fees and costs in the amount set forth below from the proceeds
of the settlement of the above captioned case.
REPORT OF LITIGATION EXPENSES
In accordance with the requirements of § 72-528, Idaho Code. this form shall be filled out

and returned to the Industrial Commission within 30 days following the time of entry of a final

award by the Industrial Commission in the above case, or, in the event of an appeal to a final

•

3.

Counsel advised Claimant as to the procedures involved in processing a claim for

benefits under the Idaho Workers Compensation Act. Counsel advised Claimant as to the need
for cooperation with treating physicians, the Idaho Industrial Commission rehabilitation
department, and Seiniger Law Offices, P.A.
4.

Counsel advised Claimant as to the disclosures required by the Idaho Industrial

Commission.
S.

Prior to retaining Counsel, Claimants entitlement to additional medical treatment, as well

as time loss benefits associated therewith, were disputed. Subsequent to retaining Counsel, a
lump sum settlement was negotiated on Claimant's behalf.

6.

Counsel created a database file for Claimant in which pertinent information was recorded

for later use in the band ling of the claim.
7.

During, or shortly after, the initial meeting with Claimant, Counsel drafted the following

documents for the benefit of Claimant: a fee agreement and disclaimer 'statement meeting the
requirements of the Idaho Industrial Commission; medical releases; employment releases; a
letter of representation and inquiry to the surety; a letter of representation to the Idaho Industrial
Commission requesting copies of Claimant's file; a letter to the treating medical providers
requesting complete copies of Claimant's medical and billing records; a letter to the primary
treating doctor requesting an detailed report regarding the etiology of Claimant's condition,
treatment to date, impairment rating, and permanent restrictions; a client intake questionnaire for
the initial gathering of relevant information concerning the client's employment, educational,
medical and health, military, vocational, and accident history, a draft of a complaint and

discovery.

0r)

FI~E'
Wm. Breck Seiniger, Ir. (ISB #2387)
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB #6588)
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P. A.
942 Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 345-1000
Facsimile: (208) 345-4700
Attorneys for the Claimant
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

JAMES J. NUNLEY,
Claimant,
VI.

I.C. No. 95-926334
04-527810

DON YOUNG CONSTRUCITON AND
SUPPLY, INC.,

FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES
AND STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S
COUNSEL

Employer,
and

COVERTECH, INC.,
Employer,
and

STATE INSURANCE FUND,

Surety,
Defendants.

Comes now Claimant's counsel and reports his expenses and submits the following in
support of his claim. of attorney's fees and costs in the amount set forth below from the proceeds
of the settlement of the above captioned case:

FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES AND STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S
~nTl1\TQ""T
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STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL

f.

Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. ("Counsel") was retained by James Nunley ("Claimant") on

or about January S. 2006.

2.

Counsel initiated this case by interviewing Claimant concerning the facts and

circumstances of employment. the facts and circumstances of the injury, the status of benefits,
the status of medical treatment. and the background to Claimant as it related to potential
disability in addition to impairment. etc.

3.

Counsel advised Claimant as to the procedures involved in processing a claim for

benefits under the Idaho Workers Compensation Act. Counsel advised Claimant as to the need
for cooperation with treating physicians, the Idaho Industrial Commission rehabilitation
department, and Seiniger Law Offices. P.A.
4.

Counsel advised Claimant as to the disclosures required by the Idaho Industrial

Commission.
5.

Prior to retaining Counsel, Claimants entitlement to additional permanent partial

impairment was disputed.

Subsequent to retaining Counsel. Claimant received additional

permanent partial impairment. In addition. a lump sum settlement was negotiated on Claimant's

behalf.
6.

Counsel created a database file for Claimant in which pertinent infonnation was recorded

for later use in the handling of the claim.
7.

During, or shortly after, the initial meeting with Claimant, Counsel drafted the following

documents for the benefit of Claimant: a fee agreement and disclaimer statement meeting the
requirements of the Idaho Industrial Commission; medical releases; employment releases; a
letter of representation and inquiry to the surety; a letter of representation to the Idaho Industrial

FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES AND STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S

Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (lSB #2387)
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB #6588)
SEINIGERLAW OFFICES, P. A.
942 Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Teleph()ne~ (20%) 34S-l000
Facsimile: (208) 345-4700
Attorneys for the Claimant
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

JOHN AMLANE~

Claimant,

I.e. No. 04-011249
vs.
FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES
AND STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S
COUNSEL

MAVERICK STORES,
Employer,

and
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT,
Surety,

Defendants.

Comes now Claimant's counsel and reports his expenses and submits the following in
support of his claim of attorney's fees and costs in the amount set forth below from the proceeds
of the settlement of the above captioned case.
REPORT OF LITIGATION EXPENSES
In accordance with the requirements of § 72-528, Idaho Code, this form shall be filled out
and returned to the Industrial Commission within 30 days following the time of entry of a final
award by the Industrial Commission in the above case, or, in the event of an appeal to a final
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3.

Counsel advised Claimant as to the procedures involved in processing a claim for

benefits under the Idaho Workers Compensation Act. Counsel advised Claimant as to the need
for cooperation with treating physicians, the Idaho Industrial Commission rehabilitation
department, and Seiniger Law Offices, P.A.
4.

Counsel advised Claimant as to the disclosures required by the Idaho Industrial

Commission.
5.

Prior to retaining Counsel, Claimants entitlement to additional medical benefits, as well

as time loss benefits associated therewith, were disputed. Subsequent to retaining Counsel, a
lump sum settlement was negotiated on Claimant's behalf.
6.

Counsel created a database file for Claimant in which pertinent information was recorded

for later use in the handling of the clainl.
7.

During, or shortly after, the initial meeting with Claimant, Counsel drafted the following

documents for the benefit of Claimant: a fee agreement and disclaimer statement meeting the
requirements · of the Idaho Industrial Commission; medical releases; employment releases; a
letter of representation and inquiry to the surety; a letter of representation to the Idaho Industrial
Commission requesting copies of Claimant's file; a letter to the treating medical providers
requesting complete copies of Claimant's medical and billing records; a letter to the primary
treating doctor requesting an detailed report regarding the etiology of Claimant's condition,
treatment to date, impairment rating, and permanent restrictions; a client intake questionnaire for
the initial gathering of relevant information concerning the client's employment, educational,
medical and health, military, vocational, and accident history; a draft of a complaint and
discovery.
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB #2387)
Rachael M. O'Bar (ISB #5823)'
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P. A.
942 Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 345-1000
Facsimile: (208) 345-4700
Attorneys for the Claimant
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

PAUL HOLUSON,

..

Claimant.
Case No. 02·523210

v.
MOUNTAIN VIEW EQUIPMENT CO.,

Employer,

FORM 1022, REPORT OF
EXPENSES AND STATEMENT OF
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL

and
LffiERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE
CORPORATION,

Surety,
Defendants.
Comes now Claimant's counsel and reports her expenses and submits the
following in support of her claim of attorney's fees and costs in the amount set forth
below from the proceeds of the settlement of the above captioned case:
REPORT OF LmGATION EXPENSES

In accordance with the requirements of § 72-528, Idaho Code. this form shall be
filled out and returned to the Industrial Commission within 30 days following the time of
FORM 1022 REORT OF EXPENSES AND STATEMENTOF
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL Page 1

SE1NIGER LAW OFFICES. P.A
942 Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

~-------------------------------------------------------
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STATE.MENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL
1.

Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. ("Counsel") was retained by Paul Hollison

("Claimant") on or about May 20, 2003.
2.

Counsel initiated this case by interviewing Claimant concerning the facts and

circumstances of employment, the facts and circumstances of the injury, tbe status of
benefits, the status of medical treatment, and the background to Claimant as it related to
potential disability in addition to impairment, etc.
3.

Counsel advised Claimant as to the procedures involved in processing a claim. for

benefits under tbe Idaho Workers Compensation Act. Counsel advised Claimant as to the
need for cooperation with treating physicians, the Idaho Industrial Commission
rehabilitation department, and Seiniger Law Offices, P.A.
4.

Counsel advised Claimant as to the disclosures required by the Idaho Industrial

Commission.

5.

Prior to retaining Counsel, Defendants disputed the nature and extent of

impairment/disability and entitlement to retraining.
negotiate and effect settlement.

Counsel was retained to

Subsequent to retaining Counsel, lump sum

settlement was negotiated on Claimant's behalf.
6.

Counsel created a database fIle for Claimant in which pertinent information was

recorded for later use in the handling of the claim.
7.

During, or shortly after, the initial meeting with Claimant, Counsel drafted the

following documents for the benefit of Claimant: a fee agreement and disclaimer
FORM 1022 RBORT OF EXPENSES AND STATBMENTOF
CLAlMANT'S COUNSEL Page 3
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Boise. Idaho 83702
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387)
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SElNIOER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 345-1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700
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Attorneys for Claimant
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Laurel Kulm,
Claimant,

I.e. No. 06-012770
VS.

Mercy Medical Center,
Employer,

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION To REcoNsmER OlmER
DENYlNG ATTORNEY FEES AND To ISSUE A
SUBSTITUTE OPINION

And
Industrial Claims Management,

Surety,
Defendants.
COMES NOW Claimant's Counsel, SElNIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A., and files this MOTION
To RECONSIDER the Commission's FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RELATING To
COUNSEL'S REQUEST FOR APPRO VAL OF ATTORNEY'S FEES (hereinafter referred to

as the "Kulm

DeCiSion"), filed May 20, 2010.
INACCURATE FOOTNOTE

As the Commission 'Nill recall the footnote that is of concern to Claimant's Counsel reads
as follows:
Interestingly ~ in' a companion case, treating a similar demand for approval of a
requested fee, Counsel offered a Form 1022 that contained language identical to
that quoted above. At hearing on the motion to approve the requested fee in that
942 W. Myrtf$ S\I'oot
Boige. Idaho 63702
(208) 345-1DOO

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORA.NDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
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TO RECONSIDER ORDER DENYING ATTORNEY FEES ANn

TO ISSUE A SUBSTITUTE OPINION
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case, Counsel acknowledged that the quoted paragraph is "boilerplate" and goes
into all of his Ponn 1022 recitations even where, in a particular case, surety had
not denied or disputed Claimant's entitled [sic] to a PPI rating prior to Counsel's
retention. This may explain why staffwas unable to obtain a satisfactory
explanation for the averments made in the quoted paragraph. (Emphasis in
original.)

In the Conunission's ORDER ON ATTORNEY'S FEES in Drotzman V. Coors Brewing
Company and Zurich American Insurance Company, LC. No. 2006-006711 the Commission

states in Finding of Fact ,23:
At hearing, Counsel acknowledged that the quoted paragraph is "boilerplate" and goes
into all of his Form 1022 recitations even where, in a particular case) surety had not
denied or disputed Claimant':) entitlement to a PPI rating prior to Counsel's retention.
The Decision states in Finding of Fact ,26:
"Counsel explaining that he frequently uses boilerplate to create his Fonn 1022 report,
and stated that there was "some controversy'l between the parties concerning Claimant's
entitlement to permanent partial impainnent benefits, temporary total disability benefits,
and permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits." (Emphasis supplied.)
The Decision states in the portion of the decision entitled "ApPUCATlON OF THE PROVISIONS OF
IDAPA 17.02.08.033 To THE FACTS OF THIS Case":
"As well, at hearing Counsel candidly acknowledged that his Fonn 1022 avennents about
the existence of a denial or a dispute over PPI benefits may have been inadvertently
included as boilerplate.
lIMr. Seiniger: And, secondly, with respect to the questions that you had about

Mr. Marsh's affidavit Or declaration, I didn't prepare that, but I can tell you that
I'm responsible, essentially, for the boilerplate language about things being
disputed and it sounds to me like either that was just completelY incorrect or there
was a roistmderstanding on Mr. Marsh's part. (Emphasis supplied.)
II

Hr. Tr., p. 42, 1 L 15-21.
Claimant's Counsel does not qualTel with the characterization of his argument at hearing
contained in Finding of Fact ,26 or the quoted portion of the Order's
PROVISIONS

OF IDAPA 17.02.08.033 To

SEIN1GER LAW OF'FICES, PA

942 W. Myl1le Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

(206) 345-1000

THE FACTS

OF

THIS Case'~.

"APPLICATION

Or nIE

Howevet, insofar as
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TO RECONSIDER ORDER DENYING ATTORNEY FEES AND
TO lSSlJE A SUBSTITUTE OPINION
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Finding of Fact
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SEINIGER LAW OFFICES

is concerned, it is in error.

PAGF

At no time did Claimant's Counsel " . . .

acknowledge[dJ that the quoted paragraph is "boilerplate" and goes into all of his Fonn 1022
recitations even where, in a particular case, sUJ:elty had not denied or 'disputed Claimant's

entitlement to a PPI rating prior to Counsel's retention." Claimant's Counsel did not state or
imply that the boilerplate language went into every Fonn 122, and it does not. There is a world
of difference between "frequentli' or "inadvertently" inserting language from a template, and
always inserting such language. It is the difference between making a mistake and lying.

In over thirty years of piactice Claimant's Counsel

wm Breck Seiniger, Jr. has never been

accused oflying about anything. Despite the fact that the Fonn 1022's submitted in Workers
Compensation cases have been submitted by his associates and not by bim (foJ: many years, until
recently, Claimant's Counsel WID Breck Seiniger, Jr.

was actively involved in only a very few of

the flrm's Workers Compensation Cases), the inference is that he routinely and intentionally

misrepresents the facts to the Commission. Nothing could be further from the truth.

Indeed, the Commission's o\vu "Order On Attorneys Fees" in Drotzman V. Coors
Brewing Company And Zurich American Insurance Company (filed June 8, 2010) makes it clear
that Finding of Fact ~23 is erroneous, because it conflicts with Finding of Fact 1.26 and its

recognition that Claimant's Counsel stated that the questioned "boilerplate" paragraph may have
inadvertently been left in the document.
Surely, the Commission, one of whose members has had a long and distinguished career
as a defense counsel in Worker's Compensation cases, recognizes that templates including

"boilerplate" language that are adjusted as appropriate are used in the drafting of Lump Sum
Agreements, and that mistakes in drafting are sometimes made. TIlls is not to say that such
mistakes are insignificant, or even necessarily excusable, but it is a far cry from that to the
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conclusion that an inaccurate representation of fact bas been intentionally made in every fonn
1022 submitted by Seiniger Law Offices, P A.
THE KULM DECISIOJVIGNORES FACTS IN THE RECORD ESTA.:BLISB1NG THAT CLAIMANT'S
COUNSEL'S ACTIONS PRlMAlULY AND SU:BSTANrlALLY CREATED THE AVAILABLE FUNDS IN
QUESTION

As noted in the Kulm Decision, Claimant's Counsel conceded for purposes of these
proceedings that "his services were not "primarily 0)." substantially" responsible for securing the
PPI award from which he previously took a fee. .. ." However, the Commission addressed that
issue nonetheless: "Even though Counsel has chosen, for putposes of the instant proceeding, to
concede that his services were neither primarily nor substantially responsible for securing the
PPI award from which he has taken his fee, the Commission feels constrained to address this
issue, inasmuch as it is the Commission's interpretation of those regulations which informed its
decision to deny the fees in question." (See, Kulm Decision at 10.)
The Commission having chosen to address this issue, Claimant's Counsel is constrained
to address that issue in his motion to reconsider. In the Kubn Decision the Commission refers to

the case of Mancilla v. Greg, 13 ~ lda.ho 685, 963 P.2d 368 (1998) with x:egard to Claimant's
Counsel burden of proof with respect to charging liens:

"Therefore, Pena was unable to prove that his efforts were primarily or substantially
responsible for securing the PPI award simply by speculating that surety might not have
been inclined to pay the award absent his appearance as counsel in the matter.
Recognizing that it is Counsel who bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of
the evidence, the assertion of a charging lien, there is nothing untoward about the
Commission's rejection of such speculation."

Kulm Decision at 22.
The Kulm Decision goes on to defme "primarily or substantially:!!
"In summary. in order to meet his burden of proving that his efforts were "primarily or
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substantially" responsible for securing the fund from which he hopes to be paid, Counsel
bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he originally, or
initially, took action that secured the fund, that his efforts essentially. or in the main were
responSible for securing the fund, i.e. that his efforts were such that a reasonable person
would conclude that he was responsible for securing the fund from which he hopes to be
paid." (Emphasis supplied.)

The Kulm Decision is of grave concern to Claimant's Counsel, because Claimant's
Counsel's essential argument was not that his finn had primarily or substantially created the
available funds resulting from Ms. Klum' s PPI rating, but that considering all of the services
provided to Ms. Kuhn (from June 7, 2007 up through the e~ecution .of the Lump Sum Agreement

settling her case submitted to the Commission on or about May 5, 2009 - See, Finding of Fact
No. 23) Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. was entitled to be paid for its efforts. At hearing and in posthearing briefmg Claimant's Counsel argued that if the "available funds" resulting from the PPI
rating and the negotiated compensation for PPD were the only source of funds from which
Claimant's Counsel could be paid, justice, constitutional principles, and practical considerations
involving the ability of Claimants to obtain legal services required that Seiniger Law Offices,
P.A. be pennitted to take a fee from the "available funds" attributable to Ms- Kulm's pennanent

impairment ;rating. Claimant's Counsel reasoned that at the time that he was retained by Ms.
Kulm any potential disputes from which "available funds" (as defined by the Commission's
regulations) might be generated lay nascent within the womb of time. This, Claimant's Counsel
submits, requires that his fee agreement with Ms. Kulm be honored, since otherwise there might
not be any fimds out ofwruch the finn could be paid anything for its services. Consequently, not
being able to predict what benefits a surety might dispute, or what delay might occur as to the
payment of benefits, or what had in fact prompted the surety to pay benefits without speculating
(speculation having been held insufficient to meet an attorney's burden of proof with respect to
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the creation of "available funds" - see Kuhn Decision at 22), few attorneys if any could afford to
venture their resources - in some cases, as here> for years - without being able to make even an

educated guess as to whether or not a dispute might arise, much less a victory and thus a
permissible contingent fee under the present regulations.

Moreover, this problem creates a

systemic problem peculiar to Workers Compensation Practice. The ~ttomey' s Oath contains the
following affumation: "I will contribute time and resources to public service, and will never
reject, for any consideration personal to myself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed."
Arguably, this affmnation under oath prohibits all counset for declining to counsel and represent
claimants whom present themselves to counsel's office seeking advice.

Of course> as is

universally recognized, this commitment is "more honored in the breach than in the observance".
Nonetheless, it is one thing for an attorney to fail to live up to what may be in reality an ideal

than a binding commitment. It is quite another thing to enforce regulations, however well
initially intended, which. systemically make 'the violation of the Attorney's Oath an economic
necessity. 1
As Claimant's Counsel reads the Kulm Decision that point is not made, and therefore it
appears that Claimant's Counsel essentially wants something for nothing. However, putting that
matter aside, if the issue of whether or not the impairment rating and the available funds
resulting from it were primarily or substantially procured by Claimant's Counsel, Claimant's
Counsel respectfully submits that he has met his burden of proof as a manet of law, and that he
I Parenthetically. Claimant's Counsel has always been in a quandary as to whether or not the Industrial Commission
would l'ennit an attorney representing a claimant to charge the claimant an hourly fee for services rendered whioh
the Claimant could defer paying until any monetary benefits were received. As a practical matter, in over 30 years
of experience) Claimant's Counsel has never met a claimant who could afford to pay for
services 0;11 an hourly
basis. Consequently, under the regulation in question, as currently enforced, it is generally impossible for a claimant
tQ obtain any services from an attomey other than advocacy as to disputed mattel'S if an hourly fee arrangement is
not permissible. Since it would appear-that a claimant has a constitutional right to counsel ifth" claimant is willing
to pay for an attorney's services as a counselor and as his legal representative, Cla.iInant's Cou.nsel is puzzled as to

ms

whether or not an hourly fee based a&eemem with a Claimant is pertnissib)e.
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has produced uncontradicted proof of that fact and that he does not base his claim on speculation.
Nowhere in the Kulm Decision is any mention made of the testimony of defense counsel

Alan Hull:

12: 17 Until Dr. Radnovich's
12:18 rating came aboard there was no effort to get a rating by
12:19 the surety and as you know from practice, oftentimes
12:20 that's the case. Claimant's Cotmsel will force the surety
12:21 to get them a rating.
12:22
Having done that! it seems me that big fund of
12:23 money that came about, at least partially and probably
12:24 significantly because of the result of Claimant's Counsel.
12:25 1 mean a lot of times the adjuster will not get a rating
13:1 until they are forced into doing that and, certainly, it
13:2 would appear that that was the Case here.
Given the negative inference raised by the Kulm Decision to the effect that Claimant's

Counsel is attempting to get something for nothing (and in truth Claimant's Counsel argued that
Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. was entitled to a percentage of the impairment rating as

compensation for nearly two years of attorney services prior to the payment of impainnent
benefits) it is respectfully submitted that fairness would require that Mr. Hull's testimony be
mentioned in the opinion, even if it is rejected. However, it appears to counsel that Mr. Hall's
testimony carries the day. "Prima facie proof' refers to proof sufficient to justify a rIDding of the
matter in question by the uier of fact in the absence of proof to the contrary. When prima facie
proof has been introduced, the opponent must meet it with countervailing proof or suffer
whatever judgment the prima facie proof will support. Miller v. Bdknap, 75 Idaho 46, 266 P.2d
662 (1954). The term IIprima facie proof" or "prima facie evidence" is an alternative label for a

rebuttable preS1lll1ption. See, e.g., State v. Hebner, 108 Idaho 196, 697 P.2d 1210 (Ct. App.
1985).

The testimony of Alan Hull makes the case for Claimant's Counsel, in that it creates a
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presumption that Claimant's Counsel's efforts primarily and substantially created the available
funds in dispute.
This presumption is buttressed by long-standing Idaho law applicable to Mr. Hull's
testimony. Uncontradicted testimony of a credible v.ritness, unless his testimony is inherently
improbable or rendered so by facts and circumstances disclosed at the hearing or trial, cannot

arbitrarily be disregarded. The rule was fIrst announced in a case before the Idaho Industrial
Accident Board:
The rule applicable to all witnesses, whether parties or interested in the event of an
action, is, that either a board, court, or jury must accept as true the positive,
uncontradicted testimony of a credible \vitness, unless his testimony is inherently
improbable, or rendered so by f~cts and circumstances disclosed at the hearing or trial.

Pierstorffv. Gray's Auto Shop 74 P.2d 171, 175 (Idaho 1937). Since the rule's first enunciation
by.the Idaho Supreme Court, the "Pierstor/f Rule" has become iron clad law in Idaho:
That in tum begs the question: Is the Judge, who is the personification of the
Court, at liberty to reject expert testimony cq:rning from the mouths of "..itnesses, whom
he has adjudged to be "up front" and "very honest with us"? There is in Idaho an
ingrained rule which applies to the circumstances under discussion. Called the Pierstorf!
rule or Pier-stor.!! doctrine, it is as stated by the Chief Justice in Systems Associates, Inc. v.
Motorola Communications & Electronics, Inc., 116 Idaho 615; 621, 778 P.2d 737, 743
(1989): "An adjudicatory body may not 'arbitrarily or capriciously disregard the
testimony ofa witness unimpeached by any of the modes known to the law, ifsuch
testimony does not exceed probability.' Pierstorjfv. Gray's Auto Body Shop. 58 Idaho
438,447·48, 74 P.2d 171, 175 (1937)." The Chief Justice in Systems Associates went on
to add, as is equally so here, "Here the trial court, as the finder off~ct, accepted the truth
of the l.mrefuted statements by Dahmer and defendants .... Swanson v. State, 114 Idaho
607, 759 P.2d 898 (1988); PierstorjJv. Gray's Auto Body Shop, 58 Idaho 438, 74 P.2d
17l (1937)." 116 Idaho at 621, 778 P.2d at 743
The principle of law announced fust in Pierstor.fjl:Jas been cited to and applied for
over half a century. No valid reaSOn can be advanced why the Pierstorffrule is not
applicable here to the testimony of expert wimesses who were not only unimpeached, but
whose credibility was vouched for by the Court itself. Our case law precedent upholding
the pierstorjJ rule is voluminous. Equally so are the reported cases where the Court has
held the trial court in eI;tor for not recognizing the PierstorfJruk Here we can do no less,
and that error provides an additional ground for reversing the sentence imposed. Again I
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would suggest that the sentencing judge not be made to subject bimselfto endure the
agony of another sentencing.
The legal conclusion which is ultimately and necessarily diawn is that the Judge
was not at liberty to disregard the credible, unimpeached, and unrefuted testimony of the
psychologists and psychiatrists that Jeremy Broadhead would be no more of a future
threat to society than any other person. While the Judge could have said, "We don't know
that," he could not ignore it when it was the only evidence presented on that issue.

State v. Broadhead 120 Idaho 141, 163,814 P.2d 401,423 (ldaho,1991).
It is respectfully submitted that, though the issue ofthe source of the "available funds"
(stemming from the pennanent impainnent rating) is academic given Claimant's Counsel's
position that he was not seeking a percentage of the impairment rating available funds under the
regulation relied upon by the Commission, if that issue is to be disposed of by the opinion, its
analysis is faulty. Because the decision in this case has now been published? and because of the
conunents that Claimant's Counsel has receive,d regarding the decision, convincing him that his
reputation has been tarnished by the decision, Claimant's Counsel respectfully requests that the
Commission reconsider its decision, correct the subject footnote, and address the PierstorffRule.
As was acknowledged at hearing, t1ns case is not about a relatively small amount of
money; it is about principles of constitutional interpretation. But given the opiuion that. has been
issued, it has become about more than that; it has become about Claimant's Counsel's
professional reputation. As Daniel Webster famously argued to the United States Supreme Court
in what has become known as the "Dartmouth College Case": "It is, Sir, as I have said, a small
college. And yet there are those who love it!" Claimant's Counsel is no less concerned for his
reputation.
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CONCLUSION

As to the construction and constitutionality ofIDAP A 17.02.08.033 Claimant's Counsel,.
while respectfully disagreeing with the Commission's conclusions, recognizes that any relief to
which he may be entitled is a matter for appeal. However; as to the Kulm Decision's erroneous
footnote (with respect to which Claimant's Counsel does not imply that the COl)UUission in
anyway intended to disparage) it is respectfully requested that the Conunission review the record
in Dtottman and correct the opinion_ Furthennore, if-the issue of whether or not Claimant's
Counsel is entitled to a contingent fee on theimpainnent rating received by Ms. Kulm under the

''primarily or substantially standard", the testimony of Defeuse Counsel Alan Hull must be
considered.

Claimant's Counsel also respectfully requests that a substitute opinion be issued that
makes plain the basis of Claimant's Counsel's contention that he is entitled.to fees, not simply

due to the questioned constitutionality ofIDAPA 17.02.08.033, but because of the voluminous
work done by his finn over a number of years, and the record before the Commission evidencing
those services. Claimant's Counsel also respectfully requests that the Commission address the

PietstorffRule.
Dated June 15; 2010.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I CERTIFY that on June 14) 2010, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to
be served as follows:

Alan Hull
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL
250 South 5th, Ste. 700
PO Box 7426
Boise ID 83707-7426
VL4 Fax: (208) 344-5510

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr.
Attorneys for Claimant
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

LAUREL KULM,
Claimant,

v.
MERCY MEDICAL CENTER,
Employer,
and
INDUSTRIAL CLAIMS MANAGEMENT,
Surety,
Defendants.
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IC 2006-012770

ORDER ON CLAIMANT'S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

I LE

26 2010
INDUSTRIAL COMM!SSIO~1

On May 20,2010, the Industrial Commission issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law relating to Counsel's Request for Approval of Attorney's Fees. Counsel filed a timely
Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718. Counsel's motion is supported by
the Affidavit of Andrew C. Marsh and Counsel's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Reconsider, filed June 16, 2010.
I.

Counsel first takes issue with the statement made by the Commission in footnote 1 at
page 34 ofthe opinion which reads as follows:
"Interestingly, in a companion case, treating a similar demand for approval of a
requested fee, Counsel offered a Form 1022 that contained language identical to
that quoted above. At hearing on the motion to approve the requested fee in that
case, Counsel acknowledged that the quoted paragraph is "boilerplate" and goes
into all of his Form 1022 recitations even where, in a particular case, surety had
not denied or disputed Claimant's entitled to a PPI rating prior to Counsel's
retention. This may explain why staff was unable to obtain a satisfactory
explanation for the averments made in the quoted paragraph."
Counsel argues that the footnote contains an incorrect statement of fact which demands a
ORDER ON

CLAL~T'S

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 1

correction, inasmuch as it denigrates his reputation in the community. As Counsel has noted, the
companion case referenced in the footnote is the case of Drotzman v. Coors Brewing Company

and Zurich American Insurance Company, I.C. 2006-006711, a case involving a similar request
for approval of a claimed attorney's fee. In that case, Counsel testified:
"And, secondly, with respect to the questions that you had about Mr. Marsh's
affidavit or declaration, I didn't prepare that, but I can tell you that I'm
responsible, essentially, for the boilerplate language about things being disputed
and it sounds to me like either that was just completely incorrect or there was a
misunderstanding on Mr. Marsh's part. With respect to the TTD benefits that you
asked about, there was, as I understand it, a dispute and - - with respect to the
IME consultation - - ."
Although it is arguably permissible to conclude that if certain language is considered
"boilerplate", it is included
, in all documents of the type at issue, Counsel's point is well taken.
Counsel has explained that although the language in question is boilerplate in his template, it is
his practice to revise his template to meet the circumstances of a particular case. Counsel asserts
that the fact that the language at issue is contained in the subject contingent agreement is simply
the result of excusable error, and not any conscious intent to rnischaracterize the nature of what
was and was not in dispute at the time ofthe contingent fee agreement. We are aware of no facts
that would controvert Counsel's explanation and accept the same, although it is worth noting that
in each of three separate cases that have recently come before the Commission on the issue of
Counsel's entitlement to an attorney's fee, the attorney fee memoranda have contained
representations almost identical to those at issue in the instant mater. As well, there is a lack of
evidence in these cases supporting the proposition that at the time of Counsel's retention, the
surety had denied or disputed the injured worker's entitlement to PPI benefits. See, Kulm v.

Mercy Medical Center, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Relating to Counsel's Request
for Approval of Attorney's Fees, I.e. 2006-012770 (filed May 20, 2010); Drotzman v. Coors

Brewing Company and Zurich American Insurance Company, Order on Attorney's Fees, I.C.

ORDER ON CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 2

2006-006711 (filed June 8, 2010); Gomez v. Nampa Lodging Investors Inc., Order on Attorney's
Fees, LC. 2005-510285 (filed July 22,2010).
II.

As noted in the original opinion, the Commission found it important to address the
applicability of the provisions of the relevant IDAP A regulations to the claim for attorney's fees
notwithstanding that Counsel stipulated that his efforts were neither primarily nor substantially
responsible for securing the fund from which he hopes to be paid. Following the Commission's
determination, Counsel now raises a number of arguments in support of his position that even if
the regulation is applicable, his efforts were clearly either primarily or substantially responsible
for securing the fund from which he expects to be paid.
First, Counsel argues that even if his efforts were not responsible for securing the PPI
award at issue, he provided other valuable services to Claimant that did not result in the creation
of any fund from which Counsel might otherwise expect to be paid. To compensate him for
these services, Counsel should be entitled to assert a claim against the PPI award, a fund which
the Commission has concluded was not secured as a result of Counsel's efforts. Again, we are
guided by the provisions of the applicable regulation, which unambiguously states that among
the things counsel must demonstrate before a fund of money can be considered "available
funds", is that his efforts were either primarily or substantially responsible for securing that fund.
By its specific language, the provisions of the applicable regulation do not admit Counsel's
argument. Having said this, we recognize that in this, and many other cases, attorneys may
provide valuable services to injured workers which do not result in the creation of any fund from
which they might expect to be paid. In such cases, why not allow an attorney to charge a fee
against an undisputed PPI award?

Regardless of whether or not the regulation could be

beneficially refined by allowing such a practice, the simple answer is that the current regulation

ORDER ON CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 3

does not anticipate a PPI award which was not secured through counsel's efforts can fund an
attorney's fee on other services, which, though valuable, result in the creation of no fund of
money.
Finally, Counsel argues that there is, in fact, undisputed competent evidence of record
which requires the Commission to rule that Counsel's efforts were primarily or substantially
responsible for securing the PPI award. In this regard, Counsel draws upon the testimony of
Alan Hull, defense counsel for Surety. In his Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Reconsideration, Counsel states:

Nowhere in the Kulm Decision is any mention made of the testimony of defense
counsel, Alan Hull:
"Until Dr. Radnovich's rating came aboard there was no effort to get a rating by
the surety and as you know from practice, oftentimes that's the case. Claimant's
Counsel will force the surety to get them a rating.
Having done that, it seems me that big fund of money that came about, at least
partially and probably significantly because of the result of Claimant's Counsel. I
mean a lot of times the adjuster will not get a rating until they are forced into
doing that and, certainly, it would appear that that was the case here."
Supplemental Memorandum in Support ofMotion for Reconsideration, p. 7.

From the foregoing, it would appear that Counsel's efforts were, indeed, important to
obtaining the eventual 6% PPI award given by Dr. Rogers. As quoted by Counsel, Mr. Hull's
testimony would reasonably lead one to conclude that the only reason Surety obtained an
impairment rating from Dr. Rogers is because it knew it had to deal with the 12% PPI rating
previously awarded by Dr. Radnovich. If Mr. Hull's testimony is competent on this point, it
would support a conclusion that Counsel's efforts were either primarily or substantially
responsible for securing the award. However, it is important to understand the full context in
which Mr. Hull made these comments, a context that is ignored by Mr. Seiniger in advancing his
argument. In full, Mr. Hull stated:
ORDER ON CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 4

As I told the Commission in our telephone conference, we were hired only to
draft this and, unfortunately, the adjuster is no longer in the country, so I don't
know what their all thought process is, but let me suggest to you the following:
Until Dr. Radnovich's rating came aboard there was no effort to get a rating by
the surety and as you know from practice, oftentimes that's the case. Claimant's
counsel will force the surety to get them a rating.
Having done that, it seems [to] me that big fund of money that came about, at
least partially and probably significantly because of the result of claimant's
counsel. I mean a lot of times the adjuster will not get a rating until they are
forced into doing that and, certainly, it would appear that that was the case here.
Kulm Hrg. Tr., pp. 12/13-13/2.
Mr. Hull's comments are entirely speculative. He has no knowledge why Surety did

what it did, when it did. Again, as in Mancilla v. Greg, 131 Idaho 685, 963 P.2d 368 (1998), to
rely on Mr. Hull's testimony to support the claim for attorney's fees would require the
Commission to engage in speculation of the type that was found objectionable in that case. In
short, Mr. Hull's speculations have no evidentiary value, and lend no support to the proposition
for which they are offered by Mr. Seiniger.
Except as specifically corrected herein, the Commission stands by its original Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law Relating to Counsel's Request for Approval of Attorney's Fees,

I.e. 2006-012770 (filed May 20,2010).
DATED this

J./~
fa day of July, 2010.

~

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
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I hereby certify that on the ~ day of July, 2010, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Order on Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration was served by regular
United States Mail upon each of the following:
ANDREW MARSH
942 W MYRTLE ST
BOISE ID 8370
ALAN HULL
PO BOX 7426
BOISE ID 83707-7426
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387)
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588)
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 345-1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700
Attorneys for Claimant
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF:IDAIlO
Tim Stienmetz,
Claimant,
I.C. No. 2008-002191
vs.

FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES
and
STATEMENT OF
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL

G2B Co. Inc.,
Employer,
and
Idaho State Insurance Fund,
Surety,
Defendants.

COMES NOW Claimant's Counsel and reports his expenses and submits the following in
support of his claim of attorney's fees and costs in the amount set forth below from the proceeds
of the settlement of the above captioned case.

REPORT OF LITIGATION EXPENSES
In accordance with the requirements of § 72-528, Idaho Code, this form shall be filled out
and returned to the Industrial Commission within 30 days following the time of entry of a final
award by the Industrial Commission in the above case, or, in the event of an appeal to a final
court, within 30 days following a final ruling by the Court. If there is an appeal, the totals
specified below shall include the expenses, costs, or fees incurred in the appeal.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345·1000

FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES AND
STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL

PAGE 1 OF?

PRIOR TO LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT
BENEFITS, paid prior to LSS, subjected to atty fees
ATTORNEY FEES, paid prior to LSS, on the above
COSTS, incurred prior to LSS and paid directly to
Claimant's IME (Radnovich)

LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT
BENEFITS, subject to atty fees
ATTORNEY FEE, on the above
COSTS, reimbursable to atty .
TOTAL ATTY FEE & COSTS, from LSS
MEDICAL BILLS, to be paid from LSS
NET LUMP SUM AMT TO CLAIMANT

PPI
$20,394.00
$5,098.53

PPD
$25,492.50

$550.00

Fut Med Consid.
TOTAL
$2407.50 $1000.00 $28,900.00
$9,633.33
$23.37
$9,656.70
$0.00
$19,243.30

Attachments: Statement of Costs incurred in litigation, reimbursable to attorney
Contingency Fee Agreement In a Worker's Compensation Case including
Disclosure Statement

STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL
1.

Seiniger Law Offices, P .A. ("Counsel") was retained by Tim Stienmetz

("Claimant") on or about 4/10/2008.
2.

Counsel initiated this case by interviewing Claimant concerning the facts and

circumstances of employment, the facts and circumstances of the injury, the status of benefits,
the status of medical treatment, and the background of Claimant as it relates to potential
disability beyond impairment, etc.
3.

Counsel advised Claimant as to the procedures involved in processing a claim for

benefits under the Idaho Workers Compensation Act. Counsel advised Claimant as to the need
for cooperation with treating physicians, the Idaho Industrial Commission Rehabilitation
Division, and Seiniger Law Offices, P.A.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000
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4.

Counsel advised Claimant as to the disclosures required by the Idaho Industrial

Commission.
5.

Counsel created a database file for Claimant in which pertinent information was

recorded for use in the handling of the claim.
6.

During, or shortly after, the initial meeting with Claimant, Counsel drafted the

following documents for the benefit of Claimant: a fee agreement and disclaimer statement
meeting the requirements of the Idaho Industrial Commission; medical releases; employment
release; a letter of representation and inquiry to the surety; a letter of representation to the Idaho
Industrial Commission requesting copies of Claimant's file; a letter to the treating medical
providers requesting complete copies of Claimant's medical and billing records; and a client
intake questionnaire for the initial gathering of relevant information concerning the client's
employment, educational, medical and health, military, vocational, and accident history.
7.

Counsel reviewed all medical records, employment records, and other requested

documents as they were received, and consulted with Claimant about the status of the case on a
periodic basis.
8.

Counsel advised Claimant concerning the need to keep medical appointments,

aspects of medical treatment which might potentially affect Claimant's impairment rating, and
strategic issues relating to medical care which can impact the result of a worker's compensation
case.

9.

Counsel requested additional medical treatment for Claimant on 4/17/08.

10.

Counsel prepared and sent a written referral of Claimant to the Idaho Industrial

Commission Rehabilitation Division, and advised Claimant on working with the ICRD counselor
on education, training, job seeking, and other re-employment efforts. In response, the ICRD
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
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scheduled ajob site evaluation. Counsel advised Claimant of the meaning and import of the JSE
report.
11.

Counsel made written demand dated 6/3/08 upon Dr. Montalbano for a PPI rating

and permanent work restrictions.
12.

Upon receiving information that Claimant was to be seen for an independent

medical evaluation by a medical provider not chosen by Claimant, Counsel advised Claimant in
advance ofthe procedure, and subsequently advised Claimant of the meaning and import of the
IME report, and the effect of the expert's report on the need for present and future medical
treatment, the claim for benefits, and lump sum settlement.
13.

Counsel advised Claimant to undergo a new and separate independent medical

evaluation by a medical expert of Claimant's choosing; advised Claimant of the meaning and
import of the IMB report; and advised Claimant on the effect of the expert's report on the need
for present and future medical treatment, the claim for benefits, and lump sum settlement.
14.

At the time Counsel became involved, all issues were disputed or disputable

because by law all defenses remain open to Defendants in a worker's compensation case as a
matter of law unless waived or determined to have no merit by the Commission. The amount of
all compensation paid or admitted as owed by Employer immediately prior to Counsel's
involvement was equal to the amount actually paid to that date, less any claims for overpayment
that Defendants might subsequently make. All issues that arose subsequent to the date Counsel
was hired were disputed or disputable, including rights to medical benefits and treatment, time
loss benefits, impairment compensation, disability beyond impairment, retraining, and attorney
fees. For the period prior to lump sum settlement, Counsel's itemization of compensation that
constituted available funds, itemization of costs, and calculation of attorney fees is set forth
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000
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above. For the lump sum settlement, Counsel's itemization of compensation that constitutes
available funds, itemization of costs, and calculation of attorney fees is set forth above.
15.

There are compensation benefits, as set forth above, available for distribution on

equitable principles. The services of Counsel operated primarily or substantially to secure the
fund out of which the attorney seeks to be paid, due to Counsel's efforts on behalf of Claimant
and due to Counsel's reputation as a plaintiff's lawyer in the practice of worker's compensation
law. It was agreed that counsel anticipated payment from compensation funds rather than from
the client, as set forth in the Attorney Fee Agreement attached hereto. The claim is limited to
costs, fees, or other disbursements incurred in the case through which the fund was raised. There
are equitable considerations that necessitate the recognition and application of the charging lien,
including as follows: Claimant sought the services of Counsel as counselor and advocate;
Claimant contracted with Counsel to pay Counsel for said services; Counsel provided services as
counselor and advocate; Counsel has a constitutionally-protected property right to be paid as
agreed; and Claimant has a constitutionally-protected right to have Claimant's contract with
Counsel honored. All terms used in this and the preceding paragraph are used by Counsel in the
context of their fair and reasonable meaning pursuant to, and as limited by, statutory and
Constitutional law.
16.

Counsel reviewed the file in preparation for settlement. Counsel engaged in

extensive negotiations with Defendants. Counsel had extensive communications with Claimant
concerning the status of the case, and the strategic and tactical decisions that had to be made with
respect to settlement discussions and preparation for hearing.
17.

Counsel advised Claimant of the risks of going to hearing and the costs that would

be incurred in connection with obtaining sworn testimony from Claimant's medical providers.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
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Counsel further advised Claimant of the delay that would be involved in submitting this case for
resolution to the Commission.
18.

Counsel obtained a compromise settlement with representatives of the defendants

resulting in the payment of benefits over and above those which were conceded at the time that
Claimant initiated the attorney/client relationship.
19.

Claimant elected to settle the case based upon Claimant's best judgment and

personal situation, and on the basis set forth in the lump sum agreement which has been
submitted to the Commission for its approval.
20.

Counsel reviewed and analyzed the lump sum settlement agreement, completed

portions of the agreement, and reviewed the lump sum agreement with Claimant.
21.

Counsel reviewed and analyzed the file; reviewed and analyzed time and billing

program entries; reviewed and analyzed books of account to ascertain client costs advanced and
other financial data required by the Idaho Industrial Commission; and prepared Idaho Industrial
Commission Form 1022.
22.

As part of the consideration supporting the contract entered into between

Claimant and Counsel, Counsel provided legal services to Claimant from approximately
411 0/2008 until the present time. During that time, Counsel limited his practice by declining
certain cases because of the size of his caseload, which included Claimant's case. Counsel
maintained an office and staff, including the services of a full-time legal assistant, to be able to
handle whatever needs Claimant had in connection with this case, as well as the needs of his
other clients.
23.

Claimant is presently unemployed.
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Dated this December 22, 2009.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

Andrew Marsh
Attorney for Claimant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that on December 22,2009, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document to be served as follows:
Ronald D. Coston
Idaho State Insurance Fund
1215 W. State Street
Boise ID 83720
[RJ Hand Delivery

SEINIGERLAW OFFICES, P.A.

Andrew Marsh
Attorney for Claimant

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
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SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

Statement of Costs

942 W. MYRTLE STREET
BOISE, IDAHO 83702
(208) 345-1000
Andrew@ldahoRights.com

I

DATE
12/22/09

CLIENT NAME
Timothy Stienmetz

ATTORNEY

DATE
03/31108
04111/08
04/11/08
10/24/08
10/24/08
12/24/08
12/24/08
03/23109
03/23/09
03/23/09
04/29/09
04/29/09
05/27/09
05/27/09
10/09/09
10/09/09
10/09/09
12/02/09

DESCRIPTION
Balance forward
Copies -lIC req for file (med recs)
Postage
Copies - Fwd PPI ck to client
Postage
Copies - Fwd PPI check
Postage
Copies - Ltr & CD to Radnovich
Postage
compact disc
Copies - Fwd PPI ck to Client
Postage
Copies - Fwd PPI check to client
Postage
Copies - Ltr to Client pIs contact re ck
Postage
VOID: Copies - Client Copy - Ltr to Pappas re case status on issues
File Closing

OUR FILE NO.

AMOUNT

BALANCE
0.00
3.75
4.16
4.46
4.88
5.18
5.60
5.75
6.34
11.34
11.64
12.06
12.36
12.78
12.93
13.37
13.37
23.37

3.75
0.41
0.30
0.42
0.30
0.42
0.15
0.59
5.00
0.30
0.42
0.30
0.42
0.15
0.44
0.00
10.00

IBALANCE DUE II

$23.37

Thank you for allowing us to represent you. As of this date we have concluded our work on your case and have closed your file. If
you would like to have a copy of the file within the next 30 days you may do so at $.20 per page. If you choose to obtain your file
at a later date there will be a $30.00 retrieval fee in addition to copying charges of $.20 per page. Your file will be destroyed two (2)
years from the above date.

I

CONTINGENCY FEE AGREEMENT
IN A WORKER'S COMPENSATION CASE
This is an agreement for representation and consultation in a worker's
compensation claim before the Idaho Industrial Commission. This agreement is
between SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A., 942 Myrtle Street, Boise, Idaho
83702, (hereafter referred to as "Attorney") and Timothy Stienmetz, (hereafter
referred to as "Client").
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT AGREE AS FOLLOWS:

1) Attorney will represent Client in the following action: Stienmetz v. G2B & SIF
with respect to worker's compensation claim for date of injury of
1/07/2008 only.
2) For their representation of Client, Attorneys will be paid a fee which will be in
lien upon the cause of action and will be equal to a portion of all amounts
recovered by way of settlement, or award including attorney fees, and
including sums recovered in satisfaction thereof from any third party. That
portion will be as follows:
i) Twenty-five percent (25%) of all amounts obtained for Client after
execution of this agreement if the case is settled before a hearing. If
Client is receiving temporary disability benefits at the time of the
execution of this agreement, Attorney will not take a percentage of that
benefit until such time as the surety discontinues or threatens to
discontinue payment of said benefit; if Client has received an
impairment rating which has been admitted and is being paid, Attorney
will not take a percentage of the balance of the impairment rating unless
it is later disputed.

ii) Thirty percent (30%) of such amounts after a hearing and the claim is
resolved without the filing of an appeal by either party;
iii) Forty percent (40%) of such amounts if the claim is resolved after an
appeal has been filed by either party;
In the event that there are attorney fees awarded against the defendant(s) by the
commission, or otherwise paid by defendant(s), Attorney shall be entitled to be
paid those attorney fees or the percentage calculated above, whichever is greater.

3) Client will not be required to pay attorney fees to Attorney if nothing is
recovered by way of settlement or award unless Attorney withdraws due to

- - - - . - - . - -.. - ...

lack of cooperation by Client. In the event that Attorney is required to
withdraw due to lack of cooperation in presenting and prosecuting Client's
claim, he will be compensated as set forth in paragraph 7 below.
4) Actual costs required to prepare and prosecute Client's claim by Attorney,
or to achieve a settlement, are to be paid by Client; if advanced by
Attorney, these costs will be repaid from Client's portion of amounts
recovered, as defmed in Section 2, above; if a settlement is not reached in your
case, you will be responsible to make payments on these costs until they are
paid in full. These costs include fees for investigators if hired by Attorney:
filing fees, fees for court reporters, travel expenses, costs of service of process,
costs for medical records and reports, costs for expert witnesses and
physicians, long distance telephone and fax charges, postage and related
mailing costs, and all other costs associated with the prosecution of Client's
claim. Attorney is authorized, but not obligated, to pay all medical bills
outstanding at the time of settlement of Client's claim out of any funds received
by Attorney to the health care provider or their designated agent.
5) Client agrees that he will not make settlement except with Attorney's prior
approval, which approval shall not be reasonably withheld. Should Client do
so in violation of this Agreement, Client agrees to pay Attorney the sum and
share indicated in Paragraph 2(ii), above; upon settlement Attorney is
authorized to pay any outstanding medical bills of Client directly to the
provider. Attorney shall not settle the case without Client's prior approval.
6) Attorney makes no representations' concerning the likelihood of a successful
resolution of Client's case, and does not guarantee to obtain sufficient funds to
reimburse Client for the costs or expenses incurred in the prosecution of the
case; it is expressly agreed that all statements of Attorney on these matters are
good faith statements of opinion only;
7) Attorney may be discharged by Client at any time. If Attorney is discharged
Attorney will be compensated for services rendered to the date of discharge, as
well as for all costs, expenses and disbursements, as follows:
i) If Attorney is discharged before the case is settled or tried, Attorney
shall be paid at the rate of $150.00 per hour or a percentage calculated
in accordance with paragraph 2 (based upon the highest settlement offer,
if any, made by the defendants at the time of the discharge) whichever is
greater; Attorney will furnish Client with an itemized statement of such
serVices.

ii) If Attorney is discharged after the case is settled or tried, the
compensation of Attorney shall be computed in accordance with the
provisions of this agreement just as if the verdict, award, determination
or judgment had actually been collected in full for Client.
iii) Attorney has the right to retain possession of Client's documents and
money until Attorney's bill is paid in full by Client, and Attorney shall
have a lien on the cause of action.

8) Client will pay to Attorney an initial retainer as an advanee against the eosts
referred to in Paragraph 4 abEY/e in the amount of $100.
9) Client agrees that any interest earned on any of Client's funds held in trust will
be donated to the Idaho State Bar in connection with its Interest on Lawyer
Trust Accounts program.
lO)Both Client and Attorney have read this agreement, have a copy of it, and
agree to its terms and conditions. There are no other oral or written
representations between Client and Attorney. Any modifications of this
contract shall be made in writing.
11)This Agreement shall be binding upon the heirs, successors, representatives
and assigns of Client and Attorney.
12)Client has been advised that Client may pick up a copy of the file in this case
within 30 days after settlement or after the attorney client relationship is
terminated by either party to this agreement. After that time, Attorney's file,
and all documents and things in it from whatever source will be destroyed.
13)Client has been advised that Attorney may be retained on an hourly basis of
$150 per hour by depositing a retainer with Attorney of $2,000.00 which shall
be replenished as Attorney charges against it. In the event that Attorney is
retained on an hourly basis, Attorney shall not be entitled to any percentage of
any settlement or benefits recovered by Client. Client has declined to retain
Attorney on an hourly basis and has chosen to retain Attorney on the
contingent basis described herein.

I have read the foregoing and decline to retain the attorney on an hourly
~daYOf 10
,200L.

nm~tz,
~

Cf'imothy
.

.

.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

1. In workers' compensation matters~ attorney's fees normally do not exceed
twenty-five percent (25%) of the benefits your attorney obtains for you in a case in
which no hearing on the merits has been completed. In a case in which a hearing
on the merits has been completed, attorney's fees normally do not exceed thirty
percent (30%) of the benefits your attorney obtains for you.
2. Depending upon the circumstances of your case, you and your attorney may
agree to a higher or lower percentage which would be subject to Commission
approvaL Further, if you and your attorney have a dispute regarding attorney fees,
either of you may petition the Industrial Commission to resolve the dispute.

I certify that I have read and understand this disclosure statement and
Contingency Fee Agreement, and agree to the terms contained herein.

DATED this

~day of .#",,/

An~4~

SEIN1GER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
Attorney for Client

,200f!)

\

c

Ronald D. Coston, ISB No. 2816
State Insurance Fund
1215 W. State
Statehouse Mail
Boise, ID 83720
(208) 332-2100
Attorney for Defendants G2B Company, Inc., and State Insurance Fund
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
TIMOTHY STIENMETZ,
Claimant,
vs.
G2B COMPANY, INC.,
Employer,
and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendant

) IC NO.: 08-002191
)
)
) SIP NO.: 200801005
)
)
)
)
) LUMP SUM AGREEMENT
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

In consideration of the premises, promises and covenants hereinafter set fO,rth an4 subject
-:-.J

to the approval of the Agreement by the Industrial Commission, the parties her~to ent6i'into the
following Lump Sum Agreement and request an order of the Commission discharging the
Defendants from liability pursuant to Section 72-404, Idaho Code.
FIRST: The parties shall be designated herein as follows:
TIMOTHY STIENMETZ is the Claimant herein and during all relevant times was an
employee of G2B COMPANY, INC., hereinafter referred to as "Employer"; Employer was
insured for its workers compensation liability by STATE INSURANCE FUND, hereinafter
referred to as "Surety". The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of the State of Idaho, hereinafter
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referred to as the "Commission", has the exclusive jurisdiction to hear, determine and make the
appropriate award and order in this matter.
SECOND: Claimant alleges that, on or about January 7, 2008 while he was employed by
said Employer, he suffered an injury to his back while in the course and scope of his
employment. At the time of said injury, Claimant was 22 years of age and single. Claimant
worked 40 hours a week earning an average weekly wage of $S68.41. Timely notice was given
to the Employer and Surety and benefits were paid pursuant to the Idaho Workers Compensation
Act.
THIRD: As will appear from the medical reports following his accident, Claimant was
primarily treated by Paul Montalbano, M.D. for right LS-Sl radiculopathy, right LS-Sl herniated
disk, lateral recess stenosis, lumbar spondylosis, and degenerative disk disease. On March 4,
2008, Dr. Montalbano performed a right LS-Sl microdiskectomy.

On March 31, 2008, Dr.

Montalbano carried out a right LS-Sl redo microdiskectomy. Claimant was evaluated by Robert
H. Friedman, M.D. and, on October IS, 2008, Dr. Friedman found that Claimant had sustained a
12% permanent partial impairment of the whole person as a result of his accident of January 7,
2008.
FOURTH: The Employer and Surety have paid Claimant the following medical benefits:
Doctors
Paul J. Montalbano, M.D.
Mountain View Medical Center
Michael H. McClay, Ph.D.
Carol Griffith, LCPC
Idaho Physical Medicine & Rehab
Hospitals
Idaho Elks Rehab Hospital
St. Alphonsus RMC
St. Lukes RMC

$

13,S73.71

24,348.94
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Physical Therapy
Morris Physical Therapy
St. Alphonsus Rehab Services

2,484.10

Miscellaneous
Claimant Reimbursement
Anesthesia Associates of Boise
Gem State Radiology
Intermountain Medical Imaging
Paul J. Montalbano, M.D.
Interpath Laboratory
Medical Services Company
MSC Group, Inc.

9,234.23

Total Medical Paid to Date:

$

49,640.98

!

Claimant agrees to allow Surety to provide to the Commission any medical records reasonably
necessary to effectuate the terms of this Agreement.
FIFTH: There are genuine and substantial disputes and differences between the parties as
to the degree, if any, of Claimant's impairment and disability, the need for retraining benefits and
the need for future medical benefits. The parties, however, wish to settle their differences on a
full and final basis advising the Commission that it is in the best interests of the parties to do so.
Therefore, as provided by Idaho Code Section 72-404, in an effort to settle this disputed matter,
the Surety tenders to the Claimant and the Claimant accepts the sum of $28,900.00 in full and
final settlement of any and all claims he has or may have as a result of any of the alleged injuries
described herein. Further, the parties agree to waive any underpayment of total temporary
disability benefits and temporary partial disability benefits which may exist for any reason,
including any underpayments that may exist as a result of the method used to calculate the
compensation rate(s).
IT IS

FURTHER UNDERSTOOD BETWEEN THE PARTIES

THAT THE

CLAIMANT AGREES TO PAY ALL OUTSTANDING MEDICAL BILLS NOT LISTED IN
THE FOURTH SECTION OF THIS AGREEMENT AND THE EMPLOYER AND SURETY
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WILL NOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR, NOR DO THEY ASSUME LIABILITY FOR, ANY
OTHER MEDICAL BILLS WHATSOEVER AND THAT SAID LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT
SHALL BE APPORTIONED AS FOLLOWS:
LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT
Total Temporary Disability Benefits

01l0S/OS through 0911110S
35 weeks, 3 days at $380.S3 per week

$

13,492.26

TOTAL DUE

$ 13,492.26

Temporary Partial Disability Benefits

$

-0-

Retraining Benefits

$

-0-

Permanent Partial Impairment
12% whole person at 60
weeks at $339.90 per week

$

20,394.00

TOTAL DUE

$ 20,394.00

Future Medical Benefits

$

2,407.50

Unapportioned Disputed
Impairment and Additional
Disability Benefits at 15% whole
person at 75 weeks at $339.90 per week

$

25,492.50

In consideration for this Lump
Sum Agreement pursuant to
Idaho Code Section 72-404,
waiver of right of appeaL
waiver of right of
reconsideration. waiver
of right of modification

$

1,000.00

$ 28,900.00

$ 62,786.26)
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I.l'lq

$
$
$
$
$

Less TID previously paid
Less TPD previously paid
Less Retraining paid
Less PPI previously paid
Less LSS advance paid

13,492.26
-0-020,394.00
-0-

$ -33,886.26

$ 28,900.00

TOTAL AMOUNT DUE CLAIMANT

CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS:
A. Attorney fees taken prior to LSS
B.
Costs taken prior to LSS (Claimant s 1ME, Dr.
C.
Additional attorney fees to be taken from LSS
D. Additional costs to be taken from LSS
f

Radnovich)

$
$
$
$

5,098.53

55().()()
9,633.33
23.37

ITEMIZED LIST OF OUTSTANDING MEDICALS TO
BE PAID BY CLAIMANT FROM LUMP SUM
SETTLEMENT BALANCE: (List provider and amounts.)
(Counsel knows of none.)

E.

Total of Outstanding Medicals
NET AMOUNT TO CLAIMANT
(Subtract Lines C & D relating
to attorney fees, and Line E
relating to outstanding medicals,
from the total amount due
Claimant of this LSS)

$
$

-0-

19,243.30(,

SIXTH: The parties advise the Commission that they believe that it is in their best /
interests that this disputed matter be settled as herein set forth.
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The parties acknowledge that the nature and extent of the temporary disability and
permanent partial disability and medical and related expenses in this matter are uncertain and
may be continuing or progressive and may substantially exceed those hereinabove set forth, and
the above shall not limit the scope of this Agreement or the Order of Discharge entered by the
Commission pursuant hereto, both of which contemplate and include all rights and claims to all
permanent and temporary disability benefits, all impairment benefits and all medical and related
benefits whether or not known, herein listed, discoverable or contemplated by the parties.
The Claimant does agree to indemnify, defend and hold Defendants harmless from and
against any further claim or loss of any and every kind arising out of or related to the said alleged
accident, and any resultant losses, damages or injuries, including without limit, any claim
respecting past or future hospital, medical or like expenses.
SEVENTH:

The Claimant acknowledges and agrees that he has carefully read this

instrument in its entirety and has been fully advised regarding the contents of this Agreement by
his counsel, that Claimant understands its contents and has signed same knowing that the
payment forever concludes, settles and fully disposes of any and all claims of any kind and
nature and character that he now has or may have individually against Employer and Surety on
account of the alleged injuries and that these proceedings are concluded and forever discharged
and that they may be dismissed with prejudice by reason hereof, subject only to the
Commission's order and approval.
Pursuant to IDAPA 17.02.08033, a memorandum from Claimant's counsel accompanies
this Agreement setting forth the required information regarding Claimant's attorney's fees.
EIGHTH: Upon the Commission's order approving this Agreement and subject to the
payment of $28,900.00, the balance due Claimant, the Employer and Surety shall be discharged
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and released of and from any and all liability on account of the above-described accidents and
injuries.
/\

DATED this __IJ_Yl_1_i\_d_

day of

U-Q/'
,
'.::::.
'-

, 2009 .

At!
!

I

I,

U

State Insurance

RONALD D. COSTON
Attorney for G2B Company, Inc., and Surety, State
Insurance Fund.
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ORDER
Upon the foregoing and good cause appearing and the Industrial Commission being fully
advised and having determined that it is for the best interests of the parties that the liability of the
Employer and Surety be discharged in whole by the payment of the Lump Sum Agreement as
provided therein, NOW THEREFORE:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Lump Sum Agreement be and it hereby is approved
as provided by Section 72-404 Idaho Code, and that the above-entitled proceedings are dismissed
with prejudice and the Employer, G2B Company, Inc., and the Surety, are discharged and
released of and from any and all liability on account of the above-entitled injuries.
DATED: ___________________________
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
BY ______________________________
CHAlRMAN
BY ___________________
COMMISSIONER
BY ______________________________
COMMISSIONER
ATTEST:

ASSISTANT SECRETARY
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Ronald D. Coston, ISB No. 2816
State Insurance Fund
1215 W. State
Statehouse Mail
Boise, ID 83720
(208) 332-2100
Attorney for Defendants G2B Company, Inc., and State Insurance Fund

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
TIMOTHY STIENMETZ,
Claimant,
vs.
G2B COlviPANY, INC.,
Employer,
and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ICNO.:

08-002191

SIFNO.: 200801005

STIPULATION & ORDER
FOR DISMISSAL
WITH PREJUDICE

)
)
)

COMES NOW, the Claimant, TIMOTHY STIENMETZ, by and through his attorney of
record, Andrew Marsh, and the Defendants, G2B COMPANY, INC., and the STATE
INSURANCE FUND, by and through their attorney of record, Ronald D. Coston, and stipulate
and agree that the above-numbered cause has been settled and, subject only to the payment of the
sums ordered in the Commission's Order of Approval and Discharge, the above-styled and
numbered cause may be dismissed with prejudice.

STIPULATION Page 1

DATED this _ _ _~_;~_,_d

_ day of_...;;D;...;t;...,c_\_ _ _ _ _:, 2009.

RONALD D. COSTON
.I
Attorney for G2B Company, Inc., and Surety, State
Insurance Fund

ORDER
Pursuant to the above and foregoing Stipulation and good cause appearing therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above styled and numbered cause be dismissed with
prejudice.
DATED: _________________
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
BY ______________________________
CHAIRMAN
BY ______________________________
COMMISSIONER
BY ______________________________
c::OMMISSIONER
ATTEST:

ASSISTANT SECRETARY
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IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

C,L, "BUTCH" OTTER, GOVI1RNOR

POBox 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0041
(208) 334-6000 - FAX (208) 334-2321
1-800-950-2110

COMMISSIONERS
R,D. Maynard. Chainnan
Thomas E, Limbaugh
Thomas P. Baskin
Mindy Montgomery, Director

January 13,2010
Andrew Marsh
Seiniger Law Offices
942 W Myrtle Street
Boise, ID 83702
Re:

Claimant: Timothy Steinmetz
IC # 2008-002191
Proposed settlement with State Insurance Fund

Dear Mr. Marsh:
The Industrial Commission (Commission) is in receipt ofthe proposed settlement agreement
referenced above. In our review of the proposed settlement, the Commission has also
considered your letter and attachments of December 23,2009, as well as the documentation
attached to the Stipulation and Lump Sum Agreement received that same date. The
Commission staff has made an initial determination that the settlement is in the best interests
of the parties, except for the portion of the requested fees related to the Permanent Partial
Impairment (PPI) benefit previously paid, and a portion of the fees requested from the Lump
Sum Consideration, which have not been found reasonable per IDAPA 17.02.08.033. With
respect to the fee from the PPI, staff lacks sufficient information to conclude that the
requested fee is reasonable, and is therefore unable to recommend approval of the same to the
Commission. With respect to the fees in excess of 25% requested from the Lump Sum
Consideration of $28,900.00, Commission staff is unable to recommend approval as the fee
does not appear reasonable either per IDAPA 17.02.08.033, or in conformance with the
Contingency Fee Agreement.
Specifically, Counsel is requesting fees from the PPI, as itemized on page 2 of the Statement
of Claimant's Counsel, but it is unclear from the documentation submitted for consideration
that Counsel was primarily or substantially responsible for obtaining those benefits. The PPI
was paid in the amount of $20,394.00, and fees requested and previously taken amounted to
$5,098,53 (25%).
Additionally, Counsel requests fees of $9,633.33 from the Lump Sun1 Consideration of
$28,900, which equates to thirty-three and one-third percent (33.33%). Fees of25%, equaling
$7,225.00, are found reasonable. The fees in excess of 25%, $2,408.33, are not found
reasonable. Consequently, the total fees not currently found reasonable are $7,506.86
($5,098.53 plus $2,408.33).

700 So. Clearwater Ln., Boise, 10
Equal Opportunity Employer

Please be aware that this is an initial determination> and, in accordance with IDAPA
17.02.08.033.03, you may request a hearing on the matter within fourteen days. Also in
accordance with this rule, the Commission will shortly be issuing a partial order releasing
available funds, and fees and costs which have been determined to be reasonable.
Thank you for your assistance in the review of this proposed settlement.
Sincerely,

~

Scott McDougall
Manager, Claims and Benefits
Cc:

Ron Coston, State Insurance Fund
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Timothy Steinmetz,
Claimant,
v.
G2B Company, Inc.,
Employer,
and
State Insurance Fund,
Surety,
Defendant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

IC: 2008-002191

ORDER APPROVING IN PART
LUMP SUM AGREEMENT

FI LE D

JAN 2 6 2010
INDUSTRIAl COMMISSION

This matter came before the Commission on the request of the parties to approve a Lump
Sum Agreement.

The Commission desires to approve the agreement, except for a portion

relating to attorney fees. Having fully reviewed the proposed settlement and being fully advised,
the Commission finds that the agreement is in the best interests of the parties. THEREFORE,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That the Lump Sum Agreement proposed by the parties is
approved, with the exception of a portion of the claim for attorney fees submitted by Claimant's
attorney.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the Commission approves the request for attorney fees
of twenty-five percent and costs as those services related to the lump sum consideration. The
total lump sum consideration amount is $28,900.

Fees from that amount at 25% equal
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$7,225.00, which is reasonable. Fees and costs amount to $7,225.00 and $23.37 respectively, for
a total of $7,248.37. Attorney has previously withheld $5,098.53 as fees. Thus, the surety shall
pay to Claimant's attorney the sum of$2,149.84, as the balance of such fees and costs.
Attorney also claims entitlement to fees in the amount $5,098.53, which is 25% of the
PPI benefits paid per settlement. Further, Attorney claims entitlement to fees of thirty-three and
one-third percent from the lump sum consideration of $28,900. As previously noted, fees of
25% have been found reasonable from this latter amount. The amount of the fees in excess of
25% equals $2,408.33. The fees from the PPI benefit and the fees from the lump sum
consideration in excess of 25% have not been substantiated to the Commission as reasonable in
accordance with IDAPA 17.02.08.033.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the Surety release to Attorney the sum of $7,506.86,
which is the amount of the proceeds of the Lump Sum Agreement requested for unsubstantiated
attorney fees, to be held in Attorney's trust account pending further order of the Commission.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the Surety pay to Claimant the remaining sum of
$19,243.30.
Claimant's attorney has previously been advised in writing of this determination and his
right to request a hearing on the issue of attorney fees.
1"1>\

DATEDthisd6 day of d~~ ,2010.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

T omas"'E. Li\augh, c'b~iss
ORDER APPROVING IN PART LUMP SUM AGREEM'ENr---~
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Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on~(V\.. d.~ ,3 {) I D , a true and correct copy of ORDER
APPROVING IN PART LUMP S
AGREEMENT was served upon the partIes hsted
below as follows:

-X-USMAIL

COURIER

Andrew Marsh
Seiniger Law Office
942 W Myrtle St
Boise,ID 83702
State Insurance Fund
1215 West State Street
Statehouse Mail
Boise,ID 83720-0044

ORDER APPROVING IN PART STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT OF LUMP SUM
DISCHARGE - 4
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\Vm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387)
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588)
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 345-1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700
Attorneys for Claimant
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Tim Stienmetz,
Claimant,
I.C. No. 2008-002191
vs.
MOTION FOR STATEMENT
OF REASONS FOR DENIAL
OF ATTORNEY FEE
PURSUANT TO
IDAP A 17.02.08.033.03(a)

G2B Co. Inc.,

Employer,
and
Idaho State Insurance Fund,
Surety,
Defendants.

COMES NO\V Claimant's counsel, and hereby files this MOTION FOR STATEMENT
OF REASONS FOR DENIAL OF ATTORNEY FEE PURSUANT TO IDAPA
17.02.08.033.03(a).
The grounds for the Motion are that IDAP A 17.02.08.033.03(a) provides as follows:
"The Commission staff will notify counsel in writing of the staff s informal determination, which
shall state the reasons for the determination that the requested fee is not reasonable." However,
Counsel has received no such statement. Neither the Commission's order dated January 26,2010
nor the letter from Scott McDougal dated January 13,2010 contain any reasons; they only
contain the conclusion that the attorney fees requested in the above matter have not been found
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000

MOTION FOR STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR DEN IAL
OF ATTORNEY FEE PURSUANT TO
IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03(A)
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to be reasonable.
The legal dictionary at http://dictionary.lp.findlaw.com defmes "reason" as "an
underlying ground, justification, purpose, motive, or inducement. Example: required to provide
reasons for the termination in writing." In other words, a statement of reasons must include
the underlying grounds, i.e. a factual and legal basis, neither of which has been provided to
Counsel.
It would be fundamentally unfair for Counsel to be denied attorney fees or to be forced to

attend a hearing on attorney fees without receiving the statement of reasons required by the
IDAPArule.
The relief sought is compliance with IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03(a), including notification in
writing to Counsel of the factual and legal reasons for the determination that the requested
attorney fee is not reasonable.
Dated February 1,2010.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

Andrew Marsh
Attorney for Claimant

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000

MOTION FOR STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR DENIAL
OF ATTORNEY FEE PURSUANT TO
IDAPA 17.02.0B.033.03(A)
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I CERTIFY that on February 1,2010, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document
to be served as follows:
Ronald Coston
State Insurance Fund
1215 W. State Street
Boise,ID 83720-0044
Fax (208) 332-2175
[RJ

Fax

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

Andrew Marsh
Attorney for Claimant

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345·1000

MOTION FOR STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR DENIAL
OF ATTORNEY FEE PURSUANT TO
IDAPA 17.02.0B.033.03(A)
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IC 2008-002191
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)

Employer,
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ORDER DENYING MOTION
FOR STATEMENT OF REASONS
I L I:.
"'~
>

INDUSTRIAL COMMtSSiCl'N

On January 26, 2010, the Commission issued an Order Approving in Part Lump Sum
Agreement. In that Order, the Commission declined to approve attorney fees in the amount of
$7,506.86. On February 11, 2010, Claimant's counsel filed a motion requesting a statement of
reasons why the requested fees were denied by the Commission. Claimant's counsel contends
that IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03(a) requires such a statement from Commission staff and that the
statement has not been provided.

In a letter dated January 13, 2010, Commission staff informed Claimant's counsel that
staff lacks sufficient information to conclude that the requested fees are reasonable.
Specifically, Claimant's counsel failed to provide sufficient evidence demonstrating that he acted
primarily or substantially to secure the PPI fund from which the fees were being requested. In
order for the fees to be deemed reasonable, such evidence must be provided. Additionally,
Claimant's counsel requested attorney fees of 33.33% from the lump sum consideration.
Attorney fees from the consideration in excess of 25% were not found to be reasonable.
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR STATEMENT OF REASONS - 1

The January 13, 2010 letter satisfies the requirements of IDAP A 17.02.08.033.03(a).
Consequently, the motion is DENlED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this..M day of March, 2010. )
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

1;Jt;Jf.~
MaynaTd,Clla~n

R.D.

Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~

I hereby certify that on the
of March 2010, a true and correct copy of Order
Denying Motion For Statement of Reasons was served by regular United States Mail upon
each of the following persons:
ANDREW MARSH
942 W MYRTLE ST
BOISE ID 83702
RONALD COSTON
STATE INSURANCE FUND
1215 W STATE STREET
BOISE ID 83720-0044
sb/cjh
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o
Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387)
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588)
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 345-1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700
Attorneys for Claimant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Tim Stienmetz,
Claimant,
I.C. No. 2008-002191

vs.
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S
ADMISSIONS FOR
ATTORNEY FEE HEARING

G2B Co. Inc.,
Employer,
And
Idaho State Insurance Fund,
Surety,
Defendants.

COMES NOW Claimant's Counsel and files these ADMISSIONS for purposes of the
Attorney Fee Hearing (hereinafter "Hearing") now scheduled in this matter for May 10,2010.
For purposes of these proceedings, Counsel is using the phrase "but-for test" as shorthand
for a standard of proof that means that in order to prove the element of "primarily or
substantially" (IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.c.ii.), Counsel is required to prove the causal link
between Counsel's representation and the payment of benefits by demonstrating nothing less
than that without his representation, the benefits would not have been paid.
Counsel makes the following admissions:
1. For purposes of these proceedings only, and without waiving the right to raise the
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000

CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S
ADMISSIONS FOR ATTORNEY FEE HEARING
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constitutionality of the applicable IDAP A attorney fee rules on appeal, Seiniger
Law Offices admits that it cannot prove that its attorneys were "primarily or
substantially" responsible for securing the permanent partial impairment
(PPI) benefit and the other benefits paid as consideration for lump sum
settlement (LSS) if the standard of proof is the "but-for test."
2. For purposes ofthese proceedings only, and without waiving the right to raise the
constitutionality of the applicable IDAP A attorney fee rules on appeal, Seiniger
Law Offices admits that it cannot prove that the Defendants "disputed" the
permanent partial impairment (PPI) benefit and the other benefits paid as
consideration for lump sum settlement (LSS) before the Defendants paid
those benefits.

Dated May 10,2010.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

Andrew Marsh
Attorney for Claimant

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345·1000

CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S
ADMISSIONS FORATTORNEY FEE HEARING
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387)
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588)
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 345-1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700
Attorneys for Claimant
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Tim Stienmetz,
Claimant,
I.C. No. 2008-002191
vs.
G2B Co. Inc.,
Employer,

CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S
OPENING BRIEF

And
Idaho State Insurance Fund,
Surety,
Defendants.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This matter came before the Idaho Industrial Commission for a Hearing on May 11,2010
on the issue of the rights of Claimant and Claimant's Counsel's to have their attorney fee
agreement upheld. Counsel testified via the Affidavit of Andrew Marsh and its Exhibits;

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000
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Claimant testified; and no party presented any contrary evidence. There are no facts in dispute. l
Tim Stienrnetz (Claimant) was injured in the workplace and solicited and entered into a
Fee Agreement2 (Fee Agreement) with Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. (Counsel) under which
Counsel agreed to provide legal counseling and representation on all matters related to
Claimant's case in consideration ofthe contingent fee set forth in the Fee Agreement. Counsel
provided extensive legal services as counselor and advocate from 2008-2009, during which
Claimant received pennanent partial impainnent (PPI) benefits. Counsel ultimately negotiated a
Lump Sum Settlement Agreement (LSSA) for Claimant. Counsel sought approval of
contingency attorney fees on the PPI and LSSA benefits.

A. THE COMMISSION DENIED ATTORNEY FEES ON PPI
Claimant and Defendants submitted a "Lump Sum Settlement Agreement" to the
Commission, which issued its "Order Approving in Part Lump Sum Agreement" (Order) on Jan.
26,2010. 3 The Order denied Counsel's request for approval of an attorney fee of$5098.53 for
pennanent partial impainnent (pPI) benefits, stating that fees "have not been substantiated to the
Commission as reasonable." The Commission Staff Letter (Jan. 13,2010) to which the Order
refers stated that "it is unclear from the documentation submitted for consideration that Counsel
was primarily or substantially responsible for obtaining those benefits.,,4

B. THE COMMISSION DENIED COUNSEL'S MOTION FOR
1 In regard to factual questions raised by the Commission at the Hearing for which Counsel Andrew Marsh did not
have a present recollection, the second surgery was performed on 3/31/08. Counsel made written demand dated
6/3/08 upon Dr. Montalbano for a PPI rating and permanent work restrictions.
2 Affidavit of Andrew Marsh, Exhibit A.
3 The Commission approved Counsel's request for an attorney fee of25% or $7225.00 for LSSA benefits. Note: The
Form 1022 filed by Counsel contained a typographical error in a form spreadsheet used for calculating disbursement
of settlement funds. This error was corrected in a letter to Scott McDougall of the Commission Staff (Jan. 26, 2010).
4 IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01(c) states that an attorney seeking fees must demonstrate inter alia that "ii. The services of
the attorney operated primarily or substantially to secure the fund out of which the attorney seeks to be paid."

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000
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STATEMENT OF REASONS
In response to the Order, Counsel filed a "Motion for Statement of Reasons for Denial of
Attorney Fee Pursuant To IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03(a)"s on February 11,2010. The Commission
issued its "Order Denying Motion for Statement of Reasons" on March 3,2010, stating only that
"counsel failed to provide sufficient evidence demonstrating that he acted primarily or
substantially to secure the PPI fund from which the fees were being requested." This statement is
a conclusion;6 it is apparently the Commission's position that the IDAPA rule only requires a
naked conclusion, and need not be clothed with actual reasons. 7
Counsel submits that the Commission may not hold an attorney fee hearing pursuant to
IDAP A 17.02.08.033.03(b) if it has failed to follow its own rule requiring reasons.

II. ADMISSIONS BY COUNSEL
A. COUNSEL CANNOT PROVE THAT HE WAS '''PRIMARILY
OR SUBSTANTIALLY" RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PPI OR
LSSA BENEFITS IF THE STANDARD IS ··THE BUT-FOR
TEST"
At the Hearing, Counsel filed "Claimant's Counsel's Admissions for Attorney Fee
Hearing." The Admissions read as follows:
For purposes of these proceedings, Counsel is using the phrase "but-for test" as
shorthand for a standard of proof that means that in order to prove the element of
"primarily or substantially" (IDAP A 17.02.08.033.01.c.ii.), Counsel is required to
prove the causal link between Counsel's representation and the payment of
benefits by demonstrating nothing less than that without his representation, the
5 IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03(a) reads in pertinent part: "the Commission will designate staff members to determine
reasonableness of the fee. The Commission staff will notify counsel in writing ofthe staffs informal determination,
which shall state the reasons for the determination that the requested fee is not reasonable."
6 The legal dictionary at http://dictionary.lp.findlaw.com defines "conclusion" as "an opinion or judgment offered
without supporting evidence; speci!: an allegation made in a pleading that is not based on facts set forth in the

~leading."

The same legal dictionary defmes "reason" as "an underlying ground, justification, purpose, motive, or
inducement. Example: required to provide reasons for the termination in writing." A statement of reasons must
include the underlying grounds, i.e. a factual and legal basis, neither of which was ever provided to Counsel.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000
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benefits would not have been paid.
Counsel makes the following admissions:
1.
For purposes of these proceedings only, and without waiving the right to
raise the constitutionality of the applicable IDAP A attorney fee rules on appeal,
Seiniger Law Offices admits that it cannot prove that its attorneys were
"primarily or substantially" responsible for securing the permanent partial
impairment (PPI) benefit and the other benefits paid as consideration for
lump sum settlement (LSS) if the standard of proof is the "but-for test."
(emphasis in original)

B. COUNSEL CANNOT PROVE THAT THE BENEFITS WERE
--DISPUTED" BY THE DEFENDANTS
The Admissions continue as follows:
2.
For purposes ofthese proceedings only, and without waiving the right to
raise the constitutionality of the applicable IDAP A attorney fee rules on appeal,
Seiniger Law Offices admits that it cannot prove that the Defendants
"disputed" the permanent partial impairment (PPI) benefit and the other
benefits paid as consideration for lump sum settlement (LSS) before the
Defendants paid those benefits. (emphasis in original)
The Commission appears to be requiring that there be proof of a "dispute" between claimants
and defendants before it will allow attorney fees. 8 This position is directly contrary to controlling
case law. 9

ISSUES

III.

Counsel's position includes the following:
•

Counsel is constitutionally and legally entitled to the claimed attorney fees in full.

17.0.08.033.01.a. Note that the defInition of "Available Funds," upon which the Commission appears to rely, does
not require that there be an affmnative dispute; it merely excludes "compensation ... not disputed to be owed prior
to claimant's agreement to retain the attorney." Moreover, Counsel received a letter from Scott McDougall dated
10/22/09 in Drotzman v. Coors Brewing, LI.C. No. 06-006711 in which he appears to require "documentation that
the specifIc benefIt was disputed or delayed." Counsel could fInd no legal authority to support the Commission's
apparent position that proof of a "dispute" must be in documentary form. Throughout the history of American
jurisprudence, courts have admitted evidence even if it is in non-written forms, such as testimonial or demonstrative.
9 The Commission may not limit representation to "disputed matters." Curr v. Curr, 864 P.2d 132 (1993)
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
CLAI MANT'S COUNSEL'S
PAGE 5 OF 31
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•

The Commission's regulations relating to the definitions of "Available Funds" and the
associated standard defming them as benefits "primarily and substantially" made
available as a result of the efforts of Counsel are vague and unconstitutional as written
and/or as interpreted or applied under controlling case law laid down by the Idaho
Supreme Court.

•

The Fee Agreement involved was reasonable, especially when viewed at the time into
which it was entered.

•

Counsel and Claimant are constitutionally entitled to have their Fee Agreement honored
unless it is patently unreasonable (outside controlling case law or outside any of the
IDAPA rules that are valid).

•

The services provided by Counsel were lawful, important, valuable, and compensable
pursuant to controlling case law.

These, then, are among the central issues. lO The dollar amounts of the attorney fees at issue are
$5,098.53 on PPI benefits, and $7,225.00 on the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement. 11

IV. CONTROLLING LEGAL AUTHORITY
The argument which follows is based upon the premise that the constitutional holdings in
Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 864 P.2d 132 (1993) control the rights of claimants' counsel in
workers' compensation cases. Curr has not been implicitly overruled or limited by the Idaho
Supreme Court, and remains good law. It controls the bounds of discretion of the Commission in
determining the reasonableness of a claim for attorney fees and other aspects of the authority
granted to the Commission and the exercise of that authority.

V.CONSTITUTIONALITY

10 Other issues were raised in Counsel's "Request for Hearing on Order Approving Lump Sum Agreement," on file
with the Commission and incorporated herein by reference (due to rules limiting brieflength).
11 The reason that attorney fees on lump sum benefits as well as PPI benefits are at issue is that the Commission may
not "cherry-pick" which types of benefits are subject to its standards. See discussion irifra.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
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A. THE COMMISSION MUST COMPLY WITH
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS IN ADOPTING,
INTERPRETING, AND IMPLEMENTING ITS REGULATIONS
The Commission may not adopt a regulation that clearly flies in the face of the
constitutional limitations on its authority set forth in Curr and may not apply its "primarily or
substantially" rule in such a way as to patently violate that authority. Counsel is aware of no
legal authority to the contrary.

B. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF CLAIMANT'S
COUNSEL AND CLAIMANT ARE GOVERNED BY CURR
These are the holdings from Curr, set forth in quotes (emphasis added):
•

For an attorney fee agreement, "Reasonableness ... derives from the totality of the
circumstances from the perspective of the parties at the time that the fee agreement
was made." Curr, at 690.

•

The "parties to a contract have a property interest in the subject matter of the
contract that is protectable both under the Contract Clause and the Due Process Clause
of the United States Constitution." Curr, at 691-692.

•

In Idaho, "the right to follow a recognized and useful occupation is protected by a
constitutional guarantee ofliberty under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and Idaho Const. art. 1, § 13."

•

The Commission must permit the Claimant to "compensate an attorney for acting solely
as a counselor."

•

The Commission must "recognize [advocacy] efforts that do not generate monetary
awards such as [sometimes] obtaining permission for medical care or procuring an
impairment rating."

•

The Commission may not make suspect an attorney's "integrity in the eyes of their
clients."

•

The Commission may not limit attorney fees to "new money."

•

The Commission may not limit representation to "disputed matters."

•

The Commission "must have clearly articulated evidentiary standards that will be
used at the hearing. . . and formally publish clear guidelines upon which it will base the
fee modifications." Curr, at 692.

•

"This Court has recognized that a reasonable contingent fee must be 'sufficiently high
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to compensate the lawyer not only for the reasonable value of the time he or she
anticipates devoting to the particular lawsuit, but also for the time devoted to other
lawsuits undertaken on the same basis but unsuccessful in result.'" Curr, at 693.

Counsel submits, and the Commission essentially acknowledges in its recent decision in
Kulm v. Mercy Medical Center, IC No. 06-012770 (May 20,2010), that its interpretation of
Rhodes and its application of its IDAP A rules are contrary to Curro Counsel believes that Curr
has not been implicitly overruled by Rhodes V. Indus. Comm., 125 Idaho 139, 868 P.2d 467
(1993), Mancilla V. Greg, 131 Idaho 685, 963 P.2d 368 (1998), or Johnson

V.

Boise Cascade

Corp., 134 Idaho 350, 2 P.3d 735 (2000). None of these cases even mention Curr, much less
address the constitutional questions that were raised in Curr-although in Kulm the Commission
curiously omits any mention ofthis important detaiL
In the Kulm decision (p. 15), the Commission asserts that it has not "determined that Curr
v. Curr, supra, has been overruled by Rhodes, Mancilla and/or Johnson." Yet, a few paragraphs
before this, it concludes that Rhodes did overrule the "new money" provision of Curr: "From
the Rhodes decision, the Industrial Commission can discern nothing in the language of that case
that would suggest that the former provision limiting an award of attorney's fees to 25% of 'new
money' did not pass constitutional muster." But in the very next sentence, the Commission
admits that there is room for doubt about its interpretation of Rhodes: "even if it be assumed that
the majority in Rhodes only intended to narrowly address the constitutionality of a 25% cap (not
a 25% cap on 'new money'), it would seem that the constitutional analysis applied to that portion
ofthe regulation would also apply to the balance of the regulation." (Kulm, p. 14)
The Commission then launches into an analysis of the rational basis test, and predicts
how the Supreme Court would rule on the constitutionality of the regulations: "nothing in
Rhodes seems to suggest that the Court found, or would find, that only certain of the provisions
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of the former IDAPA 17.01.01.803.d are constitutional." All this occurs despite the fact that it is
black-letter law that the Commission has no power to interpret constitutionality, and its
discretion is limited by the bounds of controlling case law on constitutional issues.

C. THE COMMISSION'S APPLICATION OF ITS RULES
VIOLATES THE "CLEARLY ARTICULATED EVIDENTIARY
STANDARDS" REQUIREMENT OF CURR
As regards the IDAP A phrase "operated primarily or substantially to secure the fund out
of which the attorney seeks to be paid," the Commission created a defmition in the Kulm
decision, p. 28. For example, they define "primarily" in this way: "that he originally, or initially,
took action that secured the fund ... from which he hopes to be paid." In doing so, the
Commission overtly contradicts itself. First, it states:
For example, it is possible that an attorney could undertake some action in a
particular case that might be deemed to be responsible for initiating or originating
the fund from which he hopes to be paid, without being able to satisfy his burden
of showing that his efforts were "in the main" responsible for obtaining the fund
from which he hopes to be paid.
The clear implication is that as long as the attorney initiates or originates the fund, he doesn't
have to show that his efforts were responsible for obtaining it.
But a few paragraphs later, the Commission illustrates their Scenario No.1, in which the
physician gives claimant an impairment rating because he remembers that earlier in the case he
got a letter from claimant's attorney requesting it. The Commission states:
Attorney may be primarily responsible for securing the impairment rating, since it
was his letter that originated, or initiated the rating. However, it is important to
note that in order to meet his burden of proof, counsel would need to demonstrate
that there existed some nexus between his letter to the physician and the
physician's action. In other words, counsel would need to demonstrate that the
physician acted because of counsel's letter.
In Scenario No.1, unlike their previous example, the Commission states that even though the
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attorney is "primarily responsible for securing the impairment rating," in addition he must
"demonstrate that the physician acted because of counsel's letter," i.e. he must "satisfy his burden
of showing that his efforts were responsible for obtaining" the rating. In other words, Scenario
No. 1 requires a showing of "primarily AND substantially"-even though the actual IDAP A rule
uses the disjunctive "or," not the conjunctive "and."
Incredibly, Scenario No.1 is actually even more confusing than this. First, the
Commission states that the physician gave the rating because a/the attorney's request letter
("physician remembers counsel's letter, and generates a letter to counsel in which he gives
claimant her impairment rating"). This certainly sounds like the very definition of a nexus. But
two sentences later, the Commission concludes that no attorney fee is allowed since there did not
exist "some nexus between his letter to the physician and the physician'S action." Kulm, p. 29.
Counsel submits that the Commission's attempted definitions do not meet the "clearly
articulated evidentiary standards" requirement of Curro
On a related topic, the Affidavit of Andrew Marsh submitted at the Hearing, Section 3.5.3

et seq., goes into great detail about the problems with the Commission's use and application of
the term "disputed." The Affidavit shows that the Curr precedent is not being followed.
On another related topic, the phrase "clearly articulated evidentiary standards" would
include a standard for the level of proof required of Counsel, which according to IDAP A
17.0.08.033.03.d. is a preponderance ofthe evidence. This is defmed by law as "evidence that is
of greater weight, or is more convincing, than that offered in opposition to it.,,12 In terms of

12 'A ''preponderance of the evidence" is evidence that, when weighed with that opposed to it, has more convincing
force and from which results a greater probability of truth.' Harris v. Electrical Wholesale, 141 Idaho 1,3, 105 P.3d
267,269 (2004). Also, "A preponderance of evidence is evidence that is of greater weight, or is more convincing,
than that offered in opposition to it. The term does not mean preponderance in amount." 32A c.Js. Evidence §
1628. Clearly, the "probability of truth" is not just a function of the supporting evidence offered, but also of the
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Counsel's and Claimant's right to have their Fee Agreement upheld, there was no contrary
evidence offered at the hearing, nor is there any contrary evidence in the record. It is well-settled
law that a tribunal may not make a ruling for which there is no factual support, so on that basis
alone the Commission may not deny the request for attorney fees. 13

D. COUNSEL'S ATTORNEY FEE REQUEST IS REASONABLE
AS DEFINED BY CURR
When an attorney takes a workers' compensation case, the risk of no recovery is great.
These risks are set forth in detail in the Marsh Affidavit, Section 3 et. seq.
For example, in trying to decide whether to take a case, an attorney must speculate as to
whether the injured worker will eventually have a PPI rating; if so, whether the surety will
dispute it; and if disputed, whether it will be possible to prevail at a hearing so that the claimant
will actually receive benefits from which the attorney can take a fee. Even an experienced
physician would be unwilling to attempt such a prediction: "It is impossible for a layman or
even for a physician to know, or to accurately predict, whether an injured worker will ultimately
have an impairment rating, or what the percentage of that rating might be, until the injured
worker has completed his or her medical treatment." (Affidavit of Dr. Richard Radnovich,
Exhibit 5.)
Given the risks and the unknowable factors, the Supreme Court recognizes that
"Reasonableness [of a fee agreement] ... derives from the totality of the circumstances from the
perspective of the parties at the time that the fee agreement was made." Curr, at 690. For
weight of the evidence "offered in opposition to it." If there is no evidence offered in opposition, a tribunal may not
make a ruling contrary to that of the evidence that is offered. Pierstor./f, infra.
13 Uncontradicted testimony of a credible witness, unless his testimony is inherently improbable or rendered so by
facts and circumstances disclosed at the hearing, cannot arbitrarily be disregarded. Pierstorffv. Gray's Auto Shop 74
P.2d 171, 175 (Idaho 1937). Since its first enunciation by the Idaho Supreme Court, the "PierstorffRule" has
become ironclad law in Idaho. State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 163,814 P.2d 401, 423 (Idaho, 1991).
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example, if at the time of contracting for an attorney the contracting parties had reasonable
concerns that legal counseling or advocacy might be needed to address existing or potential
disputes or issues, the benefit of hindsight may not be used for a fmding that it was unreasonable
to so contract.

In the instant case, the evidence shows that at the time of contracting, Claimant thought
he needed help;14 Claimant's Counsel agreed to help him; and Counsel did provide legal services
to him. That more than meets the reasonableness test of Curro The parties' decision to contract
for legal service may not lawfully be second-guessed by the Commission under the guise of
belatedly discovering a basis for the denial of a claim for attorney fees.

E. THE SUPREME COURT SPECIFICALLY ALLOWS A

REASONABLE CONTINGENCY FEE
"This Court has recognized that a reasonable contingent fee must be 'sufficiently high to
compensate the lawyer not only for the reasonable value of the time he or she anticipates
devoting to the particular lawsuit, but also for the time devoted to other lawsuits undertaken on
the same basis but unsuccessful in result.'" Curr, at 693. In other words, Idaho specifically
allows contingency fees to compensate claimants' attorneys for the risk factors referenced above,

in addition to the value of their time and expertise. This applies to the instant case.

VI.ETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY
A. THE COMMISSION'S APPROACH CREATES ETHICAL
PROBLEMS FOR ATTORNEYS
The Commission's approach creates a myriad of serious ethical questions for both
claimant's attorneys and defense attorneys. These include:

14

See Claimant's testimony at Hearing, pages 12-13.
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•

Since the Commission appears to be ignoring the Idaho Supreme Court's unequivocal
prohibition oflimiting attorney fees to "new money," is it now the Commission's
position that an attorney can be required to provide legal services without compensation?

•

Since the Commission appears to be ignoring the Idaho Supreme Court's unequivocal
prohibition of limiting attorney fees to "disputed" matters, is it now the Commission's
position that an attorney is not allowed to be compensated for services provided as
counselor and advocate in the absence of a dispute?

•

Although the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct allow an attorney to limit the scope of
his representation, is a claimant's attorney ethically permitted to accept responsibility for
a case and but limit his representation to only matters that become disputed?

•

If an attorney is ethically permitted to so limit his representation, may he decline to
discuss certain issues with the defendants, and limit his discussions to disputed matters?

•

If an attorney is ethically permitted to so limit his representation, may he give permission
to opposing counsel to speak directly with the claimant as to undisputed matters? If so,
would opposing counsel be ethically permitted to do so despite ethical prohibitions
against contact with a party represented by counsel?

In addition, the Commission's approach automatically creates a potential conflict of interest
between claimant's attorney and claimant anytime the Commission declines to approve an
attorney fee that is otherwise reasonable under controlling case law. This forces an attorney into
a fee hearing in which attorney and client have conflicting fmancial interests, and contravenes
the Supreme Court's holding that the Commission may not make suspect the attorneys'
"integrity in the eyes of their clients." Curr, at 692. The Claimant acknowledged this concern in
his testimony at the Hearing, p. 13:
17
18
19
20
. 21

Q Do you understand what we're here for today?
A Yeah. I mean, I understand they need to be
paid. And I understand, you know, where you guys are
coming from as well. So, I mean, I'm kind of in an
awkward situation.
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B. THE COMMISSION IS ACTING IN VIOLATION OF
PUBLIC POLICY
The Commission has been interpreting or applying IDAP A 17.02.08.033 in such a way
that it brings about the following results, all of which are against public policy:
•

Claimants are less likely to be able to fInd counsel to take their case.

•

Attorneys are discouraged from taking workers' compensation cases because the
Commission does not honor their fee agreements with their clients. 15

•

The attorney-client relationship is damaged by the Commission's creation of a conflict of
interest between attorney and client each time the Commission or its Staff fInds the
requested attorney fee to be unreasonable, and by the implication in each such instance
that the attorney acted unfairly, unethically, or unreasonably.

•

The confIdence of claimants and attorneys in the legal system is undermined when the
Commission, via its website and its publications (see discussion infra), strongly
encourages claimants to seek legal advice, but at the end of the case tells claimants and
attorneys that it will not honor their fee agreement, and/or tells them that portions of the
attorneys' services were of no value or not of compensable value.

•

When attorneys discontinue taking workers' compensation cases because the
Commission does not honor their fee agreements, and when as a result claimants are
unable to fInd counsel to take their case and as a result do not receive their full benefIts
under the workers' compensation law, the burden of medical and fInancial care for these
unassisted claimants shifts from the insurers who collected employers' premiums to
various public welfare and private charity organizations. 16

A related set of public policy concerns is whether the Commission should be prohibited from
15 Making it impossible for an attorney to be able to afford to practice in the plaintiffs side of workers'
compensation law is a violation of an attorney's right to practice his profession. In Idaho, "the right to follow a
recognized and useful occupation is protected by a constitutional guarantee ofliberty under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Idaho Const. art. 1, § B." Curr, at 692.
16 Put another way, injured workers who do not receive their full medical and income benefits due to lack of access
to legal counsel do not just disappear; they still need help, so they surface at emergency rooms for medical care and
welfare departments for income problems. The net cost to society is same-it is just that the cost of caring for
injured workers is shifted from insurance companies who are protected from having to pay on policy claims (even
though they collected premiums) to other governmental and charitable institutions. This shifting of the cost is clearly
counter to public policy.
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interpreting or applying IDAP A 17.02.08.033, including especially the "dispute" language of
.Ol(a), in such a way that one or more ofthe following results:
•

The plaintiffs bar is encouraged to work toward finding ways to foster, or at least to
demonstrate and document, that there was a "fight, contest, or dispute,,17 between the
claimant and defendants.

•

The more reputable attorneys are penalized, because they are less likely to have benefits
disputed by the surety, and therefore, less likely to receive approval from the
Commission for their attorney fees (and less likely to take on injured workers' cases in
the future).

•

The surety is essentially put in charge of determining how much a claimant's attorney
will be paid, because attorney fees are based more on the surety's decisions of what to
"dispute" than on the parameters of Curr or any of the factors enumerated in Rule 1.5 of
the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct regarding the value of the attorney's services.

The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that public policy favors ensuring that claimants have
access to counsel. 18 Counsel submits that the Supreme Court has never intended, nor would
public policy favor, depriving Idaho's injured workers of their constitutional right to seek the
advice and advocacy of counsel at every stage of a worker's com1?ensation matter.
In addition, the Commission's interpretation and application of its IDAP A rules leads to
results that are contrary to the legislative intent set forth in I.C. 72-201 of "sure and certain relief
for injured workmen" in enacting the worker's compensation law, and contrary to the delegation
of power under I.C. 72-508 to "promulgate reasonable rules and regulations for effecting the

17 The "fight" quote is the Commission's position as set forth in "Order Denying Reconsideration," Sandra Perez v.
Idaho Fresh Pale, Inc. and Liberty Northwest Insurance Corp., IC No. 2005-530757 (9/18/09)
18 The Curr Court noted that "two general philosophies for the Commission to consider" are to "encourage claimants
to pursue rightful legal claims and attorneys to take on such claimants' interests. Hogaboom, 107 Idaho at 17, 684
P.2d at 994." Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 693, 864 P.2d 132, 139
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purposes of this act.,,19

C. THE COMMISSION MAY NOT ENCOURAGE CLAIMANTS
TO SEEK LEGAL ADVICE, WHILE FAILING TO DISCLOSE
THAT IT WILL NOT ALLOW THEM TO PAY THEIR LEGAL
ADVISORS
The Commission openly admits that its current application of it regulations is designed to
"make it impossible for certain injured workers who desire counsel to fmd someone who is
\villing to take their case for the small recompense," if any, that the Commission vvill permit.

Kulm, p. 42.
This is directly at odds with its own web site and publications (Marsh Affidavit, Section
6.2.) On almost every page, the Commission officially recommends that claimants seek legal
advice; warns claimants of the complexity of the law; and officially urges claimants to talk to an
attorney. The Commission then tells them exactly how to go about getting a lawyer. Moreover,
the Commission also makes it clear that its Staff cannot give legal advice

It light of the Kulm decision, it is unclear why the Commission recommends that injured
workers seek legal counseling, when the Commission knows, and the plaintiff s bar knows, that
the Commission will no longer permit claimants to pay their attorneys solely for counseling and
other efforts that do not generate monetary awards. Counsel respectfully submits that in the
interest of fairness and full disclosure to the public and to injured workers, the Commission
should disclose in its publications that under their rules, it may be impossible for injured workers
to fmd someone to take their case. The disclosure should also include a statement that since
Commission Staff cannot give legal advice, there is no way for certain injured workers to get

19 "Without clear guidelines nestled in appropriately promulgated regulations, attorneys' actions are plagued by
doubt, which may have a chilling effect on the underlying purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act that the
Commission is constrained to promote." Curr at 691-692.
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legal advice unless they can pay an hourly fee 20 or find someone to do the work pro bono.
In sum, public policy and fundamental fairness prohibit the Commission from
encouraging claimants to seek legal advice, and then preventing their advisors from getting paid.

CONSISTENCY IN APPLYING STANDARDS

VII.

A. BECAUSE THERE ARE MANY CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE
AN ATTORNEY FEE MUST BE APPROVED EVEN WHERE
THE ELEMENT OF "PRIMARILY OR SUBSTANTIALLY" IS
ABSENT, THE REQUIREMENT OF THIS ELEMENT CANNOT
BE SAID TO BE ABSOLUTE
Is it the Commission's position that the element of "primarily or substantially" must be
applied even where doing so would lead to an unjust or unintended result? Counsel is aware of
no authority that would support such an illogical interpretation of the workers' compensation
statute and controlling case law. It would make no sense to assume that the legislature, in
granting rule-making authority to the Commission (I.C. 72-508), intended that the rules be
applicable in such a way that the interests of justice are intentionally not served.
Let us examine how this issue would come up in practice: John Doe is a math teacher.
One day at work, his little finger gets pinched in the door of his classroom and severely injured.
The surety accepts his claim and starts paying medical bills and TTDs. Shortly thereafter, John
goes to an attorney. The services he seeks are: an explanation of his rights and benefits under the
law and how the law applies to the facts of his case; an explanation of work comp procedure and
the statute oflimitations; an explanation of his TTD rights and whether the surety is paying the
correct amount; and help with some medical bills that have not been paid by the surety, and help
with the collection agency that is pursuing him thereto. John has no money \vith which to pay an
Suppose that a claimant signs an hourly fee agreement, and later receives PPI benefits. May the claimant pay his
attorney the hourly fees from the PPI fimds? Under Curr, the answer would be "yes," but based on the
Commission's recent stance, even this seems to be in question.

20
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hourly fee.· The parties sign a contingency fee agreement including a clause allowing the attorney
to be paid from the PPI award. The attorney provides these services and more: he discovers that
John does not know about his right to medical mileage reimbursement or prescription co-pay
reimbursement. Also, although the surety says it hasn't refused the primary treating physician's
referral to a hand specialist, many weeks have gone by and still no approval has been
forthcoming. Also, John doesn't know that he might have the right to a prosthesis. The attorney
also straightens out the problem of the physician prescribing an antidepressant or sleep
medication based on John's reaction to the injury, but the surety would not pay it because they
claim there is no proofthat John was not depressed before the accident. The attorney also advises
John on how to handle himself while attending the surety's IME appointment. He also advises
him on the law regarding disability beyond impairment. During this time, infection sets in,
resulting in amputation of John's fmger. After many months of the attorney providing counseling
and advocacy services, John is found MMI and gets a 7.5% statutory PPI rating for loss of a
finger. The surety pays it on time. John returns to work as a teacher and has no disability beyond
impairment and no lump sum settlement agreement because the loss of his finger does not
prevent him from teaching.
In retrospect, it is clear that from the very moment of John's accident, he was going to be

entitled to a statutory PPI benefit of7.5%. Is it the Commission's position that because the
element of "primarily or substantially" could not be met for the PPI rating, that the attorney is
not entitled to any compensation for his services?
Counsel submits that a reasonable person would find such a result to be patently unjust,
and certainly not what the legislature intended in passing the statute. In that event, it cannot
possibly be the law in Idaho that the element of "primarily or substantially" is a sine qua non for
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the approval of an otherwise reasonable attorney fee.
Therefore, if there are some circumstances where this portion of the ID AP A rules cannot
be applied, then there can be no requirement that it must always be applied.
Put another way, if the element of "primarily or substantially" is a requirement in every
situation, even for the fairly common scenario above, then either the IDAP A rule itself or the
Commission's application of it must be unconstitutional.
Is it now the rule in Idaho that regardless of how much work an attorney performs for an
injured client before the PPI rating is issued, the attorney may not receive any fee from the PPI
unless the Commission finds that he meets their definition of "primarily or substantially?"
Counsel respectfully submits that it would be helpful to injured workers and to the plaintiff s bar
to have this question answered.

B. THE COMMISSION APPEARS TO TREAT FEES ON
BENEFITS OTHER THAN PPI INCONSISTENTLY, BECAUSE
FOR THESE IT DOES NOT REQUIRE PROOF OF THE
ELEMENT OF "PRIMARILY OR SUBSTANTIALLY"
If the Commission's approach is that it is not reasonable to take an attorney fee on a PPI
where it concludes that the element of "primarily or substantially" was not met, then it must
analyze all other benefit types in the same way, because the IDAP A rules do not distinguish one
benefit category from another?! So for example, let us assume that an attorney has vigorously
represented a claimant for a year, at the end of which the surety offers a lump sum settlement of

Curr requires "clearly articulated evidentiary standards ... and clear guidelirles" for determirlirlg the
reasonableness of attorney fees. Curr at 692. As regards the Commission's irlterpretation of the elements of
"primarily or substantially" and "disputed," it must apply the same level of proof and the same standards to requests
for attorney fees based on PPD benefits obtairled as it applies to PPI benefits obtairled. Since on the face of it the
"primarily and substantially" standard is applicable to all benefit categories, the Commission may not apply the
standard to certain selected categories of benefits (PPI) to the exclusion of others (PPD) for the purpose of
disallowing attorney fees. To do so would arbitrarily discrimirlate based on the type of benefit obtained.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S
PAGE 19 OF 31
94~ W. Myrtle Street
OPENING BRIEF
21

BOise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345·1000

$5000. Ultimately, the case is settled for $12,000. It could be argued that the attorney can only
claim an attorney fee on the $7000 difference, because the Commission's "but-for" definition of
"primarily or substantially" has not been met for the LSSA benefits. But in three decades of
practice, Counsel knows of no case where the Commission has done that. This shows that the
Commission inconsistently applies its standard of "primarily or substantially" depending on the
type of benefit.

C. THE COMMISSION DECRIES THE USE OF SPECULATION
IN DECIDING AN ATTORNEY FEE CASE, BUT RELIES ON
SPECULATION IN RENDERING ITS DECISIONS
In Kulm, the Commission decries the use of speculation in attorney fee cases:
That burden is not met by engaging in speculation as to what might have
happened absent attorney involvement. ... to approve an award on the basis of
this argument would require the Commission to engage in pure speculation. Kulm
at p. 31.
To propose that it was the preparation of Dr. Radnovich's rating that produced the
Rogers' impairment rating would require the Commission to veer into the realm of
speculation. Kulm at p. 39.
There is no way to establish a nexus between Counse1's actions and the creation of
the PPI award that does not require speculation. Kulm at p. 39.
But in the Drotzman decision, p. 16, the Commission itself uses speculation, after first decrying
it again:
Counsel does not meet this burden by speculating that Surety might not have
acted appropriately in his absence ...
As respects the 6% PPI rating, there is a dearth of evidence that Counsel obtained
for Claimant anything that he was not already going to get absent the retention of
Counsel's services .
. In Drotzman, the Commission says that Counsel may not speculate as to what Surety would have
done in his absence, but then a few sentences later the Commission speculates as to what
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Claimant "was already going to get" from Surety in Counsel's absence.
On the same page, the Commission speculates as to what efforts Counsel made to get
Claimant's PPI paid early:
Counsel was only responsible for obtaining Surety's agreement to make that
payment in one, as opposed to many, payments. This was, in all likelihood,
accomplished by a single phone call, or short letter.
The Commission then uses this "likelihood" as a basis to deny even a partial attorney fee. These
inconsistencies make it appear that the use of speculation is arbitrarily allowed when necessary
to justify a desired conclusion.

D. THE COMMISSION ALLOWS NON-LEGAL SERVICE
PROVIDERS TO BE PAID, EVEN IF THEY DID NOT CAUSE
ANY BENEFIT TO INURE TO CLAIMANTS
In workers' compensation, the Commission allows all non-legal service providers to be

paid for their services, regardless of whether there is a nexus between their services and a benefit
to the claimant:
•

A physical therapist, even if the therapy does not help the claimant.

•

A retraining provider, even if the claimant ultimately is unable to ajob in that field.

•

A doctor, even if surgery fails to cure the claimant-or even if it kills the patient!

•

The defendant's counsel, even ifhe loses the case.

In the entire field of workers' compensation service providers, it is only the claimant's attorney
who has to "prove" that his services were "primarily or substantially" responsible for causing a
benefit to inure to the claimant, in order to be paid.

VIII.

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL

A. IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL TO ALLOW DEFENDANTS,
BUT NOT PLAINTIFFS, TO HIRE AND PAY COUNSEL
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Now let us view this same issue-whether service providers in a workers' compensation
matter are allowed to be paid-from the standpoint of the litigants. The Commission allows
defendants--employers and sureties-to hire and pay the attorneys of their choice without any
limitation whatsoever. It is only the plaintiffs (the claimants) who must worry about whether

their fee agreement will be upheld and whether there will be attorneys willing to take their case
(given the Commission's current stance).
Moreover, the Commission allows employers and sureties to pay their counsel for the
mere giving of legal advice without proof that the advice saved them money, but will not allow

claimants to pay their younsel for giving legal advice without proof that the advice gained them
some money. Counsel is aware of no legal authority for the proposition that constitutional
guarantees of equal protection and the right to counsel do not prohibit the promulgation of
separate standards for litigants in regard to the right to hire and pay counsel.

B. IDAHO RECOGNIZES A RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The Idaho Supreme Court has said: "This court noted ... that '[t]he elements of the
constitutional guaranty of due process in its procedural aspect are notice and an opportunity to be
heard or defend before a competent tribunal in an orderly proceeding adapted to the nature of the
case'; including, the court stated, 'the right of representation by counsel. '" Frizzell v.
Swafford, 104 Idaho 823, at 827, 663 P.2d 1125 at 1129 (1983) (internal citations omitted,

emphasis added) Contrast the Supreme Court's position Vilith that of the Commission:
[T]he current rule may make it impossible for certain injured workers who
desire counsel to find someone who is willing to take their case for the small
recompense that the particular facts of that case may offer. Kulm, p. 42
If the Commission's holding is allowed to stand, the bedrock right to representation by counsel
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will have been repealed in Idaho.

IX. VALUING LEGAL SERVICES
A. THE COMMISSION MAY NOT ELIMINATE AN ENTIRE
CLASS OF LEGAL SERVICES AS PER SE UNREASONABLE
Returning now to our example of John Doe, under the Commission's current approach of
not allowing attorneys to be paid for services that do not generate monetary awards, poor John
will be unable to fmd an attorney to take his case. This would have the effect of disenfranchising
an entire class of injured workers (accidents of the John-Doe type) from the right of an injured
worker in Idaho to hire and pay the attorney of his choice.
Assuming, as we must, that the Commission's determination of the reasonableness of a
requested attorney fee is an exercise of discretion, then the Commission may not hold that certain
legal services are per se unreasonable. For example, there is no authority for the position that a
legal service provided to a claimant that does not result in the receipt of a workers' compensation
benefit is per se unreasonable; such a holding would clearly be outside the Commission's
discretionary power (and contrary to Curr).
The Commission may not hold that the class consisting of all of the legal services
rendered to a claimant prior to the issuance of a PPI rating are of no value or have no
compensable value. Curr supports this position: the Commission must "recognize efforts that do
not generate monetary awards such as obtaining permission for medical care" while claimant is
in the period of recovery and before a PPI rating is issued.
Perhaps the law allows the Commission to find that a particular legal service as
performed had no value-but it may not find that a service should never have its value
considered.
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B. THE COMMISSION MAY NOT ARBITRARILY FIND THAT
AN ATTORNEY'S SERVICES ARE OF NO VALUE
The facts set forth in the Affidavit of Andrew Marsh and its attached Exhibits
demonstrate that Counsel provided extensive legal services to Claimant. For the Commission to
choose to dishonor Counsel's contract with Claimant and disallow attorney fees on the PPI
benefit obtained would be tantamount to a finding that the services of Counsel (rendered before a
PPI rating) were of absolutely no value to Claimant, and in effect that attorney should not have
performed these services. It would also be tantamount to a finding that Counsel's exercise of
professional judgment, in agreeing to accept a case and in providing legal advice and advocacy,
was erroneous. Counsel knows of no authority to the contrary.
It would be helpful to the plaintiff's bar if the Commission would publish a list of what

legal services it considers to be of no compensable value to a claimant. Counsel also respectfully
asks this question: Is there any amount of work that an attorney could perform prior to a PPI
rating that would ever be enough to warrant approval of an attorney fee on the PPI benefit, in
circumstances where the Commission believes that the attorney was not "primarily or
substantially" responsible for obtaining the PPI?

C. THE LA W DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT THERE BE A
DIRECT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SERVICES
PROVIDED AND THE FUNDS FROM WHICH AN ATTORNEY
FEE MAY BE PAID
Can an attorney provide a particular legal service to a claimant and get paid for that
service out of benefits that did not result from the providing of that particular service? The
answer has to be yes, because to say otherwise would be to say that services that do not lead
directly to a benefit fund are not compensable-which would be in direct opposition to Curr:
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The Commission must "recognize efforts that do not generate monetary awards."
In other words, an attorney can be paid for a legal service even ifthere is not a one-to-one
correlation between that service and the fund out of which the attorney will be paid for that
service.
Indeed, there is nothing in Curr that says that reasonableness of an attorney fee is a
function of the source of the fee. Thus, the fee for services provided can come from any source,
regardless of the benefit category-TTD, PPI, medical, or lump sum-ofthat source.
In fact, isn't this what the parties contemplate22 when they enter into a fee agreement?
The understanding is that the attorney will provide whatever services the claimant needs,
including services that "do not generate monetary awards," and will be paid out of whatever
contractually-anticipated funds are received after being retained. And according to Curr, these
funds cannot be limited to "new money." Clearly, the IDAPA rules may not be interpreted or
applied in any way that requires a one-to-one correlation between a legal service and the funds
from which the attorney is paid. 23

X.DE NOVO HEARINGS AND DISCOVERY
A. THE ATTORNEY FEE HEARING WAS NOT DE NOVO
The attorney fee hearing held pursuant to 17.02.08.033.03(b) was not a de novo hearing.
Prior to such hearing, the Commissioners had already received an ex parte presentation of
evidence and legal reasoning from Commission Staff, and had already decided that they agreed
Remember, Curr defines reasonableness of a fee as function of what the parties contemplated when the fee
agreement is signed.
23 Note that there is nothing in the IDAPA rules prohibiting references to "the funds" from being read as applying to
the aggregate of all types of benefit categories-TTD, PPI, medical, and lump sum. "Funds" should be interpreted
as "all benefits," not just benefits that have a direct relationship to a particular legal service. Thus, the issue in cases
like this should not be whether there is a direct, provable primarily-or-substantially relationship between the services
and the funds. Rather, the issue should be whether the attorney is entitled to a reasonable fee out of the aggregate of
benefit funds if the fee agreement allows it and the attorney performed the legal services he contracted to perform.
22
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with Commission Staff, which is de facto what the "Order Approving in Part Lump Sum
Agreement" means, even ifthe de jure language is written in an attempt to convey otherwise. So
the attorney fee hearing is really about whether Counsel can change the Commission's mind.

B. COUNSEL SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO DISCOVER THE
FACTS UPON WHICH COMMISSION STAFF RELIED IN
DETERMINING THAT ATTORNEY FEES SHOULD BE
DENIED
Unfortunately for Counsel, he is not privy to the evidence upon which the Commission
made its original decision reflected in the above-referenced Order. As stated supra, by definition
this evidence would have to include evidence contrary to Counsel's position in order to support a
denial of fees. What is this contrary evidence, and what is the source thereof?
Also, did Commission Staff request or obtain documents from Defendants? Did they
interview third-party witnesses? Did they take depositions? Are there transcripts or notes of these
interviews or depositions? If any of this occurred, it was done on a secret basis, since Counsel
received no notice of any production of, or request for, documents, records, or witness testimony.
Why all the secrecy? Disclosing the evidence to claimant's counsel could not possibly be
of any prejudice to claimant. 24 Counsel should at least be informed as to what individuals or
witnesses the Commission Staff spoke to during their investigation, so that Counsel could
examine these witnesses at the Hearing. Is it now the law in Idaho that the right to cross-examine
witnesses and inspect the opposition's evidence does not apply in certain workers' compensation
hearings?
Moreover, it appears that in regard to the Hearing, the Commission relies at least in part

There also cannot possibly be any harm to the Defendants, since they remain unaffected by the Commission's
decision on claimant's attorney fees.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
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on evidence that is not in the record:
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

COMMISSIONER BASKIN: Now, Counsel, let me
stop you just for a second. And, again, I am looking at
staff notes here, which may not be correct.
But the staff notes reflect that the fIrst
surgery was performed on 3-4 of'08; that, as of3-27-08,
Dr. Montalbano noted that Mr. Stienmetz was having
additional problems after having experienced some
postsurgical falls ... (emphasis added)

If these "staff notes," whose contents are unknown and whose source is unknown, are not in the
record, then how can the Idaho Supreme Court fairly review the full record upon appeal?
Counsel is clearly prejudiced by the Commission's apparent reliance on evidence outside the
record of the hearing.
Not only that, but Commissioner Baskin openly acknowledges that the evidence he refers
to "may not be correct." What else in that document may not be correct? Counsel will have no
way of knowing the complete factual basis for the Commission's eventual ruling in this matter,
and no way to appeal any factual errors.
In the recent Kulm matter, Counsel attempted (unsuccessfully) to use discovery

procedures to fmd out the legal and factual basis for the Commission Staff s denial of attorney
fees. In the Kulm ruling, the Commission stated that "the Commission considered Counsel's
request contrary to the long-standing legal principle that documents which disclose deliberations
of a judicial or quasi-judicial body on a decision are privileged and generally not subject to
discovery." Kulm, p. 40.
It is unclear why the Commission believes that in attorney-fee cases it is acting in a

"quasi-judicial" capacity, because the Idaho Supreme Court has held the exact opposite:
In effecting the attorney fee modifIcations under the claimed authority of I.C. §
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72-803 where there is no fee dispute, the Commission is acting in its quasilegislative as opposed to its quasi-judicial capacity. The Commission must
accordingly act within the bounds of its legislatively delegated authority and of
the omnipresent mantle of the United States Constitution." Curr at 691.
Accordingly, the Commission's basis for refusing to provide the requested information appears
to be unfounded.
Equally puzzling is the Commission's admission that it considers the actions of
Commission Staff in issuing its denial of fees to be "deliberations of a judicial or quasi-judicial
body on a decision." But if the attorney fee hearing is truly de novo, as the Commission also
maintains, then there cannot have been any such "decision." It is illogical to suggest that the
actions of Commission Staff pursuant to 17.02.08.033.03(a) are a decision for purposes of
preventing discovery, but are not a decision for purposes of claiming that the attorney fee hearing
is de novo.

25

XI.HINDSIGHT AND FORESIGHT
A. THE COMMISSION MAY NOT SUBSTITUTE ITS
HINDSIGHT-BASED OPINION FOR THAT OF CLAIMANT
The Commission appears to be applying its rules in such a way as to substitute its
hindsight-based opinion for that of the Claimant's opinion, formed at the time he chose to retain
Counsel, that he needed legal counseling and advocacy. Claimant testified as follows on pages
12-13 of the Hearing Transcript:
9
10
11
12
13

BY COMMISSIONER LIMBAUGH:
Q Mr. Stienmetz, according to our notes, it
appears that you hired Mr. Marsh shortly after your
second surgery?
A Yeah. I believe that was right.

Note that the Commission Staff (the manager of the benefits section and his staff members known as
compensation consultants) do not perform any judicial, quasi-judicial, or other privileged functions if their official
job descriptions are to be believed, of which job descriptions the Commission can take judicial notice.
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16
17
18
19
20
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23
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
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12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Q And could you help me understand what your
expectations were at that time and maybe a reason why you
thought you needed legal counsel to help you through
this.
A I wasn't quite sure how to deal with
workmen's comp or my employer at the time. So I saw fit
to seek legal counsel.
Q And were you having difficulties with your
employer -A Yeah.
Q --or surety prior to hiring counsel?
A Yeah. My employer was following me around.
And they told me that I didn't need surgery and I was
wasting time and money. And so I went and found legal
counseL
Q And then everything improved after that?
A Yeah. Everything stopped with work. And
everything seemed to go smoother with the workmen's compo
Q What was your understanding at the time
that you hired legal counsel as far as what you would
have to pay for the services?
A It was 25 percent, I believe, of whatever I
was going to be receiving.
Q And when you signed the agreements, though,
you did agree to -A Yeah, I agreed to the contract. I thought
it was acceptable.
Q And at this point, you still feel that same
way? Do you understand what we're here for today?
A Yeah. I mean, I understand they need to be
paid.

Clearly, Claimant's testimony is that he needed legal assistance. In terms of evaluating the need
for an attorney, why is the opinion of the worker who sought help while injured of less value
than the Commission's opinion rendered two years later?
Claimant's testimony is also that the legal assistance he received really helped him. If the
Commission disagrees, their eventual ruling would go something like this: "We hold that
Claimant was wrong to think he needed legal help on 'how to deal with workmen's comp.' We
further hold that Claimant was wrong to think that Counsel's efforts helped him. We further hold
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that Claimant is wrong to think that Counsel should be paid for those efforts."
How is a claimant to ever know which of the things on which he asks for help are
acceptable to the Commission, and which are not? Did the legislature really intend for the
Commission to decide, in hindsight, that an injured worker was wrong to seek legal help?

B. THE COMMISSION'S RECENT RULINGS OPEN THE
DOOR TO EVENTUALLY DISALLOWING ATTORNEY FEES
ON TTDS AND LUMP SUM AGREEMENTS
With the Commission's recent decisions, it appears that the door has been opened and it
is now accepted law that the Commission may:
•

Refuse to uphold the parties' fee agreement. 26

•

Turn a deaf ear to a claimant's entreaty that his attorney be paid as agreed. 27

•

Ignore the Idaho Supreme Court's holding that "a reasonable contingent fee must be
'sufficiently high to compensate the lawyer not only for the reasonable value of the time
he or she anticipates devoting to the particular lawsuit, but also for the time devoted to
other lawsuits undertaken on the same basis but unsuccessful in result. '"

•

Reject the Idaho Supreme Court's mandate that a claimant must be permitted to
"compensate an attorney for acting solely as a counselor" and for "efforts that do not
generate monetary awards."

Since this is now apparently the state of workers' compensation law today, injured workers and
the plaintiff's bar should be warned that it would only be a small additional step for the
Commission to start issuing rulings like this: "We find that Claimant did not need legal help in

26 In Kulm, the Commission concludes that "the current regulation impinges upon the right of an injured worker, and
his or her attorney, to make their own agreement as to how counsel should be compensated." Kulm, pA2.
27 The claimant in Drotzman requested his fee agreement to honored as a matter of personal integrity:
1
Q Mr. Drotzrnan, do you feel
2 that you have a moral obligation to see that we are paid
3 for the work that we did for you?
4
A I do. (Drotzman Hearing Transcript, p. 31)
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negotiating a lump sum settlement agreement. Therefore, we hold that Counsel should not be
paid for any of his lump sum efforts."
It is Counsel's fear that the Commission is on a slippery slope toward disallowing many

or most attorney fees in the field of workers' compensation. While some may desire such a result
for the benefit of insurance companies, it would add insult to injury for Idaho's many workers
who rely on getting help from their attorneys.

XII.

CONCLUSION

Counsel is entitled to attorney fees as requested in the instant case.
Dated July 8, 2010.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

Andrew Marsh
Attorney for Claimant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that on July 8, 2010, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to
be served as follows:
Ronald B. Coston
Idaho State Insurance Fund
1215 W. State Street
Boise, ID 83720
[8] Fax 332-2171
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

Andrew Marsh
Attorney for Claimant

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000

CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S
OPENING BRIEF

PAGE 31 OF 31

IfCiCt

/

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

TIM STIENMETZ,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Claimant,
v.
G2B CO, INC.,
Employer,
and
IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.

IC 2008-002191
ORDER ON
ATTORNEY'S FEES

FILED

AUG 3 1 2010
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

This matter came before the Commission for hearing at the request of Seiniger Law
Offices (hereinafter, Counsel) following an informal determination by Commission staff on the
issue of attorney's fees payable to Counsel from the proceeds of a lump sum settlement. Hearing
was held on May 11, 2010, at which time the Industrial Commission entertained argument from
Counsel in support of Counsel's claim for attorney's fees pursuant to IDAPA 17.02.08.033. As
well, the Commission received and considered the Affidavit of Andrew Marsh in Support of
Claim for Attorney Fees with Exhibit 1-10 attached, and Claimant's Counsel's Admissions for
Attorney Fee Hearing. Counsel requested and was granted a briefing schedule.

I.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

At all times relevant hereto Claimant, Tim Stienmetz, was an employee of G2B

Co., Employer herein.
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2.

Employer insured its workers' compensation obligations under a policy issued by

the State Insurance Fund (hereinafter, Surety).
3.

On or about January 7,2008, Claimant suffered an industrial accident arising out

of and in the course of his employment with Employer when he lifted a hosed used to pour
concrete. Surety accepted the claim and began paying benefits.
4.

On January 8,2008, Claimant presented to Dr. Maier at Mountain View Medical.

Claimant received conservative care without improvement and was then referred to Dr.
Montalbano.
5.

On March 4, 2008, Dr. Montalbano performed a right L5-S1 microdiskectomy.

Claimant experienced two falls due to right lower extremity weakness and on March 31, 2008,
Dr. Montalbano performed a redo microdiskectomy.
6.

On April 10, 2008, Claimant retained the services of Counsel.

7.

Counsel's Form 1022 report of Expenses and Statement of Claimant's Counsel

states that Counsel made written demand dated 6/3/08 upon Dr. Montalbano for a permanent
partial impairment (pPJ) rating and permanent work restrictions.
8.

On July 11, 2008, Dr. Montalbano found Claimant stable from a surgical

standpoint and recommended Claimant participate in the LifeFit work hardening program under
the direction of Dr. Friedman. Dr. Montalbano did not give Claimant a PPI rating.
9.

On August 28, 2008, Claimant completed the LifeFit program and Dr. Friedman

opined that Claimant had reached maximum medical improvement with no further treatment or
therapy recommended.
10.

On October 15, 2008, in response to Surety's request on September 23,2008, Dr.

Friedman opined Claimant incurred 12% whole person PPI.

ORDER ON ATTORNEY'S FEES - 2

11.

The contingent fee agreement Claimant executed with Seiniger Law Offices, P.A.,

on April 10, 2008, provided, inter alia:
"2) For their representation of Client, Attorneys will be paid a fee which
will be in lien upon the cause of action and will be equal to a portion of all
amounts recovered by way of settlement, or award including attorney fees,
and including sums recovered in satisfaction thereof from any third party.
That portion will be as follows:
i) Twenty-five percent (25%) of all amounts obtained for Client after
execution of this agreement if the case is settled before a hearing.
If Client is receiving temporary disability benefits at the time of
the execution of this agreement, Attorney will not take a
percentage of that benefit until such time as the surety discontinues
or threatens to discontinue payment of said benefit; if Client has
received an impairment rating which has been admitted and is
being paid, Attorney will not take a percentage of the balance of
the impairment rating unless it is later disputed.
ii) Thirty percent (30%) of such amounts after a hearing and the
claim is resolved without the filing of an appeal by either party;
iii) Forty percent (40%) of such amounts if the claim is resolved after
an appeal has been filed by either party;"

12.

At some point pnor to December 23, 2009, the parties agreed to resolve

remaining extant issues by way of a Lump Sum Settlement Agreement (LSSA). Pursuant to the
terms of the Agreement filed with the Industrial Commission on December 23, 2009, Claimant
agreed to resolve all remaining issues for the additional sum of $28,900.00 as consideration.
Counsel had previously taken attorney's fees of $5,098.53 against a PPI award of $20,394.00
prior to the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement. Counsel proposed taking an additional $9,633.33
in attorney's fees and costs of $23.37 from the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement consideration.
The net amount to Claimant would be $19,24330.
13.

Counsel's Form 1022 Report also contained an itemization of attorney's fees and

costs, and benefits to Claimant, as follows:
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Prior to Lump Sum Settlement (PPJ)
a.

Benefits, paid prior to LSS, subjected to atty fees: $20,394.00

b.

Attorney Fees, paid prior to LSS on the above: $5,098.53

c.

Costs, incurred prior to LSS and reimbursed to atty: $550.00

Lump Sum Settlement
d.

Benefits, subject to atty fees: $25,492.50 (PPD), $2,407.50 ( fut
med), $1,000.00 (Consid), Total, $28,900.00

14.

e.

Attorney fee, on the above: Total, $9,633.33 1

f.

Costs, reimbursable to atty: $23.37

g.

Total atty fee and costs, from LSS: $9,656.70

h.

Medical bills, to be paid from LSS: $0.00

1.

Net Lump Sum Amt. to Claimant: $19,243.30

On January 13, 2010, Commission staff sent Counsel an initial detennination that

the proposed Lump Sum Settlement Agreement was in the best interest of the parties, except for
the portion of the requested fees related to permanent partial impairment (PP!) benefits.
Commission staff notified Counsel that this was an initial determination, and that Counsel could
request a hearing on this matter, in accordance with IDAPA 17.02.08.033.
15.

On February 11,2010, Counsel requested a hearing before the Commission. The

Commission sent out a notice of hearing for May 11,2010.
II.

COUNSEL'S CONTENTIONS
IOn February 9,2010, the Commission received a letter from Counsel explaining that the LSSA and the Form 1022
contained a typographical error in the calculation of attorney fees from the lump sum settlement. The percentage of
attorney fees should have been 25% not 33%. Thus, Counsel disbursed $2,408.33 to Claimant and retained the
amount in controversy, $5,098.53, in his trust account.
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Counsel has raised many of the constitutional and policy arguments he made in the
attorney fee hearing of the case Kulm v. Mercy Medical Center, IC 2006-012770 (filed May 20,
2010), to support his entitlement to attorney's fees.

Ultimately, Counsel argues that the

Commission's reasoning in Kulm v. Mercy Medical Center, supra, contradicts Curr v. Curr, 124
Idaho 686, 864 P.2d 132 (1993), and is unconstitutional. Counsel argues that the Commission's
regulations regarding attorney fees are inappropriate, and create many ethical problems for
attorneys.
Counsel acknowledges that he cannot prove that he was "primarily or substantially"
responsible for obtaining Claimant's PPI rating or the LSSA benefits, if the Commission applies
a "but-for" test. Further, Counsel presents that he cannot prove that the benefits were "disputed"
by Defendants.

Counsel argues that he has provided important, valuable, and compensable

serviced to Claimant and that these services were at least instrumental in obtaining the results
that were achieved for Claimant in terms of PPI benefits and the lump sum benefits. Thus, the
fee that Counsel requests for his services is reasonable based on the IDAP A and controlling case
law.

ID.
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES

Counsel avers that the Commission ignores the legal significance of Curr v. Curr, or
considers it overruled by Rhodes v. Industrial Commission, 125 Idaho 139, 868 P.2d 467 (1993).
The Commission's Curr v. Curr decision that was appealed to the Supreme Court was issued in
1991, and treats the regulatory scheme, or lack thereof, that was in place at that time. The
legislative history of the IDAP A regulations indicate the Commission and members of the
workers' compensation bar were struggling with the issue of attorneys' fees in workers'
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compensation cases before the Court issued its decision in Curr v. Curro

By 1992, the

Commission had promulgated regulations on attorneys' fees, which the Rhodes Court evaluated.
Contrary to the assertions made by Counsel, the Commission has not determined that
Curr v. Curr, supra, has been overruled by Rhodes, Mancilla and/or Johnson. The Commission

maintains that its adopted regulatory scheme hews to the direction given by the Supreme Court
in Curr v. Curr, as evidenced by the Court's subsequent approval of those rules in Rhodes.
While those cases were issued by the Court closely in time, Curr was issued based on the
absence of duly enacted regulations or standards on attorneys' fees in workers' compensation
cases, which was the case in 1991, whereas Rhodes involved a review of the regulations adopted
by the Commission in response to Curro As discussed in Ku/m, the regulations issued after the
Commission's decision in Curr v. Curr, are the predecessors ofthe current regulations.
IV.
APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF IDAPA 17.02.08.033
TO THE FACTS OF TillS CASE

With an effective date of July 1, 1994, the Industrial Commission adopted the current
IDAP A 17.02.08.033 et seq, pursuant to the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-508. The current
regulation preserves the notion of a 25% cap on attorney's fees, contained in the former IDAP A
17.01.01.803.D (1992), but instead of applying that cap to "new money" the current regulation
allows attorneys to take a 25% fee on "available funds". Per IDAP A 17.02.0S.033(a) "available
funds" is defined as follows:
"Available funds" means a sum of money to which a charging lien may attach. It
shall not include any compensation paid or not disputed to be owed prior to
claimant's agreement to retain the attorney.
Therefore, available funds do not include (a) compensation paid to Claimant pnor to the
retention of Counselor (b) compensation which is not disputed to be owed prior to the retention
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of Counsel.
The tenn "charging lien" is defmed at IDAPA l7.02.08.033.01.c as follows:
"Charging lien" means a lien, against a claimant's right to any compensation
under the Workers' Compensation laws, which may be asserted by an attorney
who is able to demonstrate that:
1.

There are compensation benefits available for distribution on
equitable principles;

11.

The services of the attorney operated primarily or substantially to
secure the fund out of which the attorney seeks to be paid;

111.

It was agreed that counsel anticipated
compensation funds rather than from the client;

IV.

The claim is limited to costs, fees, or other disbursements incurred
in the case through which the fund was raised; and

v.

There are equitable considerations that necessitate the recognition
and application of the charging lien.

payment

from

Although IDAPA l7.02.08.033.01.a, specifies that a charging lien may attach to
"available funds," it is apparent from a review of the definition of "charging lien" that that tenn
further constrains the available funds that may be subject to a claim of attorney's fees.
Importantly, a charging lien can only attach to available funds where it is demonstrated that the
services of the attorney operated "primarily or substantially" to secure the fund out of which the
attorney seeks to be paid.

(See, IDAPA l7.02.08.033.01.c.ii.)

This is but one of five

requirements that must be satisfied before a charging lien can be said to exist against "available
funds." As important, is the fact that these requirements are not in the disjunctive. Per the
language of the regulation, all of these requirements must be satisfied before a charging lien can
be said to exist.
As discussed above, an attorney's charging lien can only attach to available funds.
However, a charging lien can only attach where attorney is able to demonstrate, inter alia, that:
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"ii.

The services of the attorney operated primarily or substantially to secure
the fund out of which the attorney seeks to be paid;"

In the recent case of Kulm v. Mercy Medical Center, supra, a case involving a claim for
attorney's fees brought by the same attorney involved in the instant matter, the Commission had
occasion to consider what the Legislature intended in adopting the "primarily or substantially"
language of the regulation. In that case, we concluded that in order to meet his burden of
proving that his efforts were "primarily or substantially" responsible for securing the fund from
which he hopes to be paid, Counsel bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that he originally, or initially, took action that secured the fund, or that his efforts
essentially, or in the main, were responsible for securing the fund, i.e. that his efforts were such
that a reasonable person would conclude that he was responsible for securing the fund from
which he hoped to be paid.
Turning to the facts of the instant matter, while Counsel asserts that he requested a PPI
rating from Dr. Montalbano, Dr. Montalbano did not give a rating and instead referred Claimant
on to a work hardening program. Once Claimant completed the work hardening program, Surety
requested a rating and Dr. Friedman issued the 12% PPI rating. Counsel took fees of $5,098.53
from the Claimant's 12% PPI rating.
The Commission has reviewed the infonnation submitted by Claimant and finds that
Counsel did not initiate the action which created the PPI rating nor did Counsel's efforts
essentially secure the PPI rating. Counsel's prior letter to Dr. Montalbano did not lead to the
rating given by Dr. Friedman several months later and after completion of the work hardening
program.
The record lacks of evidence that Counsel primarily or substantially secured Claimant's
PPI rating from Dr. Friedman or how his actions influenced the PPI rating.
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As such, the

Commission is unable to conclude that Counsel primarily or substantially secured the PPI rating,
and he is not entitled to take fees on the PPI rating. Counsel has not proven his entitlement to
$5,098.53 in attorney fees from Claimant's PPI rating.
CONCLUSION OF LAW AND ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Counsel has not shown that he is entitled to fees taken
on the PPI benefits paid to Claimant.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

~y of ~.

DATED this3 J

, 2010.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I hereby certify that on the
day of----J[...LJoe==q.--=-_:, 2010 a true and correct copy of
Order on Attorney's Fees was served by regular Unit States Mail upon each of the following
persons:
WM BRECK SEINIGER
942 WMYRTLE STREET
BOISE ID 83702
sb/cjh
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(208) 345-4700

Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387)
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588)
SElNIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 345-1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700
Attorneys for Claimant
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Maria Gomez,
Claimant,
I.C. No. 05-510285
vs.
Nampa Lodging Investors LLC,
Employer,

FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES
and
STATEMENT OF
CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL

And
Liberty Northwest,
Surety,
Defendants.

COMES NOW Claimant's Counsel and reports his expenses and submits the following in
support of his claim of attorney's fees and costs in the amount set forth below from the proceeds
of the settlement of the above captioned case.

REPORT OF LITIGATION EXPENSES
In accordance with the requirements of § 72-528, Idaho Code, this form shall be filled out
and returned to the Industrial Commission within 30 days following the time of entry of a final
award by the Industrial Commission in the above case, or, in the event of an appeal to a final
court, within 30 days following a fmal ruling by the Court. If there is an appeal, the totals
specified below shall include the expenses, costs, or fees incurred in the appeal.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000

FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES AND
STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL
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PRIOR TO LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT
BENEFITS, paid prior to LSS, subjected to atty fees
ATTORNEY FEES, paid prior to LSS, on the above
COSTS, incurred prior to LSS and reimbursed to arty

LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT
BENEFITS, subject to arty fees
ATTORNEY FEE, on the above
COSTS, reimbursable to arty
TOTAL ATTY FEE & COSTS, from LSS
MEDICAL BILLS, to be paid from LSS
NET LUMP SUM AMT TO CLAIMANT

Meds

PPI
$3,733.13
$933.28
$0.00

LS Consid. incl. PPD TOTAL

$1,236.44 $12,206.13
Waived
$3,051.53

$13,442.57
$3,051.53
$606.72
$3,658.25
$1236.44
$8,547.88

Attachments: Statement of Costs incurred in litigation, reimbursable to attorney
Contingency Fee Agreementin a Worker's Compensation Case including
Disclosure Statement

STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL
1.

Seiniger Law Offices, P .A. ("Counsel") was retained by Maria Gomez

("Claimant") on or about 10/05/2005.
2.

Counsel initiated this case by interviewing Claimant concerning the facts and

circumstances of employment, the facts and circumstances of the injury, the status of benefits,
the status of medical treatment, and the background of Claimant as it relates to potential
disability beyond impairment, etc.
3.

Counsel advised Claimant as to the procedures involved in processing a claim for

benefits under the Idaho Workers Compensation Act. Counsel advised Claimant as to the need
for cooperation with treating physicians and Seiniger Law Offices, P.A.
4.

Counsel advised Claimant as to the disclosures required by the Idaho Industrial

Commission.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000

FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES AND
STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL
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5.

Counsel created a database file for Claimant in which pertinent information was

recorded for use in the handling of the claim.
6.

During, or shortly after, the initial meeting with Claimant, Counsel drafted the

follovving documents for the benefit of Claimant: a fee agreement and disclaimer statement
meeting the requirements of the Idaho Industrial Commission; medical releases; employment
release; a letter of representation and inquiry to the surety; a letter of representation to the Idaho
Industrial Commission requesting copies of Claimant's file; a letter to the treating medical
providers requesting complete copies of Claimant's medical and billing records; a letter to the
primary treating physician requesting a detailed report of the etiology of Claimant's condition,
treatment to date, impairment rating, and temporary and permanent restrictions; and a client
intake questionnaire for the initial gathering of relevant information concerning the client's
employment, educational, medical and health, military, vocational, and accident history.

7.

Counsel reviewed all medical records, employment records, and other requested

documents as they were received, and consulted with Claimant about the status of the case on a
periodic basis.

8.

Counsel advised Claimant concerning the need to keep medical appointments,

aspects of medical treatment which might potentially affect Claimant's impairment rating, and
strategic issues relating to medical care which can impact the result of a worker's compensation
case.

9.

Counsel conducted legal research concerning aspects of Claimant's case and

lllJurWS.
10.

Before Counsel was retained, Defendants denied, discontinued, or disputed

Claimant's right to additional medical benefits and treatment, time loss benefits, impairment
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000

FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES AND
STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL
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compensation, and disability beyond impairment. Subsequent to retaining Counsel, Claimant
received additional medical treatment and other benefits.
11.

Counsel advised Claimant to undergo a new and separate vocational evaluation by

a vocational evaluation expert of Claimant's choosing; advised Claimant of the meaning and
import of the vocational report; and advised Claimant on the effect of the expert's report on the
need for retraining, the claim for benefits, and lump sum settlement.
12.

At the time Counsel became involved, all issues were disputed or disputable

because all defenses remain open to Defendants in a worker's compensation case as a matter of
law unless waived or determined to have no merit by the Commission. The amount of all
compensation paid or admitted as owed by Employer immediately prior to Counsel's
involvement was equal to the amount actually paid to that date, less any claims for overpayment
that Defendants might subsequently make. All issues that arose subsequent to the date Counsel
was hired were disputed or disputable, including rights to medical benefits and treatment, time
loss benefits, impairment compensation, disability beyond impairment, retraining, and attorney
fees. For the period prior to lump sum settlement, Counsel's itemization of compensation that
constituted available funds, itemization of costs, and calculation of attorney fees is set forth
above. For the lump sum settlement, Counsel's itemization of compensation that constitutes
available funds, itemization of costs, and calculation of attorney fees is set forth above.
13.

There are compensation benefits, as set forth above, available for distribution on

equitable principles. The services of Counsel operated primarily or substantially to secure the
fund out of which the attorney seeks to be paid, due to Counsel's efforts on behalf of Claimant
and due to Counsel's reputation as a plaintiff s lawyer in the practice of worker's compensation
law. It was agreed that counsel anticipated payment from compensation funds rather than from
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000

FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES AND
STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL
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the client, as set forth in the Attorney Fee Agreement attached hereto. The claim is limited to
costs, fees, or other disbursements incurred in the case through which the fund was raised. There
are equitable considerations that necessitate the recognition and application of the charging lien,
including as follows: Claimant sought the services of Counsel as counselor and advocate;
Claimant contracted with Counsel to pay Counsel for said services; Counsel provided services as
counselor and advocate; Counsel has a constitutionally-protected property right to be paid as
agreed; and Claimant has a constitutionally-protected right to have Claimant's contract with
Counsel honored.
14.

Counsel reviewed the file in preparation for settlement. Counsel engaged in

extensive negotiations with Defendants. Counsel had extensive communications with Claimant
concerning the status of the case, and the strategic and tactical decisions that had to be made with
respect to settlement discussions and preparation for hearing.
15.

Counsel advised Claimant of the risks of going to hearing and the costs that would

be incurred in connection with obtaining sworn testimony from Claimant's medical providers.
Counsel further advised Claimant of the delay that would be involved in SUbmitting this case for
resolution to the Commission.
16.

Counsel obtained a compromise settlement with representatives of the defendants

resulting in the payment of benefits over and above those which were conceded at the time that
Claimant initiated the attorney/client relationship.
17.

Claimant elected to settle the case based upon Claimant's best judgment and

personal situation, and on the basis set forth in the lump sum agreement which has been
submitted to the Commission for its approval.

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345·1000

FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES AND
STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL
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18.

Counsel reviewed and analyzed the lump sum settlement agreement, completed

portions of the agreement, and reviewed the lump sum agreement with Claimant.
19.

Counsel reviewed and analyzed the file; reviewed and analyzed time and billing

program entries; reviewed and analyzed books of account to ascertain client costs advanced and
other financial data required by the Idaho Industrial Commission; and prepared Idaho Industrial
Commission Form 1022.
20.

As part of the consideration supporting the contract entered into between

Claimant and Counsel, Counsel provided legal services to Claimant from approximately
10105/2005 until the present time. During that time, Counsel limited his practice by declining

certain cases because ofthe size of his caseload, which included Claimant's case. Counsel
maintained an office and staff, including the services of a full-time legal assistant, to be able to
handle whatever needs Claimant had in connection with this case, as well as the needs of his
other clients.
21.

Claimant is presently unemployed.

Dated this September 28, 2009.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

Andrew Marsh
Attorney for Claimant

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000

FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES AND
STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that on this September 28,2009, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document to be served as follows:
Scott Harmon
Harmon, Whittier & Day
6213 N. Cloverdale Road, Suite #150
P.O. Box 6358
Boise,ID 83707-6358
[RJ Hand Delivery

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

Andrew Marsh
Attorney for Claimant

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000

FORM 1022, REPORT OF EXPENSES AND
STATEMENT OF CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL
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SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

Statement of Costs

942 W. MYRTLE STREET
BOISE, IDAHO 83702
(208) 345-1000
Andrew@ldahoRights.com

I

I

DATE
9/21109

CLIENT NAME
Maria Gomez
3120 Hyde Street
Caldwell, ID 83605

DATE
09/30105
10/05105
10105105
10118/05
10/18105
11118/05
11118/05
03/07/06
03/07/06
03110106
03/10106
03/07/08
01/20109
02/27/09
02128/09
09/14/09

DESCRIPTION
Balance forward
Copies
Postage initialltrs
Med Rec requests
med rec requests
Copies Fwd med bills & recs to SIF
Postage Fwd med bills & recs to SIF
CopiesExibits
Postage
ClientCopies
Postage
vocational evaluation 914/07, 2/15108, 3/7/08
File Closing
Medical Records Medical Records File Closing

ATTORNEY

OUR FILE NO.

ACM

2618

AMOUNT
1.80
1.11
0.80
1.48
3.40
1.06
2.00
0.87
2.40
0.87
486.00
10.00
58.07
26.86
10.00

IBALANCE DUE II

BALANCE
0.00
1.80
2.91
3.71
5.19
8.59
9.65
11.65
12.52
14.92
15.79
501.79
511.79
569.86
596.72
606.72

$606.72

Thank you for allowing us to represent you. As of this date we have concluded our work on your case and have closed your file. If
you would like to have a copy ofthe file within the next 30 days you may do so at $.20 per page. If you choose to obtain your file
at a later date there will be a $30.00 retrieval fee in addition to copying charges of $.20 per page. Your file will be destroyed two (2)
years from the above date.
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ORIGINAL
CONTINGENCY FEE AGREEMENT
IN A WORKER'S COMPENSATION CASE
This is an agreement for representation and consultation in a worker's
compensation claim before the Idaho Industrial Commission. This agreement is
between SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A., 942 Myrtle Street, Boise, Idaho
83702, (hereafter referred to as "Attorney") and Maria Gomez, (hereafter referred
to as "Client").

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT AGREE AS FOLLOWS:

2) For their representation of Client, Attorney will be paid a fee which will be in
lien upon the cause of action and will be equal to a portion of all amounts
recovered by way of settlement, or award including attorney fees, and
including sums recovered in satisfaction thereof from any third party. That
portion will be as follows:
i) Twenty-five percent (25%) of all amounts obtained for Client after
execution of this agreement if the case is settled before a hearing. If
Client is receiving temporary disability benefits at the time of the
execution of this agreement, Attorney will not take a percentage of that
benefit until such time as the surety discontinues or threatens to
discontinue payment of said benefit; if Client has received an
impairment rating which has been admitted and is being paid, Attorney
will not take a percentage of the balance of the impairment rating unless
it is later disputed.
ii) Thirty percent (30%) of such amounts after a hearing and the claim is

resolved without the filing of an appeal by either party;
iii) Forty percent (40%) of such amounts if the claim is resolved after an
appeal has been filed by either party;
Attorney will take a percentage of any benefits obtained by Client with
respect to permanent partial impairment if a rating is given after the parties
execute this agreement. In the event that there are attorney fees awarded against
the defendant(s) by the commission Attorney shall be entitled to be paid those
attorney fees or the percentage calculated above, whichever is greater.

'7

3) Client will not be required to pay attorney fees to Attorney if nothing is
recovered by way of settlement or award unless Attorney withdraws due to
lack of cooperation by Client. In the event that Attorney is required to
withdraw due to lack of cooperation in presenting and prosecuting Client's
claim, he will be compensated as set forth in paragraph 7 below.
4) Actual costs required to prepare and prosecute Client's claim by Attorney,
or to achieve a settlement, are to be paid by Client; if advanced by
Attorney, these costs will be repaid from Client's portion of amounts
recovered, as defined in Section 2, above; if a settlement is not reached in your
case, you will be responsible to make payments on these costs until they are
paid in full. These costs include fees for investigators if hired by Attorney,
filing fees, fees for court reporters, travel expenses, costs of service of process,
costs for medical records and reports, costs for expert witnesses and
physicians, long distance telephone and fax charges, postage and related
mailing costs, and all other costs associated with the prosecution of Client's
claim. Attorney is authorized, but not obligated, to pay all medical bills
outstanding at the time of settlement of Client's claim out of any funds received
by Attorney to the health care provider or their designated agent.
5) Client agrees that he will not make settlement except with Attorney's prior
approval, which approval shall not be reasonably withheld. Should Client do
so in violation of this Agreement, Client agrees to pay Attorney the sum and
share indicated in Paragraph 2(ii), above; upon settlement Attorney is
authorized to pay any outstanding medical bills of Client directly to the
provider. Attorney shall not settle the case without Client's prior approval.
6) Attorney makes no representations concerning the likelihood of a successful
resolution of Client's case, and does not guarantee to obtain sufficient funds to
reimburse Client for the costs or expenses incurred in the prosecution of the
case; it is expressly agreed that all statements of Attorney on these matters are
good faith statements of opinion only;
7) Attorney may be discharged by Client at any time. If Attorney is discharged
Attorney will be compensated for services rendered to the date of discharge, as
well as for all costs, expenses and disbursements, as follows:
i) If Attorney is discharged before the case is settled or tried, Attorney
shall be paid at the rate of $150.00 per hour or a percentage calculated
in accordance with paragraph 2 (based upon the highest settlement offer,
if any, made by the defendants at the time of the discharge) whichever is
greater; Attorney will furnish Client with an itemized statement of such
services.

ii) If Attorney is discharged after the case is settled or tried, the
compensation of Attorney shall be computed in accordance with the
provisions of this agreement just as if the verdict, award, determination
or judgment had actually been collected in full for Client.
iii) Attorney has the right to retain possession of Client's documents and
money until Attorney's bill is paid in full by Client, and Attorney shall
have a lien on the cause of action.
8) Client '.vill pay to Attorney an initial retainer as an ad'vance against the costs
referred to in Paragraph 4 above in the amount of $1 00.

9) Client agrees that any interest earned on any of Client's funds held in trust will
be donated to the Idaho State Bar in connection with its Interest on Lawyer
Trust Accounts program.
10)Both Client and Attorney have read this agreement, have a copy of it, and
agree to its terms and conditions. There are no other oral or written
representations between Client and Attorney. Any modifications of this
contract shall be made in writing.
ll)This Agreement shall be binding upon the heirs, successors, representatives
and assigns of Client and Attorney.
12)Client has been advised that Client may pick up a copy of the file in this case
within 30 days after settlement or after the attorney client relationship is
terminated by either party to this agreement. After that time, Attorney's file,
and all documents and things in it from whatever source will be destroyed.
13)Client has been advised that Attorney may be retained on an hourly basis of
$150 per hour by depositing a retainer with Attorney of $2,000.00 which shall
be replenished as Attorney charges against it. In the event that Attorney is
retained on an hourly basis, Attorney shall not be entitled to any percentage of
any settlement or benefits recovered by Client. Client has declined to retain
Attorney on an hourly basis and has chosen to retain Attorney on the
contingent basis described herein.
I have read the foregoing and decline to retain the attorney on an hourly
-so: day of
/0
, 200..QL.
basis, this

M ria

omez, Clie .
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DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
1. In workers' compensation matters, attorney's fe~s normally do not exceed
twenty-five percent (25%) of the benefits your attorney obtains for you in a case in
which no hearing on the merits has been completed. In a case in which a hearing
on the merits has been completed, attorney's fees normally do not exceed thirty
percent (30%) of the benefits your attorney obtains for you.
2. Depending upon the circumstances of your case, you and your attorney may
agree to a higher or lower percentage which would be subject to Commission
approval. Further, if you and your attorney have a dispute regarding attorney fees,
either of you may petition the Industrial Commission to resolve the dispute.
I certify that I have read and understand this disclosure statement and
Contingency Fee Agreement, and agree to the terms contained herein.

DATED this 5th day of October, 2005.

aria Gomez

DATED this 5th day of October, 2005.

Reed G. Smith
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
Attorney for Client

Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387)
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588)
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P .A.

~'

942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 345-1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700
Attorneys for Claimant
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Maria Gomez,
Claimant,
I.e. No. 05-510285
vs.
Nampa Lodging Investors LLC,
Employer,

MEMORANDUM OF LAW
IN SUPPORT OF
FORM 1022

and
Liberty Northwest,
Surety,
Defendants.

COMES NOW Claimant's Counsel and files this MEMORANDUM on the issue of
Counsel's right to attorney fees on permanent partial impairment awards, together with the
Affidavit of Andrew Marsh attached hereto as Exhibit A and the Exhibits attached to said
Affidavit, all in support of his claim of attorney's fees as set forth in Counsel's Form 1022
already on file with the Commission.

FACTS
Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. (hereinafter "Counsel") provided extensive legal counseling
and advocacy services to Claimant in the above-captioned matter from 2005-2009, and has met

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000

MEMORANDUM OF LAW
IN SUPPORT OF FORM 1022
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all Constitutional and legal requirements for receiving their attorney fees. See Affidavit of
Andrew Marsh attached hereto as Exhibit A and the Exhibits attached thereto.

DISCUSSION
COUNSEL HAS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO ATTORNEY FEES
The law governing claimants' right to be represented by an attorney in a workers'
compensation case, and the constitutional right of that attorney to be paid an attorney's fee, was
set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court in Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 864 P.2d 132 (Idaho
1993). The Court held as follows:
•

An attorney has a constitutional right to be paid for services rendered on the
whole case, including services rendered as counselor and advocate.

•

Payment of attorney fees cannot be limited to the basis of "new money."

•

Legal representation, and compensation for same, cannot be limited to "disputed
matters."

Counsel has recently briefed the Commission in detail on the above Constitutional issues
in other cases currently pending before the Commission, and in the interest of judicial economy
will not repeat them in this brief, unless requested to do so by the Commission.
In the instant case, the facts show that Counsel rendered services to Claimant as
counselor and advocate, and Counsel is therefore constitutionally entitled to have his fee contract
honored.

THE COMMISSION IS NOT OBLIGATED TO APPLY ITS OWN IDAPA
RULES IN A WAY THAT VIOLATES CONTITUTIONAL LAW
In a recent telephone conference on another case that Counsel has pending before this
Commission, the Commission expressed concerns over how to reconcile its IDAP A rules
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000

MEMORANDUM OF LAW
IN SUPPORT OF FORM 1022
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defining "Available Funds" 1 and "Charging Lien" 2 with the mandates of Curro Counsel submits
that the Commission is not obligated to apply its rules in a way that violates constitutional law,
or the statutorily-expressed intent of the legislature, or the dictates of public policy.
In fact, it is well-settled law that administrative regulations may not be interpreted and
applied in ways that violate case law or the constitutional rights of a party.3
Indeed, the Commission itself appears, at least in dicta, to be willing to recognize that a
strict application of its "primarily or substantially,,4 rule is not always required:
Finally, quite apart from the question of whether Attorney's efforts were
"primarily or substantially" responsible for securing the fund from which he
hopes to be paid, Attorney argues that he should be entitled to take a fee against
the PPI award because he provided other services of value to Claimant, services
which did not result in the creation of a fund of money from which he might
otherwise expect to take a fee. However, Attorney has failed to articulate, in any
detail, what other valuable services he provided in the instant matter. "Order
Denying Reconsideration," Sandra Perez V. Idaho Fresh Pak, Inc. and Liberty
Northwest Insurance Corp., IC No. 2005-530757, pages 11-12, (Sept. 18,2009)
(emphasis added)

Note that the Commission does not say that the law does not permit consideration of whether the
Attorney "provided other services of value to Claimant." The fact that the Commission in the
Perez case rejected Attorney's claim on the basis of a failure to provide sufficient supporting
1 "Available funds" means a sum of money to which a charging lien may attach. It shall not include
any compensation paid or not disputed to be owed prior to claimant's agreement to retain the attorney. IDAP A
17.02.08.033.01.a.
2 "Charging lien" means a lien, against a claimant's right to any compensation under the Workers'
Compensation laws, which may be asserted by an attorney who is able to demonstrate that:
i. There are compensation benefits available for distribution on equitable principles;
ii. The services of the attorney operated primarily or substantially to secure the fund out of which the attorney seeks
to be paid;
iii. It was agreed that counsel anticipated payment from compensation funds rather than from the client;
iv. The claim is limited to costs, fees, or other disbursements incurred in the case through which the fund was raised;
and
V. There are equitable considerations that necessitate the recognition and application of the charging lien. IDAP A
17.02.08.033.01.c.
3 Because this principle cannot reasonably be disputed, Counsel sees no reason to cite authority for it, but will do so
if requested by the Commission.
4 IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.c.ii.
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facts suggests that the Commission, at least on some level, recognizes that it has the power to
refuse to strictly apply its IDAP A rules when such strict application would be unjust or unlawfuL
In sum, Counsel submits that in regard to allowing attorney fees, the Commission's

obligation to comply with case law and constitutional law supersedes whatever obligation it may
have, if any, to apply its IDAP A rules in a strict and literal way. Accordingly, the Commission
may, and constitutionally must, allow attorney fees in the instant case.

FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS PROHIBITS THE COMMISSION FROM
ENCOURAGING CLAIMANTS TO SEEK LEGAL ADVICE, AND THEN
REFUSING TO ALLOW THE LEGAL ADVISORS TO BE PAID
Where does the Commission stand on the issue of (to quote the Idaho Supreme Courts)
"compensat[ing] an attorney for acting solely as a counselor and ... efforts that do not generate
monetary awards such as obtaining permission for medical care or procuring an impairment
rating ... "? Let us allow the Commission to answer this question in its own words, in official
quotes taken directly from the Commission's own website: 6
There are many reasons for a dispute to arise in a claim. These disputes can
sometimes center around complicated legal issues. The assistance of an attorney
may be needed.
If an injured worker (claimant) has a disagreement with the insurer/employer that
cannot be resolved informally, the claimant can use the formal judicial process.
Due to the complexity of the judicial process, it is recommended that you
contact an attorney.
After filing the complaint, the case must be prepared and presented to the Hearing
Officer. Some typical steps are listed below but this is not a complete list. If you
have questions, you may want to consult an attorney.
Some costs may be incurred in preparing for and attending a hearing. If you have
questions for [sic] concerns about costs and expenses you may want to seek legal
counsel.
5
6

Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho at 692, 864 P.2d at 138
hrtp:lliic.idaho.gov (bold emphasis added on all quotes)

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000

MEMORANDUM OF LAW
IN SUPPORT OF FORM 1022

PAGE 4 OF

19

Legal representation is not required to file a Complaint with the Industrial
Commission. However, due to the complexity of the judicial process, you may
wish to consider legal counsel.
If your employer does not have workers' compensation insurance and you believe
that you should receive workers' compensation benefits, you may contact an
Idaho Industrial Commission Compensation Consultant by calling toll free 1-800950-2110 VITDD; or consult with an attorney.
Industrial Commission employees can assist you with many of your questions or
concerns about workers' compensation. However, they cannot provide you with
legal advice. If you believe that you need legal advice, you should consult an
attorney.
If you choose to formally contest the decision of your employer or the employer's
insurance company, you may want to consult an attorney.
You may obtain a copy of the Complaint Form from the Industrial Commission or
your attorney.
To obtain a date for your hearing, you or your attorney must file a "Request for
Calendaring" with the Idaho Industrial Commission.

The "Facts for Injured Workers" pamphlet, which was downloaded from the website, also
contains many of these same recommendations for seeking legal advice.
The "General Information on Representing Yourself in a Workers' Compensation Case"
pamphlet, which was downloaded from the website, contains these quotes:
1. The materials you have received are not a substitute for legal advice from an
attorney.
2. Workers' compensation laws and Industrial Commission rules are
complex.
4. It is a good idea to talk to an attorney before proceeding on your

o~n.

MY CHECKLIST
o I understand it would help me to talk with an attorney about my case.
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Over and over again, the Commission officially recommends that claimants seek legal advice.
Over and over again, the Commission officially warns claimants of the complexity of the law.
Over and over again, the Commission officially urges claimants to talk to an attorney.
Does the Commission intend for the public to assume that legal advice is free? No, of
course not.
Does the Commission intend for attorneys to assume that they are required to provide
legal advice for free? No, of course not.
What, then, does the Commission intend by its recommendations? The only logical
interpretation is that the Commission expects that a claimant will contract with an attorney for
legal advice, and then pay the attorney pursuant to that contract. Under that interpretation, it must
be presumed that the Commission intends to honor the parties' contract as required by
constitutional law.
But the Commission does not stop with just recommending that a claimant seek legal
advice, it goes into detail of how and where to obtain it:
4. It is a good idea to talk to an attorney before proceeding on your own. You
may contact the Idaho State Bar at 208-334-4500 for a referral. Information
about obtaining an attorney may also be found at www2.state.id.us/isb. 7
The information contained in this pamphlet is general in nature and is not
intended as a substitute for legal advice. Changes in the law or the specific facts
of your case may result in legal interpretations which are different than those
presented here.
The Idaho State Bar can provide you names of lawyers in your area
who are familiar with workers' compensation issues and related matters. The
Idaho State Bar is located in Boise, Idaho, and can be reached by calling 1208-334-4500 or toll-free at 1-800-221-3295. 8

"General Information on Representing Yourself in a Workers' Compensation Case" pamphlet, which was
downloaded from the website. (emphasis added)
8 "Facts for Injured Workers" pamphlet, which was downloaded from the website. (emphasis added)

7

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, PA

~~Ts:",~~~~;J;;t

(208) 345-1000

MEMORANDUM OF LAW
IN SUPPORT OF FORM 1022

PAGE 6 OF 19

Can the Industrial Commission recommend a workers' compensation attorney?
It is not appropriate for the Commission to recommend counsel. However,
you can call the Idaho State Bar Lawyer Referral Service at (208) 334-4500 or
look in the Yellow Pages in the Attorneys - Workers' Compensation section. 9

The information contained in this web page is general in nature and is not
intended as a substitute for legal advice. Changes in the law or the specific facts
of your case may result in legal interpretations, which are different than presented
here.
The Idaho State Bar can provide you names of lawyers in your area
who are familiar with workers' compensation issues. The Idaho State Bar is
located in Boise, Idaho and can be reached by calling 1-208-334-4500. 10

Apparently, it is so important to the Commission that injured workers consider getting legal
advice that the Commission tells them exactly how to go about getting a lawyer.
The Commission also makes it clear that its staff cannot give legal advice:
Industrial Commission employees can assist you with many of your questions or
concerns about workers' compensation. However, they cannot provide you with
legal advice. If you believe that you need legal advice, you should consult an
attorney.l1

Again, the Commission makes it clear that the only way for claimants to get legal advice is from
an attorney.
Let us apply all of this to the instant case. The Commission, via its website and
pamphlets, tells people like Claimant Maria Gomez to seek legal advice. Maria seeks advice
from Seiniger Law Offices. So far, it is clear that Maria did nothing wrong, because the
Commission says that is what it wants Claimants to do. Maria signs a contract with Seiniger Law
Offices in which she agrees to pay them for their services, but rather than require an hourly fee,
Seiniger agrees to take a risk and accept a contingency fee on PPJ benefits. Again, the

http://iic.idaho.gov (emphasis added)
http://iic.idaho.gov (emphasis added)
11 http://iic.idaho.gov (emphasis added)

9

10
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Commission never says that the legal advice should be free, so neither Maria nor Seiniger Law
Offices did anything wrong by signing this contract. Maria asks her attorney for advice and he
provides it. Again, this is exactly what the Commission says it wants.
How is it, then, that four years later, the Commission staff is prepared to fmd that in
retrospect, Maria should not have sought advice, Seiniger should not have provided it, and
therefore Seiniger should not be paid? What, exactly, did Maria or Seiniger do that was different
than what the Commission specifically said they should do? If the Commission staff is prepared
to tell Counsel that his actions were somehow not compensable and therefore wrong, then in
fairness the staff should inform Counsel of what he should have done instead when Maria came
to him and asked for legal advice.
In sum, fundamental fairness prohibits the Commission from encouraging claimants to

seek legal advice, and then preventing their legal advisors from getting paid. 12

COUNSEL IS AWARE OF NO LEGAL AUTHORITY THAT ALLOWS A
TRIBUNAL TO ARBITRARILY FIND THAT AN ATTORNEY'S
SERVICES ARE OF NO VALUE
The facts set forth in the Affidavit of Andrew Marsh and its attached Exhibits
demonstrate that Counsel provided extensive legal services to Claimant between the time
Counsel was retained (October 5, 2005) and the time that the permanent partial impairment (PPI)
rating was issued (December 19,2006). For the Commission to choose to dishonor Counsel's
contract with Claimant and disallow attorney fees on the PPI benefit obtained would be

12 Because this principle cannot reasonably be disputed, Counsel sees no reason to cite authority for it, but will do so
if requested by the Commission.
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tantamount to a finding that the services of Counsel (rendered during the fourteen months before
a PPI rating) were of absolutely no value to Claimant. 13
Let us consider a few of the dozens of service transactions that Counsel rendered prior to
the PPI rating:
•

When Claimant signed up, she provided correspondence from Saltzer Medical Group that
said the surety had denied payment on their worker's compensation medical bill;
subsequent correspondence threatening collection on Saltzer and Mercy Medical Center;
and correspondence from West Valley Medical Center stating they had made a credit
rating report against her. Counsel reviewed and advised her on these issues. Was that
service of no value to Claimant?

•

When Claimant signed up, she provided correspondence from the surety that included a
Change of Status dated six days earlier (9/30/05) regarding changing her temporary
wage-loss benefits, as well as correspondence dated 8/5/05 that showed that nearly six
months after the accident, the surety still had the case under investigation. Claimant does
not speak English, has very little formal education, and is not sophisticated in American
legal matters. Counsel reviewed and advised her on these issues. Was that service of no
value to Claimant?

•

On 10/24/05, Claimant's husband (who speaks some English) called and asked for legal
advice on Claimant's concerns about not receiving wage-loss benefits and her perception
that the employer and surety had stopped cooperating ever since she had exercised her
right to retain legal counsel. Counsel advised her on these issues. Was that service of no
value to Claimant?

13 It would also be tantamount to a fmding that Counsel's exercise of professional judgment, in agreeing to accept a
case and in providing legal advice and advocacy, was erroneous.
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•

On 11/18/05, Counsel reviewed and responded to a Work Status Report from Dr. Sant,
sending him a letter requesting a statement of work restrictions and an impairment rating.
Was that service of no value to Claimant?

•

On 11123/05, Claimant called14 and asked for legal advice on Claimant's concerns about
having been fired from her job and whether to seek new employment. Counsel advised
her on these issues. Was that service of no value to Claimant?

The above service events occurred during the first seven weeks of counsel's representation of
Claimant. During this same period, Counsel also provided many other service events, such as
requesting, receiving, and reviewing medical records; contacting and/or communicating with
the surety, medical providers, creditors, and employer; and communicating with Claimant.
In the year that ensued after these first seven weeks (i.e. from 11123/05 to 12/19/06 when
the PPI rating was obtained), Counsel engaged in dozens of other service transactions on
Claimant's behalf. Were all of these services of no value to Claimant? Does the amount of
attorney fees that Counsel is seeking for the PPI benefits obtained ($933.28) somehow
exceed the value of the attorney time, attorney expertise, office staff time, and office
overhead that Counsel expended on Claimant's behalf?
In sum, it would defy logic for the Commission to fmd that the fourteen months' oflegal
services provided to Claimant prior to a PPI rating were of no value and should not be
compensated. IS, 16

Counsel provided a Spanish translator on the call.
Of course, from December 2006 until a settlement agreement was reached in 2009, Counsel engaged in many
dozens of other service transactions on Claimant's behalf.
14

15
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COMMISSION STAFF'S REQUEST FOR PROOF OF A "DISPUTE" IS
CONTRARY TO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
As noted above, Curr prohibits the Commission from allowing attorney fees only in
"disputed matters." Nonetheless, Counsel received a calIon 10/14/09 from Scott McDougal of
the Commission's staff in which it was requested that Counsel provide "documents" to show
what issues were in "dispute" when Counsel was retained, and how the services of Counsel
operated "primarily or substantially" to secure the PPI benefit.
Constitutionally, then, the Commission staff may not require proof of a "dispute" in
determining whether to approve attorney fees. However, for purposes of making a record, and
without admitting that Counsel is required to submit such documents, Counsel is submitting with
his affidavit scores of non-privileged documents in the instant case. These documents provide all
the proof of Counsel's entitlement to attorney fees that the law requires.

COMMISSION STAFF'S REQUIREMENT THAT PROOF BE
"DOCUMENTARY" MISAPPREHENDS WHAT BURDEN OF PROOF
APPLIES
IDAP A rule 17.02.08.033.03.d reads in pertinent part:
The attorney shall always bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence his or her assertion of a charging lien and reasonableness of his or her
fee.

Assuming arguendo that the rule itself is constitutional, the burden of proof required of an
attorney to establish his right to an attorney fee is "preponderance ofthe evidence." Counsel is
aware of no legal authority that requires this evidence to be in documentary form. Indeed, it is

16 Because there is no known legal authority for a tribunal to take the position that it may make a blanket finding that
an attorney's services have no value to a client, there is no need for Counsel to attempt to provide citation to
contrary legal authority.
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well-settled that the fonns of evidence in a civil matter may also include circumstantial,
testimonial, demonstrative, parol, etc. 17
Nonetheless, Commission staff has taken the unyielding position that "documentation" is
required to meet the burden of proof. Besides the call from Mr. McDougal referenced above,
Counsel has received a letter from him dated 10122/09 regarding a similar case that Counsel has
pending with the Commission, in which Mr. McDougal states that "Absent ... documentation
that the specific benefit was disputed or delayed," Counsel is not entitled to attorney fees.
Apparently, Commission staff believes that the law allows it to deny attorney fees if
Counsel does not provide "documents" to prove (1) the existence of a PPI dispute and (2) how
Counsel's actions were "primarily and substantially" responsible for the PPI benefit. This is not a
correct statement of the burden of proof requirement.
First, as seen above, the evidence need not be documentary. Second, to the extent that the
staff is interpreting the "primarily and substantially" language to require a higher burden of proof
than "preponderance of the evidence," this would not be a correct interpretation:
A "preponderance of the evidence" is evidence that, when weighed with that
opposed to it, has more convincing force and from which results a greater
probability of truth. Harris v. Electrical Wholesale, 141 Idaho 1,3, 105 P.3d 267,
269 (2004).
A preponderance of evidence is evidence that is of greater weight, or is more
convincing, than that offered in opposition to it. The tenn does not mean
preponderance in amount. 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 1628

Thus, "preponderance" does not require a particular quantity or "amount" of evidence. It also
does not require that the evidence be in any particular fonn, so the Commission may consider,
for example, circumstantial evidence. Moreover, the "probability of truth" is not just a function
17 Because this principle cannot reasonably be disputed, Counsel sees no reason to cite authority for it, but will do so
if requested by the Commission.
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of the supporting evidence offered, but also of the weight of the evidence "offered in opposition
to it." In cases where, as here, there is ample supporting evidence and no contrary evidence, the
probabilities heavily favor Counsel's right to attorney fees, and the burden of proof has been well
met. Again, the law does not require Counsel to provide "documentation that the specific benefit
was disputed."

COMMISSION STAFF'S REQUIREMENT OF "PROOF" THAT
COUNSEL WAS "PRIMARILY AND SUBSTANTIALLY" RESPONSIBLE
FOR PPI BENEFITS MISAPPREHENDS THE NOTION OF PROOF
As noted above, the "primarily and substantially" language may not be interpreted to
require a higher burden of proof than "preponderance of the evidence." Similarly, the burden of
proof does not require Counsel to prove a causal link between his representation and the payment
of PPI by demonstrating that without his representation, the benefits would not have been paid.
Logically, it is impossible to "prove" that without Counsel's assistance, the surety would
not have paid PPI. Consider this example: Can you prove that if your doctor had not given you
that flu shot last winter, you would not have avoided the flu? Of course not, because whether you
catch the flu depends on a host of factors such as whether you were exposed to the virus, your
degree of pre-existing immunity, your level of stress, and how much sleep you get, as well as the
flu shot. Does the Commission staff believe that at the end of the winter, if they did not catch the
flu, they should not have had to pay their doctor for that flu shot? After all, in retrospect there is
no "proof' that his service was primarily and substantially responsible for them avoiding the flu!
1bis analogy demonstrates why the law only requires a preponderance of the evidence to
support a claim for attorney fees, and not some kind of absolute "proof." In sum, although
Counsel cannot absolutely "prove" that without his representation the Claimant would not have
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received PPI benefits, the preponderance of the evidence shows that with Counsel's
representation, the Claimant did receive benefits.

THE PRESENCE OF A REPUTABLE CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY IS
LIKELY TO REDUCE THE CHANCE THAT A SURETY WILL DISPUTE
A PPI BENEFIT
There are other reasons why a narrow focus on the concept of "dispute" is misplaced. The
hiring of a claimant's attorney with a reputation for strong advocacy is usually enough to prevent
the surety from disputing a PPI benefit or other benefit that the surety might otherwise have
disputed if the claimant were unrepresented.
Most sureties in Idaho know the following about Claimant's Counsel, Breck Seiniger:
•

He has been practicing work comp law for thirty years.

•

He is equally respected by the plaintiffs bar and the insurance defense bar for his
professionalism, expertise, and integrity.

•

He is AV-rated by Martindale-Hubbell.

•

He has been selected by his peers for The Best Lawyers in America and Mountain
States SuperLawyers, both of which are rare honors.

•

He has taken dozens of claimant's cases to hearing.

•

He has appealed work comp cases, and some of his appeals have resulted in
setting precedent in the field of work comp law.

•

He is not afraid to take difficult cases to hearing if he feels that fairness requires

When Seiniger Law Offices represents a claimant, most

~ureties

and opposing attorneys (who are

well aware of the above facts) are more likely to comply with the law, more likely to pay
18

Because these facts are common knowledge, Counsel requests the Commission to take judicial notice thereof.
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benefits that are owed, and less likely to dispute PPI ratings. If the Commission staffhas any
evidence to the contrary, Counsel will be glad to review and respond to same. Othenvise, the
preponderance of the evidence shows that Counsel's representation of Claimant made it likely
that the surety in the instant case would choose not to dispute the PPI benefits.

THE COMMISSION STAFF'S APPLICATION OF THE "DISPUTE"
RULE ENCOURAGES LITIGATION CONFLICT AND PENALIZES THE
BEST ATTORNEYS
First, the Commission staff s focus on "dispute" as a key factor in determining the
reasonableness of attorney fees misapprehends the way that good plaintiff's attorneys approach
the practice of worker's compensation law. A good plaintiff's attorney seeks to find common
ground with the surety or opposing counsel and to develop a working relationship of mutual
respect, recognizing that communication, cooperation, and consensus-building is usually a better
strategy than acrimony and asperity. Properly understood, both the claimant's counsel and the
insurance adjuster perform the function of helping the injured worker-the attorney by guiding
her through the maze of legal issues, and the adjuster by arranging for the payment of muchneeded medical treatment and time-loss benefits. It is in no one's best interest, least of all the
claimant's, for the Commission to apply its rules in such a way as to encourage the plaintiff's bar
to work toward finding ways to foster, or at least to demonstrate and document, disputes between
the two sides.
Second, the Commission staffs insistence on a "dispute" actually penalizes the more
reputable attorneys, because they are less likely to have benefits disputed by the surety, and
therefore under the staff s application of IDAP A rules, less likely to receive approval for their
attorney fees (and less likely to take on injured workers' cases in the future!).
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Indeed, if proof of "dispute" is required, it almost puts the surety in charge of
determining how much a claimant's attorney will be paid, because attorney fees are based more
on the surety's decisions of what to "dispute" than on any of the factors enumerated in Rule 1.5
of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct regarding the value of the attorney's services. 19

THE COMMISSION STAFF MAY NOT SUBSTITUTE ITS HINDSIGHTBASED OPINION FOR THAT OF THE CLAIMANT
On the question of whether a benefit was disputed, the Commission staff appears to be

applying its rules in such a way as to substitute its hindsight-based opinion for that of the
Claimant's opinion, formed at the time she chose to retain Counsel, as to what issues the
Claimant thought were being disputed or might be disputed. Obviously, the Claimant thought
something in her case was currently or potentially a dispute or a problem, or she would not have

sought an attorney. In terms of evaluating the need for an attorney, why is the opinion of the
worker who sought help while injured of less value than the Commission staffs opinion rendered
four years later?
When the Commission staff rules that the attorney's services were not needed (i.e., of no
value), it is also saying that the claimant was wrong to seek legal help. Did the legislature really
intend for the Commission to decide who does and does not need the help of an attorney?
Moreover, under the Commission staff's current approach, an attorney trying to decide
whether to take a case has to do the following:

19 A clever surety will simply say "I don't dispute that PPI benefit," but then just not pay it. Eventually the
claimant's attorney will have no choice but to make a proper motion, at which point the surety will quickly start
making payments, claiming that they intended to do so all along. But at the end of the case, the Commission staff
won't approve any attorney fee for the hours and expertise invested in getting the PPI benefits paid, because
technically the surety didn't dispute it!
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•

Make a guess as to whether the injured worker will eventually have a PPI rating. (That is
a lot to ask, given that there aren't even any doctors who are willing to make such a
prediction in advance.)

•

Make a guess as to whether the surety will dispute the rating. (That is a lot to ask, given
that the surety itself probably doesn't know whether it intends to dispute any eventual
rating.)

•

Make a guess as to whether, if disputed, it will be possible to prevail at a hearing so that
the claimant will actually receive benefits from which the attorney can take a fee. (That is
a lot to ask, given that no one knows what will be the testimony ofthe treating physicians
and IMEs.)

By way of analogy, this would be like requiring a physician, at the very first appointment, to
predict how much medical help the patient will need, what infections or other medical
complications mayor may not crop up during treatment, how long it will take to get better, and
what will be the end result of treatment. Does the Commission staff really believe that at the end
of the treatment, the board of medicine should second-guess the physician's judgment and
prevent him from getting paid for his services?
This is why a hindsight-based approach is prohibited by the Idaho Supreme Court, which
said that the reasonableness of an attorney fee "derives from the totality of the circumstances
from the perspective ofthe parties at the time that the fee agreement was made." Curr v. Curr,
124 Idaho at 690,864 P.2d at 136.
In the instant case, the Claimant thought she needed help, and Counsel agreed to help her.

The Commission staff may not lawfully second-guess their decisions through the denial of a
claim for attorney fees.
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THE COMMISSION STAFF MAY NOT CHERRY-PICK WHICH
ATTORNEY FEES HAVE TO MEET THE STANDARD OF "PRIMARILY
AND SUBSTANTIALLY"
The preceding paragraph leads us to this key issue: does the law allow the Commission to
apply the standards from its IDAP A rules differently to different types of work comp benefits?

In recent months, the Commission staff appears to have taken the position that the
"documentation" standard and the "primarily and substantially" standard20 may be used to deny
attorney fees on PPI benefits. If this approach is to be permitted, there is nothing in the IDAP A
rules to suggest that the same standard should not be applied with equal fervor to attorney fee
requests for having obtained lump sum settlements, or TTDs, or any other benefits.
Counsel notes that in the instant case, he possesses no "documents" in which the surety,
prior to commencing negotiations to a lump sum settlement, stated that it "disputed" the right of
the Claimant to receive "Consideration of lump sum settlement.,,21 Applying the Commission
staff's approach, since Counsel has no documentary "proof' of a "dispute," how can Counsel
possibly be entitled to attorney fees on the lump sum settlement he negotiated?
Counsel also notes that in the instant case, he cannot "prove" (using the Commission
staff s absolute interpretation discussed above) that his actions operated "primarily and
substantially" to obtain the lump sum benefits?2
Counsel submits that if the Commission applies its IDAPA rules in such a way as to
disallow attorney fees on the PPI, it must apply the rules the exact same way to the lump sum
agreement, and deny attorney fees on that benefit also, in the instant case and in every other
worker's compensation case. To do otherwise would be to apply its IDAPA standards unequally
17.02.0S.033.01.c.ii.
Lump Sum Agreement, page S.
22 If a surety desired to prevent a claimant's attorney from receiving a fee on the lump sum agreement, all it would
have to do is say to the Commission, "Even if Claimant had not been represented by counsel, we still would have
paid the lump sum amount."
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depending on the type of benefit obtained, and there is nothing in the rules or the law to permit
this.

CONCLUSION
Counsel is entitled to attorney fees as requested in the instant case.

Dated October 23,2009.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

Andrew Marsh
Attorney for Claimant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that on October 23,2009, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document to be served as follows:
Harmon Whittier & Day
P.O. Box 6358
Boise ID 83707-6358
Fax: (800) 972-3213
[R]Fax

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

Andrew Marsh
Attorney for Claimant
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(208) 345-1000

MEMORANDUM OF LAW
IN SUPPORT OF FORM 1022
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387)
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588)
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 345-1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700
Attorneys for Claimant
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Maria Gomez,
Claimant,
I.C. No. 05-510285
vs.
Nampa Lodging Investors LLC,
Employer,

AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW C. MARSH
IN SUPPORT OF
MEMORANDUM OF LAW

and
Liberty Northwest,
Surety,
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
)ss
)

Andrew C. Marsh, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows:
1. I am an associate attorney of the firm Seiniger Law Offices, P .A., and attorney of record
for the Claimant in the above-entitled matter. I make this Affidavit based on personal
knowledge.
2. Seiniger Law Offices, P.A. was retained by Claimant in regard to the above matter on or
about 10/5/05. A copy ofthe engagement agreement has been previously provided to the
Commission as an attachment to my Form 1022.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000

PAGE 1 OF 2

EXHIBIT
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3. In retaining Counsel, Claimant specifically sought the services of Counsel as counselor
and as advocate, which were then provided.
4. In representing Claimant, this office drafted, reviewed, analyzed, and/or acted upon the
exhibit documents attached hereto on a CD. This includes many pages of correspondence,
damages and bills, fee and cost records, Industrial Commission records, and medical
records.
5. In representing Claimant, this office also engaged in many phone transactions, email
transactions, and meeting and note transactions.
FURTHER SAYETH YOUR AFFIANT NAUGHT.

Dated October 23,2009.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

Andrew Marsh
Attorney for Claimant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on October 23, 2009.

GvL V, Uc, )~
Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at: NA0PA tbM-fO
My Commission expires: 1/2,-"':>1Z-o 11--

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000
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E. Scott Harmon, ISB 3183
LAW OFFICES OF HARMON, WHITTIER & DAY
6213 N. Cloverdale Rd., Ste. 150
~~.. !~!
P.O. Box 6358
Boise, ID 83707-6358
Telephone (208) 327-7563
FAX (800) 972-3213
Employees of the Uberty Mutual Group

Attomey for Defendants

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Maria Gomez,

)
)

Claimant,
vs.
Nampa Lodging Investors, LLC.
Employer,
and
Uberty Northwest Ins. Corp.,
Surety,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)

,-;

I. C. No.: 2003-522535 TLC
- - 2005-510285 TLC
2005-510286 !7V)CJ

"1/L

'Il

!L.-

STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT
OF LUMP SUM DISCHARGE AND
ORDER OF APPROVAL AND
DISCHARGE

)

)
)
)
)
)
)

In consideration of the premises and promises and covenants hereinafter set forth,
and subject to the above-entitled Commission's approval and Order of Discharge pursuant
thereto, and further pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 72-707 and 72-404, the above-entitled
parties hereby stipulate and agree in favor of the Claimant, Maria Gomez, as hereinafter
setforth.

RECEIVED
1 -STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT OF LUMP SUM DISCHARGE AND
ORDER OF APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE

SEP 2 9 2009
BOISE LEGAL

\

~

I.
It is agreed that on or about October 19, 2003, the Claimant, Maria Gomez,
was employed by Nampa Lodging Investors. LLC, in the County of CANYON. Idaho, and
on the same date the Claimant allegedly sustained an injury as a result of an industrial
accident arising out of and during the course of employment which she then had with the
Defendant, Nampa Lodging Investors, LLC. These injuries include, but are not necessarily
limited to, right rotator cuff tear with subsequent surgery; shoulder and neck myofascial
pain syndrome.
It is agreed that on or about February 03, 2005, the Claimant, Maria Gomez, was
employed by Nampa Lodging Investors, LLC, in the County of CANYON, Idaho, and on
the same date the Claimant allegedly sustained an injury as a result of an industrial
accident arising out of and during the course of employment which she then had with the
Defendant, Nampa Lodging Investors, LLC. These injuries include, but are not necessarily
limited to, right knee pain with subsequent surgery.
It is agreed that on or about February 26,2005, the Claimant, Maria Gomez, was
employed by Nampa Lodging Investors, LLC, in the County of CANYON. Idaho, and on
the same date the Claimant allegedly sustained an injury as a result of an industrial
accident arising out of and during the course of employment which she then had with the
Defendant, Nampa Lodging Investors, LLC. These injuries include, but are not necessarily
limited tO,neck, mid-back, right shoulder, and low back strain/pain and contusions.
All damages, disability, loss, expense and injury, past, present and future, in any
way resulting from or related to the alleged accidents are finally settled and discharged by
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this Agreement.

This is the case whether or not these damages, disability, loss or

expense are now known, recognized or foreseen.
II.
At all times herein mentioned, Uberty Northwest Ins. Corp. was the Surety of said
Employer under the Workers' Compensation Laws of the State of Idaho.
III.
Claimant contends, and Defendants deny, that the Defendants are liable for all of
the medical expenses and compensation pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Laws of
the State of Idaho as a result of injury sustained from said alleged industrial accident. It is
Defendants' contention that disputes exist in this claim concerning the nature and extent of
injuries, the cause and extent of Claimant's permanent impairment and disability,
entitlement to temporary partial and total disability benefits and probable amount of future
medical expenses. The parties hereto acknowledge that these are serious questions and
disputes, and that all differences are compromised and settled by this Agreement.
In consideration of this Agreement, all parties stipulate that the Comm!ssion shall,
on and by approval hereof, be deemed to adjudicate these issues and all other issues
ariSing out of Claimant's alleged accident and injuries, as provided by the Workers'
Compensation Laws of the State of Idaho.

IV.
At the time of the alleged accident herein referred to, the Claimant was married with
4 dependent(s), and was receiving an average weekly wage on the following dates of
injury:
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10119/2003 = $248.73;
02/03/2005 = $250.00;
02126/2005 $250.00.

=

v.

It is agreed and stipulated that Claimant filed Notices of Injury and Claim for
Compensation with respect to the subject claims with the Industria! Commission of the
State of Idaho on the dates identified below; and Defendants have paid Claimant's medical
expenses as indicated:
DATE OF ACCIDENT
10/19/2003
213/2005
2/26/2005

NOTICE FILED
10/28/2003
511012005
5/10/2005

TOTAL MEDICALS PAID

$ 14,998.87
$ 21,616.09
$ 3,594.27

The following medical and related expenses have been incurred by Claimant
following said accident to the present date, none of which have been paid by Defendants
and all of which will be paid by Claimant from the proceeds of this Jump sum settlement:
Action Collection Service

$231.01

for Nampa Radiologists, PA
NCO Collection Agency

$622.00

for Treasure Valley ER Physician
Bonneville Billing & Collections

$383.43

for Saltzer Medical Group

TOTAL

$1,236.44

Claimant represents that the above itemization of unpaid medica! bills is complete
and accurate, and agrees to pay any medical billing, whether indicated above or not, that
remains unpaid as of the date of this Agreement.
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VI.
By way of settlement of these disputes, the parties agree to the following:
1.

Medical expenses paid by Surety:

(a) Date of Injury - 10/19/2003:
Physicians:
Anesthesiology Consultants
Idaho Physical Moo and Rehab
Mercy Ambucare Center
Nampa Radiologist PA
Saltzer Medical Group PA
Treasure Valley ER Physicians
West Valley emergency Physician
Total: $11,076.75
Hospitals:
Mercy Medical Genter
West Valley Medical Center
Total: $ 1,320.75
Physical Therapists:
Mercy Medical Center
Total: $ 1,574.18
Miscellaneous:
LMMNGMT
Restat Pharmacy Contract
Med Now Inc
MRI Mobile
Orthopedic Fracture
Working RX
Med Now Pharmacy
Total: $ 1,027.19

TOTAL MEDICAL PAID:
(Re: 10/19/03 Injury)

$14,998.87/
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(8) Date of Injury - 02/3/2005:
Physicians:
Associn Family Practice
Caldwell Radiological Assoc
Idaho Physical Medicine Rehab
Idaho Physical Medicine
MRI Mobile
Nampa Radiologists
Orthopedic Fracture Clinic
Total: $ 6A10.20
Hospitals:
Idaho Surgery Center
West Valley Medical Center
Total: $ 9,753.46
Phl!sical Therapists:
Idaho Elks Rehab
Idaho Physical Therapy
Total: $ 4,616.89
Miscellaneous:
Maria Gomez
Uberty Mutual Group
LM MNGMNT
Restat
Medical Service Company
Total: $
TOTAL MEDICAL PAID:

835.54

$21,616.09

j

(Re: 2/3/2005 Injury)
(C) Date of Injury 2-26-2005
Physicians:
Idaho Physical Medicine
Nampa Radiologists
Saltzer Medical Group PA
Total: $

798.88
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Hospitals:
Mercy Medical Center
Total: $ 2,175.04
Physical Therapists:
Mercy Medical Center
Total: $

TOTAL MEDICAL PAID:
(Re: 2/26/2005 Injury)

620.35

$

3,594.27 . /

TOTAL MEDICAL PAID ON ALL CLAIMS:

2.

$40,209.23

Total Temporary Disability
Owed by Surety:
Re: 10/19/2003 Date of Injury:
10/19/2003 through 10/21/2003
3 days @ $223.86 per week =

$

10/27/2003 through 02/05/2004
14 weeks, 4 days @ $223.86 per week
03/04/2004 through 04/0212004
4 weeks, 3 days @ $223.86 per week

95.94/

= $ 3,261.96 /

=

$

991.38

j

07/15/2004 through 08120/2004
5 weeks, 2 days @ $223.86 per week = $ 1,183.26

TOTAL nD OWED:
(Re: 10119/03 Injury Date)
Re: 213/2005 Date of Iniury:
7/
07/31/2005 through 09/25/200fi
8 weeks, 1 day @ $225.00 per week =

$ 5,532.54 /

$ 1,832.14

09/30/2005 through 08/02/2006
43 weeks, 6 days @ $225.00 perweek= $ 9,867.86
08/03/2006 through 12/18/2006
19 weeks, 5 days @ $254.25 per week =$ 5,012.36
TOTAL nD OWED:
(RE: 2/3/2005 Injury Date)

$16,712.36
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Re: 2/26/2005 Date of Injury:
No TID's Owed
3.

Temporary Partial Disability
Owed by Surety:
Re: 10/19/2003 Date of Iniury:
10/22/2003 through 10/26/2003 =

$

02/06/2004 through 03/0212004 =

$ 339.14('

66.60 /

TOTAL TPD OWED:
(Re: 10/19/03 Injury date)
4.

$

405.74./

$

3,733.13

Permanent Partial Impairment:
5% Whole person Assessed with
2.5% Pre-Existing - Re: right Knee
Assessed by Dr. Nicola
12.5 weeks@ $298.65 per week
TOTAL PPI OWED:

5.

Consideration of lump sum settlement;
disputed compensation benefits of any
kind, accrued and future; waiver of
right to reconsideration and to appeal

$13,442.57

TOTAL:

$39,826.34/

LESS TID PAID (10/19/03 Injury)
LESS TID PAID (2/3/2005 Injury)
LESS TPD PAID (10/19/03 Injury)
LESS PPI PAID:

($ 5,532.54)
($16,712.36)
($
405.74)
($ 3,733.13)

TOTAL DUE CLAJMANT:

$ 13,442.57

a) Attorney fees taken prior to LSS:
b) Costs taken prior to LSS:
c) Additional attorney fees to be taken
from LSS:
d) Additional costs to be taken from LSS:

$
$

933.28

$
$

3051.53

$
$

3658.25

-0-

606.72

(includes voc eval expert)

SUBTOTAL (ADD c + d)
Total Claimant's Fees and Costs:

4591.43
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Itemized list of outstanding medicals
to be paid by Claimant from LSS
balance:
TOTAL TO CLAIMANT:

$
$

1236.44

8,547.88

VII.

All parties acknowledge that the nature and extent of temporary and permanent
disability, if any, and the amount of medical and related care and expense in this matter
are uncertain and in dispute; that pursuant to I.C. § 72404, it.is in the best interest of the
parties that the above-entitled claims be fully. 'finally and forever discharged upon a lump
sum payment by Surety in the amount of $13,442.57, such settlement to discharge all / '
rights and claims to aU permanent and temporary compensation, and all medical and
related benefits whether or not known, herein listed, discoverable or contemplated by the
parties.
VIII.
Claimant does indemnify and agree to save Defendants harmless from and against
any further claim or loss of any and every kind arising out of or related to said alleged
accidents and any resultant loss, damage or injury, including without limit any claim
respecting past or future hospital, medical or like expense.

IX.

In making this Stipulation and Agreement of Lump Sum Settlement, all parties
acknowledge and agree that neither Defendant admits the allegations of Claimant, this
Agreement being solely for the purpose of adjudication and settlement of doubtful and
disputed claims.
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x.
This Agreement is made at Claimant's request and is the acceptance by the
Claimant of the offer of the Surety. By this instrument, Claimant requests settlement be
made in accordance with the terms and conditions of this Agreement, and further petitions
the Commission for approval hereof and Order of Discharge pursuant hereto. Employer
and Surety herein join in said petition and stipulate that it shall be granted.

XI.
Claimant acknowledges that she has carefully read this Agreement and legal
instrument in its entirety. understands its contents, and has executed the same knowing
that this Agreement forever concludes and fully and finally disposes of any and all claim of
every kind and character she has or may have against the Employer and Surety on
account of the alleged accidents and injuries on October 19, 2003; February 03, 2005; and
February 26. 2005.
IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that the Defendants shall pay the
sum within fifteen days following their receipt of the approved and conformed copy of this
entire agreement.

Any interest allowable under the Workmen's Compensation Laws of

the State of Idaho will not begin to accrue until after the fifteen-day period.
Claimant further acknowledges that she is represented by Andrew Marsh, legal
counsel, in these claims and has reviewed the contents of the Agreement with her
attorney, who has explained the contents hereof and apprised Claimant of the
consequences of her acceptance and execution.
IT

is

UNDERSTOOD THAT IN EXECUTING THIS AGREEMENT THESE

PROCEEDINGS ARE CONCLUDED AND FOREVER CLOSED BY REASON THEREOF,
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SUBJECT ONLY TO COMMISSION APPROVAL AND ORDER, AND THAT CLAIMANT
WILL NOT THEREAFTER BE ABLE TO REOPEN THE SAME FOR ANY PURPOSE.
Notwithstanding this knowledge, Claimant and Defendants hereby petition the Industrial
Commission for a lump;z settlement as evidenced by these presents.
DATED this5D~ay of September, 2009

APPROVED:

LAW OFFICES OF HARMON, WHiniER & DAY

h~armon
~~,/A /

E. Scott
;.
Attorney for Defendants

l

~

'1rutli(

}07C

nette Yorgason U
Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp_
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ORDER OF APPROVAL AND OF DISCHARGE
UPON LUMP SUM PAYMENT

The foregoing stipulation, agreement and petition having duly and regularly come
before this Commission and that pursuant to I.C. § 72-404, it is in the best interests of the
parties that approving said agreement and Order of Discharge be granted as prayed for,
NOW, THEREFORE, said foregoing stipulation and agreement shall be, and the
same hereby is, APPROVED; and further,
Said petition shall be and hereby is granted and the above-entitled proceedings are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
DATED this _ _ day of ~er, 2009.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

By ________________
Chairman

Member

Member

ATTEST:

Assistant Secretary
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the _ _ day of

~temt5er,

2009, a true and

correct copy of the STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT OF LUMP SUM DISCHARGE
AND ORDER OF APPROVAL AND DISCHARGE, I.C. Nos. 2003-522535, 2005-510285,
and 2005-510286 was served by first class mail, postage prepaid upon each of the
following:

E Scott Harmon
Law Offices of Harmon, Whittier & Day
6213 N. Cloverdale Rd., Ste. 150
P.O. Box 6358
Boise, 10 83707-6358
Andrew Marsh
Attorney at Law
942 Myrtle st.
Boise, 10 83702
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IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

C.L. "'BUTCH" OTTER, GOVERNOR

POBox 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0041
(208)334-6000 - FAX (208) 334-2321
1-800-950-211 0

COMMISSIONERS
R.D. Maynard, Chainnan
Thomas E. Limbaugh
Thomas P. Baskin
Mindy Montgomery, Director

December 24, 2009
Andrew Marsh
Seiniger Law Offices
942 W Myrtle Street
Boise,ID 83702
Re:

Claimant: Maria Gomez
IC # 2005-510285
Proposed settlement with Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp.

Dear Mr. Marsh:
The Industrial Commission (Commission) is in receipt of the proposed settlement
agfe~ment referenced above. In our review of the proposed settlement, the Commission
has also considered your letters, attachments and CD-R of September 28, October 23, and
November 11,2009, regarding your representation of the claimant and your proposed fees,
as well as the documentation attached to the Stipulation and Agreement of Lump Sum
Discharge and Order of Approval and Discharge received September 29, 2009. The
Commission staff has made an initial determination that the settlement is in the best
interests of the parties, except for the portion of the requested fees related to the Permanent
Partial Impairment (PPI) benefit previously paid. With respect to that fee, staff lacks
sufficient information to conclude that the requested fee is reasonable, and is therefore
unable to recommend approval of the same to the Commission.
Specifically, Counsel is requesting fees from the PPI, but it is unclear from the
documentation and other evidence that you have asked us to consider, that Counsel was
primarily or substantially responsible for obtaining those benefits. The PPI was paid in the
amount of$3,733.13, and fees requested / previously taken amounted to $933.28 (25%).
However, it is also noted that counsel has not requested fees from $1,236.44 of the lump
sum consideration to be paid per the settlement document, which fees would amount to
$309.11, and are deemed reasonable. Consequently, the net amount of fees not currently
found to be reasonable is $624.17 ($933.28 minus $309.11).
Please be ·aware that this is an initial determination, and, in accordance with IDAP A
17.02.08.033.03,you may request a hearing on the matter within fourteen days. Also in

700 So . Clearwater Ln., Boise, ID
Equal Opportunity Employer

accordance with this rule, the Commission will shortly be issuing a partial order releasing
available funds, and fees and costs which have been determined to be reasonable.
Thank you for your assistance in the review of this proposed settlement.
Sincerely,

Scott McDougall
Manager, Claims and Benefits
Cc:

Liberty NW
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Maria Gomez,
Claimant,
v.

Nampa Lodging Investors, LLC,
Employer,
and
Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp.,
Defendants,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

IC: 2005-510285
2005-510286
2003-522535

ORDER APPROVING IN PART
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT
OF LUMP SUM DISCHARGE

FI LE D

JAN "':4 2010
INDUSTRIAlCOMMISSION

This matter came before the Commission on the request of the parties to approve a
Stipulation and Agreement of Lump Sum Discharge. The Commission desires to approve the
agreement, except for a portion relating to attorney fees. Having fully reviewed the proposed
settlement and being fully advised, the Commission finds that the agreement is in the best
interests ofthe parties. THEREFORE,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That the Stipulation and Agreement of Lump Sum Discharge
proposed by the parties is approved, with the exception of a portion of the claim for attorney fees
submitted by Claimant's Attorney.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the Commission approves the request for attorney fees
and costs as those services related to the lump sum consideration. The total lump sum amount is

ORDER APPROVING IN PART STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT OF LUMP SUM
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$13,442.57. Fees from that amount at 25% are $3,360.64, which is reasonable. Fees and costs
amount to $3,360.64 and $606.72 respectively, for a total of $3,967.36. However, Attorney has
previously withheld $933.28 as fees from the permanent partial impairment benefit paid to
claimant.

Pursuant to IDAP A 17.02.08.033.03(a), Commission staff has previously informed

Claimant's Attorney that staff has been unable to determine that such a fee should be
recommended for approval.

It is noted that Counsel requests from the lump sum consideration

$309.11 less in fees than has to this point been deemed reasonable. Consequently, the amount of
fees unawarded at this time will be $624.17 ($933.28 minus $309.11).

Accordingly, Surety

shall release to Attorney the sum of $4,270.52 ($3,967.36 minus $624.17 plus $1,236.44) as the
total of fees and costs due, less those fees previously taken, plus proceeds allocated for
outstanding medicals.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the Surety release to Attorney the sum of $624.17,
which is the amount of the proceeds of the Stipulation and Agreement of Lump Sum Discharge
requested for unsubstantiated attorney fees, to be held in trust pending further order of the
Commission.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the Surety pay to Claimant the remaining sum of
$8,547.88.
Claimant's attorney has previously been advised in writing of this determination and his
right to request a hearing on the issue of attorney fees .
.;.1..
(\
.;)0\0
DATED this ~day of ~~CAllA~< ,2009.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

f'/J~
Ch~an

R.D. Maynard,
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Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner
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DISCHARGE - 3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on ~CVb. L\ ,J,. D\ 0, a true and correct copy of ORDER
APPROVING IN PART STIPU ATION AND AGREEMENT OF LUMP SUM
DISCHARGE, IC # 2005-510285, was served upon the parties listed below as follows:
_X_US MAIL

COURIER

E. Scott Harmon
Laws Offices of Harmon, Whittier & Day
PO Box 6358
Boise, ID 83707-6358

Andrew Marsh
Seiniger Law Office
942 Myrtle St
Boise,ID 83702
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Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387)
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588)
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 345-1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700
Attorneys for Claimant

L'

I';

i

.,
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,
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Maria Gomez,
Claimant,
I.e. No. 06-006711
vs.
Nampa Lodging Investors LLC,
Employer,
and

MOTION FOR STATEMENT
OF REASONS FOR DENIAL
OF ATTORNEY FEE
PURSUANT TO
IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03(a)

Liberty Nothwest,
Surety,
Defendants.
COMES NO\V Claimant's counsel, and hereby files this MOTION FOR STATEMENT
OF REASONS FOR DENIAL OF ATTORNEY FEE PURSUANT TO IDAPA
17.02.08.033.03(a).
The grounds for the Motion are that IDAP A 17.02.08.033.03(a) provides as follows:
"The Commission staff will notify counsel in writing of the staff s informal determination, which
shall state the reasons for the determination that the requested fee is not reasonable." However,
Counsel has received no such statement. Neither the Commission's order dated January 4,2010
nor the letter from Scott McDougall contain any reasons; they only contain the conclusion that
the attorney fees requested in the above matter have not been found to be reasonable.

1

The McDougal letter was received by Counsel on 12/28/09.

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208)345-1000

MOTION FOR STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR DENIAL
OF ATTORNEY FEE PURSUANT TO
IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03(A)

PAGE
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The legal dictionary at http://dictionary.lp.findlaw.com defines "reason" as "an
underlying ground, justification, purpose, motive, or inducement. Example: required to provide
reasons for the termination in writing." In other words, a statement of reasons must include
the underlying grounds, i.e. a factual and legal basis, neither of which has been provided to
Counsel.
It would be fundamentally unfair for Counsel to be denied attorney fees or to be forced to

attend a hearing on attorney fees without receiving the statement of reasons required by the
IDAPA rule.
The relief sought is compliance with IDAPA 17.02.0S.033.03(a), including notification in
writing to Counsel of the reasons for the determination that the requested attorney fee is not
reasonable.
Dated January 12,2010.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

Andrew Marsh
Attorney for Claimant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that on January 12,2010, I caused a true and correct copy ofthe foregoing document
to be served by facsimile on:
Harmon, Whittier and Day
(SOO) 972-3213

SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
.--:::,.., /.,< .....t- /<~~i£,l<~.-4Andrew Marsh
Attorney for Claimant
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 345-1000

MOTION FOR STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR DENIAL
OF ATTORNEY FEE PURSUANT TO
IDAPA 17.02.0B.033.03(A)
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S1EliNliGJE1R
AVV OFFiCES
Professional Association

WM. BRECK SEINIGER, JR.

ANDREW C. MARsH
Idaho, Indiana, and Missouri

Idaho, Oregon, Washington, and the District of Columbia
JULIE MARsH SEINIGER
Idaho, Indiana, and the District of Columbia

January 26,2010
VIA HAND DELIVERY
WITH COPIES TO THE COMMISSIONERS

RE:

Maria Gomez v. Nampa Lodging Investors, LLC & Liberty NW
06-006711
..

IIC Case No.:
Dear Mr. McDougall:

This is in response to your letter of December 24,2009, and the Commiss~Qn's Order of
January 4,2010, regarding attorney fees in the above matter. The Order firic!s that •
$933.28 in attorney fees for the PPI was not found to be reasonable. But on a separate
issue, the Order finds that Counsel (Seiniger Law Offices) did not request $309.11 in
attorney fees on the Lump Sum Agreement for which Counsel was eligible, thus directing
that Counsel retain the difference, $624.17, in trust pending a hearing.
Our Form 1022, filed September 28,2009, provides on page two that we are waiving our
attorney fees of$309.11 on medical benefits we obtained for Maria in the sum of
$1236.44.
The reason we are waiving our right to these fees of $309.11 is as follows:
1. In negotiating the original LSA amount, I promised Maria that I would continue
my efforts to get the surety to go back and pay medical bills that were clearly
related to her workplace injury and that should have been paid by the surety in the
first place.
2. I also promised Maria that if we succeeded in obtaining from the surety the
additional sum of up to $1236.44, we would not charge an attorney's fee. Again,
although we were clearly entitled to a fee, we did not want Maria to lose out just
because the surety had failed to comply with the law regarding their responsibility
for medical bills.
3. I further promised Maria that since the unpaid work comp bills had been turned
over to collection agencies, that in the event we were to recover the additional
$1236.44 for her, we would ask the collection agencies to accept a compromise
and settlement in a lesser amount than their claims (e.g. at least some of their
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claims were for interest on the bills that the surety had not paid), and that we
would refund to Maria the amount we saved for her.
In the ensuing months, we were able to get the surety to agree to pay Maria the $1236.44
in addition to the LSA amount of$12.206.13 upon which we had originally reached
agreement with the surety. Accordingly, the LSA as drafted and signed shows a total
LSA of $13,442.57.
In accord with the traditions of this firm, it is our desire to honor our understanding with
our client. Therefore, we have retained in our trust account the full sum of$933.28. In the
event that the Commission, after hearing, finds that we are not entitled to attorney fees on
the PPI benefit, it would be our intention to refund this entire amount to Maria, and not to
offset it against the $309.11. We consider the medical bills issue to be separate from the
PPI issue, and we believe we should honor our understanding with Maria.
After the Order was issued, we contacted the collection agencies listed on page 4 of the
LSA. So far, we have heard back from Bonneville Collections, who agreed to accept
$304.00 instead of their original charges and interest of$383.43; and Action Collections,
who agreed to accept $138.60 instead of $231.01. We have sent a check to Maria for the
amount we saved her in the sums of $79.43 and $92.41 respectively. Given Maria's
difficult fmancial circumstances, even this small amount will make a positive difference
for her.
We assume that the Commission will have no objection to our retaining in trust a sum
($933.28) greater than that which was ordered ($624.17). However, if the Commission
would prefer that we file a formal motion for approval in regard to the above, we would
be happy to do so.
Please let me know. Thank you.

Andrew Marsh
Cc:

Commissioner Maynard
.5=. Ommis. sioner L.imbaug~.
c~oinmissioner Baskin tI""
Kent Day, defense counsel
Maria Gomez, claimant
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

)
)
Claimant,
)
)
)
v.
)
NAMP A LODGING Il\TVESTORS, LLC , )
)
Employer,
)
and
)
)
LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE )
CORPORATION,
)
)
Surety,
)
)
Defendants.
)

MARIA GOMEZ,

IC 2005-510285

ORDER DENYING :MOTION
RE: ATTORNEY FEES
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2010

INDUSTRIAL COMMiSSION

On January 4,2010, the Commission issued an Order Approving in Part Stipulation and
Agreement of Lump Sum Discharge ("Order").

In the Order, the Commission declined to

approve attorney fees in the amount of$624.17. On January 12, 2010, Claimant's counsel filed a
motion requesting a statement of reasons why the requested fees were denied by the
Commission. Claimant's counsel contends that IDAP A 17.02.08.033.03(a) requires such a
statement from Commission staff and that the statement has not been provided.
In a letter dated December 24,2009, Commission staff informed Claimant's counsel that

staff lacks sufficient information to conclude that the requested fees are reasonable.
Specifically, Claimant's counsel failed to provide sufficient evidence demonstrating that he acted
primarily or substantially to secure the fund from which the fees were being requested. In order
for the fees to be deemed reasonable, such evidence must be provided.
The December 24, 2009 letter satisfies the requirements of IDAPA 17.02.0S.033.03(a).
Consequently, the motion is DENIED.
ORDER DENYING MOTION RE: ATTORNEY FEES - 1

IT IS SO ORDERE,it
DATED this

ff

day of February, 2010.
INDUSTRlAL COMMISSION

RD. Maynard, Chairlllan
{

Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

.
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I hereby certIfy that on the ~ day of February 2010, a true and correct copy of Order
Denying Motion Re: Attorney Fees was served by regular United States Mail upon each ofthe
following persons:
ANDREW MARSH
942 W MYRTLE ST
BOISE ID 83702
SCOTT HARMON
PO BOX 6358
BOISE ID 83707-6358

eb/cjh

ORDER DENYING MOTION RE: ATTORNEY FEES - 2

ORIGr~~Al
Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. (ISB # 2387)
Andrew C. Marsh (ISB # 6588)
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.
942 W. Myrtle Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 345-1000
Fax: (208) 345-4700
Attorneys for Claimant

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Maria Gomez,
Claimant,
I.C. No. 05-510285
vs.
Nampa Lodging Investors LLC,
Employer,
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CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S
ADMISSIONS FOR
ATTORNEYFEEHEAruNG
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Liberty Northwest,
Surety,
Defendants.

COMES NOW Claimant's Counsel and files these ADMISSIONS for purposes of the
Attorney Fee Hearing (hereinafter "Hearing") now scheduled in this matter for April 12, 2010.
For purposes of these proceedings, Counsel is using the phrase "but-for test" as shorthand
for a standard of proof that means that in order to prove the element of "primarily or
substantially" (IDAP A 17.02.08.033.01.c.ii.), Counsel is required to prove the causal link
between Counsel's representation and the payment of benefits by demonstrating nothing less
than that without his representation, the benefits would not have been paid.
Counsel makes the following admissions:

1. For purposes of these proceedings only, and without waiving the right to raise the
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constitutionality of the applicable IDAPA attorney fee rules on appeal, Seiniger
Law Offices admits that it cannot prove that its attorneys were "primarily or
substantially" responsible for securing the permanent partial impairment
(PPI) benefit and the other benefits paid as consideration for lump sum
settlement (LSS) if the standard of proof is the "but-for test."
2. For purposes of these proceedings only, and without waiving the right to raise the

constitutionality of the applicable IDAPA attorney fee rules on appeal, Seiniger
Law Offices admits that it cannot prove that the Defendants "disputed" the
permanent partial impairment (pPI) benefit and the other benefits paid as
consideration for lump sum settlement (LSS) before the Defendants paid
those benefits.

Dated April 12, 2010.
SEINIGER LAW OFFICES, P.A.

Andrew Marsh
Attorney for Claimant
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